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Abstract 
Mental imagery has been linked to creativity through the reports of many historically 
creative individuals. Following a review and evaluation of the theoretical, anecdotal 
and empirical literature, the material presented in the thesis investigates the role of 
individual differences in mental imagery in performance on psychometric creativity 
tasks. A meta-analytic review of previous research showed a small marginally 
acceptable criterion association between self-reported mental imagery vividness and 
control and divergent thinking performance. However, additional non-statistical 
examination showed that further investigation was required. This led to five studies of 
the variables under consideration and a revised meta-analytic review in the light of 
the findings. The main conclusion was that self-report measures of mental imagery 
have a statistically significant but inconsequential association with divergent thinking 
performance. Consequently a new series of studies was undertaken in which the 
creative visualization task (CVT) was employed using an individual differences 
approach. Having established the parametric properties of a test-format version of the 
CVT two behavioural measures of mental imagery were used to predict performance. 
As neither measure predicted CVT performance high and low vividness and 
Symbolic Equivalence Test groups were used to assess a dissociative model of CVT 
performance. A significant interaction effect showed that vividness plays a mediating 
role in predicting CVT performance. In two final studies the individual differences 
approach was employed in the context of a hypothesised perceptual mediation. The 
results showed firstly that High Imagers performed significantly better than Low 
Imagers in creativity tasks following perceptual isolation and secondly that Low 
Imagers performed significantly better on perceptually sourced creativity tasks than 
on verbally sourced creativity tasks. The combined findings suggest that, while 
established protocols do not support a strong imagery-creativity association, nev,,i 
methods of investigation may reveal the predicted differences in creativity between 
high and low imagery participants. 
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Chapter I 
Mental Imagery and Creativity. Some Introductory Thoughts on the 
Uses of Mental Imagery by Historically Creative Individuals. 
1 
Introduction 
The primary aim of the present chapter is to provide a clearer understanding of the 
relationship between mental imagery and creativity. Its inclusion is necessary in order to 
dispel many of the myths that have surrounded the role of mental imagery in creativity. 
The ideas dealt with include the notion that mental imagery is both a necessary and 
sufficient condition for creativity, and the view that there is a general mental imagery 
heuristic used in the creative process. Despite the fact that arguments in favour of these 
beliefs can easily be shown to be fallacious, through the use counter argument and 
anecdotal reports, they have been adopted by many researchers in the field (e.g. Finke, 
1990; Rothenberg, 1979 Shepard, 197 8ab) and have frequently been used as a raison 
d'etre for investigating mental imagery per se. 
The secondary aim is to provide a basis upon which mental imagery is to be 
understood in the context of creativity. Simply stated, this is that if the role of mental 
imagery in creativity is to be understood, the discussion must start from a realistic basis, 
namely, that the occurrence of a mental image does not automatically lead to creativity 
and that when mental images are implicated in the process, they appear in a variety of 
ways. 
Creativity in the Absence of Mental Imagery 
Mental imagery has been a controversial area in psychology for over 80 years. 
The effect of the Wurtzberg School's imageless thought debate and Watson's (1913) attack 
upon introspective psychology resulted in a neglection of the area for 50 years. When the 
subject did return to mainstream psychology it was quickly embroiled in the debate over 
whether representations could take on an analogical form (Pylyshyn, 1973, 1981). In the 
past decade mental images have again fallen out of favour with psychologists as neural 
networks, normally in the form of perceptual devices, have offered a stronger challenge to 
the symbolic representationalists. Again mental imagery research has been marginalised 
and those who work in the field may feel that its role is generally underestimated in 
psychology. 
While those researchers may be justified in claiming that mental imagery has been 
devalued, they are also guilty of distortion. In their case, however, the problem concerns 
the exaggeration of mental images in psychology. Nowhere is'this more evident than in 
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the study of creativity where there are numerous examples of overstating the usefulness of 
mental imagery. Finke (1990), for example, introduces his book on mental imagery and 
creativity by stating that: 
"Every person has the potential to make creative discoveries in their 
imagery" (Finke, 1990, p.1). 
Others have emphasised the role of specific types of mental imagery in science 
(Shepard, 1978ab), or in the arts (Rothenberg, 1979, 1995; Rothenberg and Sobel, 1980). 
Implicit in these claims is that mental imagery is essential to the creative process and that 
a failure to recognise mental images in cognition will lead to the omission of those 
achievements which are most cherished by our society. Creativity, it would seem, is 
reason enough to study mental imagery. 
While mental images can facilitate problem solving tasks, specifically those 
which require the application of original strategies, they are neither a necessary nor a 
sufficient condition for the resolution of problems. For every historically creative 
individual who has made a claim to the use of mental imagery, it is likely that there are 
many more who have not. After all, if mental imagery is so essential to the creative 
process, then it is remarkable that it has been ignored, or passed over as a footnote, by so 
many writers on the subject area (e.g. Boden, 1990, 1994; Eysenck, 1994, 1995; McGuire, 
1997; Ochse, 1990; Sternberg, 1988). 
Some writers have even suggested that mental images do not facilitate the creative 
process at all. Weisberg (1993), who is sceptical about the involvement of any special 
purpose processes in creativity, in a study of the reports of a broad range of creative 
individuals (e.g. Coleridge, Mozart, Darwin, and Poincare), claims that those factors 
associated with inspiration, especially visions, are embellishments of the creator. The 
claim to have visions gives the impression of a difference between creative individual and 
ordinary individuals. 
Whilst acknowledging that creative individuals are likely to embroider their 
reports of the creative process, it is unlikely that the significance of all of these reports is 
inconsequential. However, it is the case that in certain circumstances mental images can 
prove to be a hindrance to the creative process. Boden (1990), for example, claims that 
mental images - or "analogical representations" - when used in the wrong conceptual frame 
can hinder the problem solving process. In demonstrating this Boden refers to two 
3 
examples. The first is a trick-puzzle that invokes mental imagery but can only be resolved 
with the use of a non-imagery heuristic (see Boden, 1990, p.103). The second example 
concerns the invention of Euclidean geometry proofs, specifically the proof that the base-
angles of an isosceles triangle are equal, by a geometry program (using an algorithmic 
strategy). The program, which was unable to use a visual representation, produced a more 
elegant way of proving the isosceles theorem than Euclid who had access to a visual 
representation. The crux of Boden's argument is that in these examples, and many others, 
there is a temptation to use mental imagery in the problem solving process. However, the 
adoption of such a strategy is unlikely to lead to any creative insight. Thus, mental images, 
although useful in some circumstances, can prove to be an obstacle to creativity. 
Poincare (190811952), a mathematician, was also sceptical about the status 
attributed to mental images in the creative process. Despite his acknowledgement that the 
resolution of a class of Fuschian functions emerged from a hypnagogic reverie, he was 
aware of the frequently deceiving nature of mental images. He suggests that the 
inspirational feelings associated with these states should not be taken too seriously as the 
claims inherent in them are frequently unwarranted. As he states: 
"I have often spoken of the feeling of absolute certitude accompanying 
the inspiration; in the case cited this feeling was no deceiver, nor is it 
usually. But do not think that this is a rule without exception; often this 
feeling deceives without being any the less vivid, and we only find it out 
when we seek to put on foot the demonstration. I have especially noticed 
this fact in regard to ideas coming to me in the morning or evening in 
bed while in a semi-hypnagogic state." (Poincare, 190811952, p.27). 
Thus, although Poincare often made use of the images occurring during these periods, he 
was well aware of the dangers of treating the ideas emerging from these mental images 
with the certainty that they had initially conveyed. 
From these arguments it can be concluded that mental images are neither a 
necessary nor a sufficient condition for creativity. While it is the case that there have been 
many reports of the use of mental imagery in creativity, it must not be forgotten that in 
some cases there is no use for mental imagery. It is tempting to count only the positive 
instances but this will not lead to a better understanding of the role of mental imagery in 
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creativity. The implications of this for empirical research are considerable as there is 
unlikely to be a simple causal relationship between the two variables. 
The Case Against a General Mental Imagery Heuristic 
Mental imagery may not be a necessity for creativity, and in some cases it may be 
an impediment, but there are many reports of the use of mental imagery in original 
thinking. These accounts have been provided by a diverse range of individuals from both 
the sciences and the arts. This has led many to propose a specific role for mental imagery 
in creativity, a mental imagery heuristic. Two of the most well known imagery strategies 
advocated for the enhancement of original thinking are proposed by Finke (1989, 1990, 
1996; Finke & Slayton, 1988) and Shepard (Shepard, 1978ab). Finke, proposes a creative 
visual synthesis hypothesis for the role of mental imagery in creativity. Here mental 
imagery is used as a tool in developing novel combinations of stimuli. Shepard (1984), 
claims that creativity occurs through the voluntary manipulation of mental images; 
analogous to his mental rotation paradigm (e.g. Shepard & Metzler, 1971). Similarly, 
Rothenberg (1979, 1995; Rothenberg and Sobel, 1980) claims that homo spatial and 
Janusian thinking are central to the development of creative ideas. Others have 
emphasised vividness (Shaw & De Mers, 1986), control (A.Richardson, 1969; Campos & 
Perez, 1989), and cognitive style (Forisha, 1983) as crucial to the deployment of cognitive 
strategies. Alternatively, there are some who believe that it is the emergence of an 
unconscious flow of thought (primary process thinking) that enables mental imagery to be 
used as a successful tool for creativity (Suler, 1980). 
In all of these notions of the relationship between mental imagery and creativity 
there is the underlying belief that the source of creativity resides in the use of a specific 
aspect of mental imagery. However, the testimonies given by historically creative 
individuals do not imply a single strategy for mental imagery in creativity. Rather (like 
the ideas put forward collectively by the mental imagery researchers), they demonstrate 
that there are a multitude of factors inherent in both mental imagery and the domain in 
which the process occurs. 
The reasons why mental imagery should not be treated as a general heuristic in 
the creative process are numerous. Anecdotal reports of the use of mental imagery in the 
creative process differ in many respects. The most prominent factors are: the vividness of 
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the mental image; the amount of control exerted over the mental image; the context in 
which the mental image occurs; and the content of the mental image. All of these factors 
effect the adoption of a heuristic in the creative process. 
There are also obvious differences in the creative process which suggest that a 
single strategy would not satisfy the range of circumstances in which creativity has taken 
place. At a macroscopic level Gruber (Gruber,1989; Gruber and Davies, 1988) may be 
correct in his assertion that there are common constituents in the process of creativity. 
However, there are also differences, some of which can be quite dramatic. For example 
an obvious difference can be found in the availability of information to the sciences and 
the arts. 
Science, for example, involves the imposition of constraints not normally 
associated with the arts. The arts may be bound by a specific paradigm or they may break 
from that paradigm and create a new standard. Here there is no difference between the 
scientist and artist. However, in both the problem domain and the problem solution there 
may be divergence. For example, the scientist is more bound by the history of the subject 
than the artist. That is, they are subjected to a theory replacement (Kuhn, 1970) or at least 
to a reduction-replacement continuum (Churchland, 1989). While it is perfectly 
reasonable for an artist to take features from several schools and develop them into new 
art forms (e.g. Dali's use of renaissance perspective, Klimt's use of pre-renaissance art), a 
scientist is invariably compelled to discard everything that has been superseded by a later 
paradigm (Foss, 1995). Einstein, for example, could not insert Aristotelian notions of 
physics into his theory of relativity because the Newtonian model of physics had become 
untenable; or unfashionable in artistic terms. Thus, in terms of the applications of a 
strategy the artist has a wider selection of methods s/he can adopt. 
Most importantly, people differ in their mental imagery abilities (Marks, 1973; 
Harshman and Paivio, 1987; Paivio, 1978a) and in the way they use mental imagery 
(Forisha, 1983; Paivio, 1971; A.Richardson, 1969, 1977). This difference has been found 
amongst groups in the general population. Harshman and Paivio (1987), for example. 
found sex differences in the way that mental images are constructed; episodic memory 
images for females and generic images for males. Isaac and Marks (1994) found evidence 
of developmental differences for males and females and also evidence of specialisation in 
different occupational groups. There are also an immense number of ways in which a 
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mental image can be defined and therefore a variety of options are available to the 
individual (see Chapter Three). 
Altogether, these arguments demonstrate that it is unlikely that a general mental 
imagery heuristic is used to facilitate the creative process. The strongest evidence against 
a general heuristic, however, can be derived from the reports of historically creative 
people who asserted the use of mental imagery. The most remarkable feature of these 
reports is that they differ in both the types of mental imagery used and in the way in 
which the mental images are treated. For the purposes of creating The Ancient Mariner or 
Kubla Khan Coleridge's ingestion of opium proved to be a worthwhile way of 
enhancing the imaginal processes (Coleridge, 1816/1952). This, though, would hardly 
have suited Helmholtz's purposes (Ochse, 1990). He preferred to take solitary walks and 
allow his mind to wander around a problem. Freud viewed mental images in a completely 
different way to those before him (Fancher, 1979); this in itself could be said to constitute 
a creative insight. Freud believed that images held the key to the unconscious 
components of mind and set about recording and translating them. Einstein, was even 
more deliberate in his use of mental images. He produced them at will and used them to 
perform thought experiments (Miller, 1989, 1992; Shepard, 1978a). Kekule had no 
conscious control over his mental images at all. He relied upon the ideas startling him into 
an alert state (Boden, 1990; Partington, 1964). Dali and Edison could not even rely on 
being woken by their mental images, and had to devise plans do so (Mavromatis, 1987); 
Dali, rested his chin on a spoon and Edison held steel balls in his hands which would fall 
noisily onto a tray as he drifted from the hypnagogic to the sleep state. 
In summary, an understanding of the relationship between mental imagery and 
creativity will require a great deal more than advocating a specific strategy. Those who 
adhere to the, "use mental imagery" philosophy fail to acknowledge the great variety of 
circumstances in which creativity occurs and the many ways in which mental imagery is 
augmented. 
Two Cases of the use of Mental Imagery in Creativity 
So far it has been argued that mental imagery is neither a sufficient nor a 
necessary condition for creativity. It has also been suggested that mental images can 
sometimes prove to be an obstacle to creativity and that there are no reasonable grounds 
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for assuming that there is a general mental imagery heuristic used in the creative process. 
The aim of the following accounts is to reinforce the latter point by contrasting the use of 
mental imagery in two scientists, i.e. Kekule and Einstein. 
There are several reasons why the reports from Einstein and Kekule have been 
selected. The first is that they are frequently cited together as a kind of heuristic brethren 
(e.g. Kuzendorf; 1982; Shepard, 1978a) with little regard for the differences apparent in 
the use of mental imagery. The second reason is that the examples of creativity by Kekule 
and Einstein are two of the most important achievements in science. Thirdly, they have 
been selected because, while there are many similarities in the conceptual structure of the 
problems, there are obvious contrasts in the use of mental imagery. Finally, they have 
been chosen because they represent the two most prevalent ways of using mental imagery 
in creative problem solving, namely, in a hypnagogic or a thought form. 
KekuIe's Discovery of the Benzene Ring 
The problem faced by Kekule in developing a model of the compound benzene 
was that the known atomic constituents of benzene, six carbon atoms and six hydrogen 
atoms (C6H6), violated the then known principles of structure and valence in carbon 
compounds. To fully recognise the magnitude of Kekule's resolution to the problem it is 
necessary to explain the position of chemistry when Kekule was working. Initially, 
however, a brief review of his use of mental imagery will be undertaken. 
Kekule's Use of Mental Imagery 
Kekule was working in chemistry at a transitional stage in its development. 
Through laboratory work it had become possible to identify the various elements that 
make up a compound structure. However, the principles that governed the development of 
structure were not clearly understood. The main reason for this was that the key 
components in the valency process, electrons, were not identified until the end of the 
century. In this respect the position of chemistry in the second half of the nineteenth 
century was limited in its use of the purely inductive method (see the section on Einstein's 
use of mental imagery for further details on the then accepted modes of operation). In 
summary progress was dependent upon the then unorthodox hypothetico-deductive 
method of discovery. 
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If Kekule had persisted with a purely inductive methodology for the derivation of 
chemical structure then he would not have been able to resolve the benzene structure 
problem. This is evident in both of his major discoveries, i.e. the valency of carbon 
compounds and the discovery of benzene ring structure. The means by which he formed 
hypotheses concerning both of these findings was through the use of mental imagery. In 
each case Kekule is alleged to have had an unfolding reverie in which the solution 
appeared to him. In the first case, the discovery of the valency of carbon, the image 
offered a direct solution to the problem. In the second case, the discovery of the benzene 
structure, the image required a translation to its chemical form. 
Kekule's use of mental imagery can be summarised as a tool through which 
hypotheses were formed. The images formed occurred during circumstances that were not 
directly related to finding the solution to the problem. They were passively received by 
Kekule in an almost prophetic style. In other words the only conscious role played by 
Kekule was in recognising them as the solution to the problem he had been searching for. 
The Problem Domain: The Contradiction Between the Structure and Valence of the 
Carbon Compound Benzene 
The knowledge of both the structure and the valency (the potential of an element 
to bond with other elements) of compounds in 1865 was limited. It wasn't until the 
beginning of the twentieth century, following the discovery of the electron by Thomson in 
1897, that the structure of atoms was sufficiently understood to enable a proper evaluation 
of the role of valency in compound formation. However, chemists were able to identify 
elements in compounds and from this deduce a linkage theory. 
By the mid 1850s a reasonable body of knowledge concerning valency had been 
accrued. Using hydrogen as a measurement of valency potential it had been possible to 
deduce the valences of many elements. In 1854 Kekule proposed that combinations of 
elements occurred as a consequence of the valency potentials of the atoms in the 
compounds, as opposed to chance interaction. For example, the constituents of water, two 
hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom (H20), develop because hydrogen (valency = I) has 
a valency half that of oxygen (valency = 2). Thus, a compound of three hydrogen atoms to 
one oxygen atom (H30) could not occur unless oxygen had a valency three times greater 
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than the valency of hydrogen. Kekule referred to this relationship within compounds as 
"affinity" . 
Kekule's main concern was in understanding the structure of carbon compounds. 
It had been acknowledged by this time that carbon must have special properties that make 
it so prevalent in organic compounds. In 1857 Kekule established the first property of 
carbon, namely, that it had an invariant valency of four units. Thus, in a simple carbon 
compound containing a single carbon atom, four hydrogen atoms, or two oxygen atoms, 
would be required for an affinity to be reached. However, in more complex compounds 
carbon did not appear to follow the four valency unit rule. 
In 1858, Kekule published his structure theory of chemical compounds. The 
structure theory proposed that constituents of a compound were arranged in a specific 
relation to each other. The larger atoms (Kekule symbolised atomic size according to 
valency potential, e.g. see Figure 1.1) attached themselves to the smaller atoms in 
arrangements of affinities. A further feature of the structure theory pertained specifically 
to carbon atoms. Kekule claimed that a second special property of carbon was its ability to 
form a union between itself and other carbon atoms and that this bond remains even when 
other elements are replaced in the compound; the discovery of carbon bonding was found 
independently in the same year by Couper. This explained both the reduction in valency in 
complex carbon compounds and the proliferation of carbon in organic compounds, which 
were often formed of large molecular arrangements. 
The dual concepts of chain structure and carbon to carbon bonding were derived 
from a mental image. Although the ideas were not expounded until 1858, Kekule claimed 
that the original notions appeared to him in 1854 whilst daydreaming on a London 
omnibus. This account was given several years later: 
"I fell into a reverie. The atoms were gambolling before my eyes. I had 
always seen them in motion, those small beings, but I had never 
succeeded in discerning the nature of their motion. Now, however, I saw 
how, frequently, two smaller atoms united to form a pair; how a larger 
one embraced the smaller ones; how a still larger one kept hold of three 
or even four of the smaller; whilst the whole kept whirling in a giddy 
dance. I saw how the larger ones formed a chain and the small ones hung 
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on only at the end of the chain." (Kekule, cited in Partington, 1964, 
p.537). 
Clearly, the theory of structure and carbon linking in chains was given to Kekule 
complete in his reverie. This linkage also explains the valency values required by the sum 
of the elements. The addition of carbon atoms results in an alteration of valency for the 
compound. For example, in a compound containing two carbon atoms six valency units 
would be required to reach an affinity because the carbon atoms share a valency unit (i.e. 
C2 = 6). With three carbon atoms a minimum of eight valency units would be required to 
reach an affinity (i.e. C3 = 8). With four carbon atoms a valency of ten would be required 
(C4 = 10). 
In summary organic chemistry, that is, the study of carbon compounds, was 
governed by two principles underlying the structure of all organic compounds. The first 
was that carbon atoms catenate thereby producing string compounds. The second 
principle was that atoms have valency units and that these valency units determine the 
combination of organic compounds. These principle had worked efficiently for Kekule 
and others in defining the structure of several organic compounds. For example, the 
number of non-carbon atoms in ethyl alcohol was sufficient to fulfil the chain/valency 
principle proposed by previous research. 
Figure 1.1 The Structure of Ethyl Alcohol 
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Kekule's structure theory was successfully applied to alcohol compounds. for example, the 
structure of ethyl alcohol confirmed the prevailing notion that carbon atoms were 
quadrivalent and formed string combinations with other chemicals. However, the 
contradiction between valency and structure emerged when the same applications were 
attempted with carbocylclic compounds. 
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When Kekule attempted to describe the structure of the compound benzene he was 
confronted with a contradiction. The atomic constituents of benzene did not conform to 
the principles of structure and valency. In other words benzene consisted of six carbon 
atoms and six hydrogen atoms, yet the minimum number of hydrogen atoms required to 
reach an affinity should be fourteen (i.e. C6 = 14). This problem was also encountered 
with other compounds, which, having a distinct odour were collectively referred to as the 
'aromatic compounds'. Kekule's early attempt to resolve the contradictions inherent in the 
structure of the aromatic compounds was to suggest that the density of carbon atoms was 
relative to the compounds they were in (1858, cited in Partington, 1964). This meant that 
in simple compounds, e.g. alcohol, carbon was quadrivalent, but in larger compounds the 
valency was altered. However, this view contradicted the assumption that carbon had an 
invariant valency potential, a notion that Kekule was clearly attached to. 
The resolution of the benzene compound problem was achieved by Kekule in 
1865. There are two features of the benzene ring that distinguish it from the previous 
beliefs held about compound formation. The first is in the structure, instead of having 
chains of atoms Kekule proposed a ring structure in which the six carbon atoms linked to 
each other. The origin of this idea came from a complex set of kinematic hypnagogic 
images which came to Kekule after unsuccessfully deciphering the problem. As Kekule 
states: 
"I turned my chair to the fire and dozed. Again the atoms were 
gambolling before my eyes. This time the smaller groups kept modestly 
in the background. My mental eye, rendered more acute by repeated 
visions of this kind, could now distinguish larger structures, of manifold 
conformation; long rows, sometimes more closely fitted together; all 
twining and twisting in snakelike motion. But look! What was that? One 
of the snakes had seized hold of its own tail, and the form whirled 
mockingly before my eyes. As if by a flash of lightning I awoke." 
(Kekule, cited in Boden, 1990, p.16). 
The dream differs from the previous image Kekule had in that it includes both 
representational and symbolic imaginal forms. It commences as before with a random 
selection of atoms moving around in space, then, however, the larger atoms (carbon it is 
recalled was perceived to be a large atom, see Figure 1.2) take the foreground. This time, 
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however, they are not only forming chains but are moving in a flexible state of unison. 
From here the atoms turn into snakes, a symbolic state, and when one of the snakes bites 
its tail Kekule is awoken only to tum them back to a representational state and partially 
resolve the benzene problem. 
Figure 1.2 The Discovery of the Benzene Structure 
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Kekule resolved the contradiction of valency and structure by modifying both principles. In 
modifying the structure principle he introduced the notion of stable ring forms in carbon chemistry. 
The valency of carbon remained atfour units but the idea of a double valency was introduced. 
From this image Kekule developed a hexagon structure for benzene compounds 
whereby the six carbon atoms formed a ring (a common nucleus) and the remaining six 
hydrogen atoms linked to each carbon atom on the periphery of the compound (see Figure 
1.2.). This, though, did not fully explain the structure/valency problem inherent in the 
benzene compound. Even with all of the carbon atoms linked together and the hydrogen 
atoms on the outside there remained an excess valency of 6 (i .e. C6 = 12) . 
Kekule's second invention was the concept of bivalency. He deduced that if the 
carbon atoms formed a ring structure and the hydrogen atoms bonded to the periphery of 
the structure then the excess valency (six units) must be consumed within the common 
nucleus of the compound. The only way to resolve this was to suggest that some of the 
carbon atoms had a bivalency, that is , they bind with two rather than one affinity unit · 
known now as a resonance structure . If this were the case than Kekule realised that there 
would only need to be three bivalent atoms. The problem was which of the carbon atoms 
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should be bivalent? Which should not be bivalent? And according to what criteria should 
bivalency be designated? The answer to the problem was to delocalise the bivalency from 
the element and place it within the common nucleus of the compound. Benzene, it was 
concluded, has a two-phase structure where each phase satisfies the affinity level (i.e. C6 = 
6) for the six carbon atoms. In phase one, the bivalent links are between carbon atoms 1-2, 
3-4, and 5-6, the remaining links are univalent. In the second phase the bivalent links are 
between carbon atoms 2-3,4-5, and 6-1. This perpetual motion of bivalency (see Figure 
1.2) produces the necessary valency potential during anyone period in the existence of the 
compound. 
Einstein's Special Theory of Relativity 
The problem faced by Einstein has many conceptual features that are similar to 
those encountered by Kekul6 in his resolution of the structure and valence of benzene. 
Like Kekul6, the problem arose from a contradiction between two principles. The first 
principle, derived from classical mechanics, was that the laws of motion were the same 
for all bodies when moving at a constant velocity; the principle of relativity. The second 
principle, derived from Maxwell's laws of optics, states that the propagation of light, in an 
inert system, remains constant at a velocity of 300,00 kilometres per second (c). The 
problem posed for Einstein was that whilst both principles appeared to work adequately 
they contradicted each other to the extent that the first was a statement of the relativity of 
velocity and the second of the constancy of the velocity of light. 
The majority of physicists working at this time preferred to ignore this problem 
(Penrose, 1989). After all, Newtonian physics successfully predicted the motion of 
everything except light. However, several experiments (Michelson, 1882; Michelson & 
Morley, 1887; cited in Lorentz 1895/1923) reinforced the validity of the Maxwell 
equation. Einstein resolved the problem by turning in part to Gedanken experiments 
(thought experiments) whereby laws are applied to the variable under investigation and 
the outcome is monitored by the imager (Epstein, 1965; Miller, 1989, 1992; and Shepard, 
1978a). To understand the importance of this use of mental imagery in the development of 
the special theory of relativity it is necessary to review the role of experimentation in 
physics and the problem faced by Einstein. 
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Einstein's Use of Mental Imagery 
The experimental method was developed in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries as a refutation of common sense science. The writings of Bacon, Hobbes, and 
Locke set forth a new agenda for investigating the natural form and order of matter. 
According to this view it was necessary to cast aside the 'idols' and 'false images' which 
prejudice the true understanding of nature and to advance a new practice of induction 
(Hesse, 1964). The method was based upon the combination of a mechanistic perception 
of nature and the systematic investigation of both the positive and negative instances of 
the occurrence of the phenomena under study. 
This new method was exemplified in the work of the great physicists of the 
period, i.e. Galileo and Newton, who developed, through mathematics and 
experimentation, classical mechanics. The superiority of experimentation over common 
sense appears constantly in the work of these men. Galileo, for example, uses Simplico 
(an Aristotelian) to show that the mistakes made by Aristotle reside in his failure to adopt 
an inductive principle for investigation. While there is no proof that Galileo conducted the 
free fall experiments from the tower of Pisa there are many example of the use 
experiments to confirm hypotheses in his publications and even to develop hypotheses in 
unpublished manuscripts (Cohen, 1987). Newton was also bound by the experimental 
philosophy of the day. He was so committed to the inductive method that when he 
proposed his theory of universal gravitational attraction he was compelled to deny it the 
status ofa scientific theory (Newton, 1687/1981). 
By the eighteenth century the empirical methods employed by physicists had 
become the dominant procedure in the natural sciences. The correct prediction of the 
arrival of Halley's comet in 1758 by Newton in 1667 produced the ultimate verification of 
the scientific method espoused by Bacon. In the late nineteenth century, however, a 
culmination of experiments disrupted the mechanistic world view. Faraday and Maxwell 
demonstrated the existence of electromagnetic phenomena which did not conform to the 
Newtonian model. Maxwell's propagation of light equations and the experiments of 
Michelson and Morley contradicted the Galilean principle of relativity. 
The fundamental problem was that whilst the technology available was capable of 
disproving the classical position it was inadequate at the investigative stage. As a 
consequence physics engaged in a process of reformulating the old system in accordance 
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with the contradictions found in the new experiments. A similar situation had occurred 
with the transition from the geocentric to heliocentric systems only this time there was no 
telescope to act as a catalyst for a new system. 
While the empirical method was the dominant paradigm of investigation in 
physics an alternative mode of thinking was also popular in Germany, gewohnliche 
Anschauung, which was the antithesis of the method proposed by the Empiricists. 
Anschauung involved the use of visual mental imagery to represent abstract phenomena 
in physical space. As Miller (1989) states: 
"Anschauung is the visual mode of representation that is based on 
abstractions from phenomena actually witnessed in the world of sense 
perceptions. For example, the visual image of magnetic lines of force 
was raised to an Anschauung by most electrical engineers in the German 
cultural environment. They assumed that magnetic lines of force are an 
integral part of electromagnetic theory, rather than just an aid to 
visualisation as was believed by the vast majority of American and 
British engineers." (Miller, 1989, p. 172). 
Thus, Einstein was brought up in an environment where the use of mental imagery was 
encouraged not just as a way of visualising but as an essential aspect of the physical 
system under investigation. 
Einstein went further than visualising the known phenomena of the period. He 
also used the Anschauung to construct and test hypotheses. Einstein referred to these 
thought experiments as Gedanken experiments. This use of mental imagery is 
summarised by Epstein: 
"Gedanken experiment is Einstein's German expression for a thought 
experiment. It is an experiment you carry out in your head. You can do it 
because you also have in mind all the laws governing the events you 
visualize." (Epstein, 1965, p. 33). 
The emphasis upon visual thinking by Einstein has been well documented by Hadamard 
(1945), Shepard (1978a), Miller (1986, 1989, 1992), and many others. A brief review of 
his work reveals numerous uses of Gedanken experiments (Einstein, 1920) to describe his 
theories. Below are several examples: 
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Example I: Illustrating the system of co-ordinates developed by Descartes: 
"If, for instance a cloud is hovering over Trafalgar Square, then we can 
determine its position relative to the surface of the earth by erecting a 
pole perpendicularly on the Square so that it reaches the cloud. The 
length of the pole measured with the standard measuring-rod. combined 
with the specification of the position of the foot of the pole, supplies us 
with a complete place specification." (Einstein, 1920, p. 6). 
Example II: On the notions of space and time in classical mechanics: 
"I stand at the window of a railway carriage which is travelling 
uniformly, and drop a stone on the embankment, without throwing it. 
Then, disregarding the influence of air resistance, I see the stone descend 
in a straight line. A pedestrian who observes the misdeed from the 
footpath notices that the stone falls to earth in a parabolic curve." 
(Einstein, 1920, p. 9). 
Example III: On the contradiction between the speed of light and the principle of 
relativity: 
" .. .let us again choose our embankment. We shall imagine the air above 
it to have been removed. If a ray of light be sent along the embankment, 
we see from the above that the tip of the ray will be transmitted with the 
velocity c relative to the embankment. Now let us suppose that our 
railway carriage is again travelling along the railway lines with the 
velocity v, and that its direction is the same as that of the ray of light, but 
its velocity of course is much less. Let us inquire about the velocity of 
propagation of the ray of light relative to the carriage." (Einstein, 1920, 
p.18). 
In summary Einstein's use of mental imagery went against the method of 
induction advocated by the Empiricists and used by the classical physicists in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The predominant context in which the images were 
used was in the development of Gedanken experiments. These were actively produced by 
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Einstein. It can also be surmised that Einstein had much control over his Images, 
especially as they contained many constraints imposed by the imager. 
The Problem Domain: The Contradiction Between the Principle of Relativity and the 
Propagation of Light in vacuo 
The special theory of relativity is concerned with the laws of moving bodies 
(Einstein, 190511923). It is called the "special theory" because it refers to only one aspect 
of motion. This is the uniform motion of bodies in inertial reference frames, that is, 
objects that are either moving at a constant velocity or are resting. It wasn't until a decade 
later, when Einstein completed his general theory of relativity, that a General design for 
all bodies in motion was developed. 
Prior to the publication of the special theory of relativity in 1905 the prevailing 
theory of the uniform velocity of bodies was that proposed by Newton, the principle of 
relativity. The principle of relativity, also known as Galilean relativity, is simply that all 
uniform motion is relative to the position of the observer. Several features emerge from 
the principle of relativity, the most fundamental of which is that we are unaware of the 
motion of the earth despite the fact that it orbits around the sun at 100,000 kph. The proof 
of this unperceived motion is given through Galileo's ship at sea experiment in which it is 
demonstrated that the position of the observer is crucial to determining the nature of 
movement. A contemporary equivalent of this experiment is given by Epstein: 
"Suppose you are flying along smoothly and standing inside an aircraft 
cabin ... and you drop a coin directly above your toe. Sure enough it hits 
your toe ... the central idea is that if you are closed inside a box that is 
moving smoothly ... you cannot tell if you are in motion." (Epstein, 1965, 
p.2). 
If the principle of relativity is extended to the measurement of velocities then further 
features arise. The most important of these is that the speed of any body in motion can 
only be measured relative to an observer or a reference point in the locality of the 
observer. Suppose you are travelling at a constant velocity (300kph) but you are not aware 
of this because you have no means of discerning your movement; a quiet aircraft 
travelling at night could give this impression. What you do have is a device for measuring 
the speed of other objects. In the first situation an object approaches you from the 
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opposite direction at 400kph and you measure its speed. You find, however, that it is 
travelling at 700kph because your only means of measuring its speed is relative to 
yourself (V'= 400kph + 300kph). In the second situation an object travelling in the same 
direction as you passes you at a constant velocity of 400kph. Again you measure its speed 
but this time you conclude that it is travelling at 100kph (V' = 400kph - 300kph). 
Although the objects were travelling at the same speed you can never discern this because 
you can only measure their velocities relative to your own direction and velocity. This is 
the principle of relativity and, until the late nineteenth century, it proved to be a very 
useful means of measuring the motion of all bodies. 
There is one further aspect of the system which has not been discussed. This is the 
concept of a medium through which bodies travel, namely, ether. The notion of ether was 
initially proposed by Newton. It was necessary in order to explain the mechanistic laws 
underlying nature. It explained how light travelled from the sun to the earth, why the earth 
orbited around the sun, and why the moon orbited around the earth. Ether was crucial to 
Newton's General Design. If it could be detected then it would provide the only absolute 
measure of uniform velocity, which paradoxically would also have the effect of both 
destroying and explaining the principle of relativity. 
As it was believed that light travelled in ether most physicists assumed that its 
velocity was finite. In accordance with the Newtonian world view it was also postulated 
that light was made up of particles and that these particles obeyed the same laws of 
motion as other particles (i.e. the principle of relativity). However, the study of optics 
proved to be a Pandora's box for classical mechanics. Every time optics was investigated 
it challenged the previously held assumptions. The particle theory of light was first 
challenged by Grimaldi's discovery in the sixteenth century that light produced flow 
effects; suggesting that it had a wave formation. Although a wave theory of light 
presented problems for classical mechanics it was quickly incorporated into the General 
Design. After all, if sound propagates in wave formations through the compression of air, 
its medium, there is no reason why light shouldn't behave the same way in ether. 
During the nineteenth century an extensive understanding of the laws of optics 
was developed by Ampere, Faraday, Hertz, and Maxwell. It was found that light behaved 
in a similar way to electromagnetic bodies and that these forces act according to fields of 
force. Faraday showed that force fields were real physical things. Maxwell developed a 
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series of equations that explained the propagation of light with the implication that the 
speed of light was constant in space. Nevertheless, the mechanistic view was upheld. 
However, by this time it had become a far more complex system than Newton had 
initially envisaged. 
The real dilemma for physics came about as a consequence of the development of 
experimental techniques in the late nineteenth century. Technology had progressed to the 
extent that it was possible to measure the effects of ether. Ether, it is recalled, is an all 
pervasive stationary substance through which all matter moves. If a body was moving at a 
sufficient force (the earth) it seemed reasonable to assume that this would have a 
displacement effect upon the ether and that this displacement would influence the motion 
of particles (light) travelling through it. However, when experiments were conducted that 
would detect the effects of ether-drift upon the motion of light (notably those by 
Michelson in 1881 and Michelson & Morley in 1887) it was found that its speed remained 
constant 
The findings of these experime:::lts puzzled the scientific community. The most 
common explanations for the results were either to criticise the experimenters or to 
explain the findings in terms of a contraction hypothesis (Lorentz, 1895/1923). The 
contraction hypothesis, independently proposed by Fitzgerald and Lorentz (Lorentz, 
1895/1923), postulates that, just as matter flattens upon impact, it also contracts with the 
force of ether movement. Except for Einstein, few considered the possibility that ether did 
not exist as this would have thrown the Newtonian system into disarray. 
This is the problem domain up to the point of Einstein's special theory of 
relativity. The obvious strategy to take in the face of this dilemma was to reject one of the 
principles underlying the problem. That is, either the principle of relativity is wrong or the 
velocity of the propagation of light in vacuo is wrong. Einstein chose to do neither. His 
reasoning was derived from a faith in both principles and the application of Gedanken 
experiments to reason through the consequences. 
Einstein did not wish to dispose of classical mechanics as it provided a very 
powerful means of making predictions. These had proved to be accurate in respect of all 
matter except electromagnetic phenomena. As he states: 
"Even though classical mechanics does not supply us with a sufficiently 
broad basis for the theoretical presentation of all physical phenomena, 
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still we grant it a considerable measure of "truth," since it supplies us 
with the actual motions of the heavenly bodies with a delicacy of detail 
little short of wonderful. The principle of relativity must therefore apply 
with great accuracy in the domain of mechanics. 1/ (Einstein, 1920, p.14). 
Neither did he wish to countenance the laws of optics derived from Maxwell's 
equations for it was clear to him that they were correct. This is demonstrated in a 
Gedanken experiment he first conceived of in 1895 in which he imagined the 
consequences of catching up with a light wave (Miller, 1989). It was obvious to him that 
if an observer did catch up with a light wave it would, according to the principle of 
relativity, appear static. Yet light can never appear static because it is derived from an 
electromagnetic source which is self-sustaining. Therefore, the constancy of light in vacuo 
must be maintained. 
If light has a constant speed and the principle of relativity concerning velocity is 
correct then the only other factor that determines the velocity of an object, that is time, 
must be relative. This is a radical departure from the Newtonian concept of the 
absoluteness of time, however, Einstein had found the basis for the preservation of both 
principles. As he states: 
"As a result of an analysis of the physical conceptions of time and space, 
it became evident that in reality there is not the least incompatibility 
between the principle of relativity and the law of the propagation of 
light, and that by systematically holding fast to both of these laws a 
logically rigid theory could be arrived at." (Einstein, 1920, p. 19-20). 
Here we have the development of a fourth-dimension in the principle of relativity. While 
the first three dimensions provide an accurate, though wrong, measurement of the velocity 
of most forms of matter when they are applied to objects approaching the speed of light a 
fourth factor must be considered, namely time. Finally, there was no longer any reason or 
logic in supposing the existence of ether as light in vacuo formed the bedrock of the new 
theory. 
In summary, Einstein succeeded in resolving the apparent contradiction between 
two principles, the principle of relativity and the constancy of the speed of light relative in 
vacuo, by applying thought experiments. His dependence upon these thought experiments 
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was crucial. This is evident in both, the revolutionary nature of v,,"hat he was proposing. 
and the limitations in developing a new system from purely inductive methods. 
Similar Problems, Different Mental Imagery Heuristics 
These case studies provide two insights into the nature of the relationship between 
mental imagery and creativity. The first is that any attempt to impose a general heuristic 
will fail to cover the full scope of the relationship between mental imagery and creativity. 
The second is that despite the similarities in the problem domains for Kekule and Einstein. 
the actual application of mental imagery is contrastive. This suggests that the use of 
mental imagery is dependent upon the individual and the problem structure. 
In reviewing the uses of mental imagery by Kekule and Einstein the differences 
between them are striking. Kekule's use of mental imagery can be summarised as passive 
and prophetic, in contrast Einstein's mental imagery is active and deductive. Yet there are 
noticeable similarities in both, the areas they were working in, and the conceptual 
structure of the problems and solutions they arrived at. Both Kekule and Einstein were 
working in a similar time period when the old order was being challenged by new 
discoveries. The inductive method was predominant and the areas were changing so 
rapidly that constructive information was limited. There is also a great amount of 
similarity in the problems presented to them. In both cases there was a contradiction 
between two established principles. For KekuIe this was the contradiction between the 
known valence and structure of carbon atoms. For Einstein it was the contradiction 
between the speed of light and the principle of relativity. 
The resolutions reached by Kekule and Einstein were also alike. The two of them 
succeeded in preserving the foundations of the principles that contradicted each other. 
Furthermore, both solutions were derived from a hypothetico-deductive method, that is, 
they were formed prior to testing. Finally, they also made predictions that went a long 
way beyond the known reasoning of the time; both of which were found to be correct 
when the technology was available. 
Given all of these consistencies it is surprising that the use of mental imagery \vas 
so different. Clearly, any study into the relationship between mental imagery and 
creativity is going to require a systematic investigation into the full spectrum of context. 
content, control, and vividness of mental imagery. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has attempted to demonstrate the complexity of the relationship 
between mental imagery and creativity. Having investigated the use of mental imagery by 
historically creative individuals it is clear that no single imagery heuristic will explain the 
link between the two processes. To date there is a clear disparity between the reports of 
these individuals and the empirical research carried out by mental imagery researchers. 
Whilst creativity remains a raison d'efre for the study of mental imagery, until a full and 
systematic review is carried out it will also remain a mystery. 
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Chapter II 
What is a Mental Image? On the Apparent Contradiction Between 
Creative Enhancement and Perceptual Equivalence 
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Introduction 
The previous chapter suggested that mental imagery has been frequently reported 
by historically creative individuals. It also argued that because there were many ways in 
which mental imagery could be used in the creative process, a single imagery heuristic 
could not account for the role of mental imagery in creativity. Having established that 
mental images are frequently reported in the historical process, the aim of the present 
chapter is to address an apparent contradiction between these reports and contemporary 
conceptions of mental imagery. If mental images can lead to creative enhancement then a 
definition of mental imagery must go beyond the various perceptual equivalence 
hypotheses stated by cognitive researchers. Because of this apparent contradiction it is 
necessary to develop a new definition of mental imagery that allows for the use of mental 
images in the genesis of creative ideas and properly distinguishes percepts from mental 
images. The consequences of redefining mental imagery, however, are severe, with some 
phenomena traditionally defined as forms of mental imagery being removed from the 
category. 
In the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s mental imagery research burgeoned. 
The driving force behind this development was the debate over the representational status 
of mental images. Inevitably, the inventive experimental protocols that emerged focused 
almost exclusively upon what is commonly referred to as 'the perceptual equivalence 
hypothesis' (Finke, 1989). The zooming, scanning, and rotating studies were all designed 
to demonstrate that mental images are 'percept-like' and that they shared the same 
mechanism as perception. 
Since this extremely productive period of cognitive psychology, the focus of 
research into mental imagery has moved more toward the neuropsychological structure of 
mental imagery; the same motivation, however, remains. In the periphery of this research, 
however, many of the leading researchers of cognitive psychology have turned their 
attention to some of the extraordinary aspects of mental imagery. Some of the authors of 
seminal papers into the perceptual equivalence of mental imagery went on to herald the 
unique status of mental imagery in creative processes. Shepard (1978a) claimed his 
motivations for studying mental imagery were based upon its use in creativity. Paivio 
(1983) reviewed the role of mental images in the development of history-making 
creativity and Finke (Finke, 1990; Finke and Slayton, 1988) outlined and developed a 
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research profile that involved the use of mental imagery in the development of creatiYe 
ideas. 
It is evident from the reports of these researchers and others (e.g. Daniels-
McGhee and Davies, 1994; Ghiselin, 1952; and Miller, 1992) that there is at least strong 
anecdotal support for the role of mental imagery in creativity. What is not clear, however, 
is how these reports can be placed within the almost uniform definitions of mental 
imagery put forward under the auspices of the perceptual equivalence hypothesis. 
Broadly defined the perceptual equivalence hypothesis states that mental images 
are equivalent to percepts in a variety of ways (see Finke, 1980, 1985, 1989). They may, 
for example share the same mechanisms as percepts, the same function as percepts, or the 
same structure as percepts. Demonstrations of perceptual equivalence have primarily 
focused upon visual imagery and equivalence has been suggested in: visual acuity and 
overflow (Finke and Kosslyn, 1980; Finke and Kurtzman, 1981; Kosslyn, 1978); mental 
comparisons (e.g. Paivio, 1978ab); mental rotation (Shepard and Metzler, 1971; Cooper 
and Shepard, 1973); mental scanning (Finke and Pinker, 1982; Kosslyn, 1973; and, 
Kosslyn, Ball and Reiser, 1978) and, somewhat controversially in imagery illusions 
(Broerse and Crassini, 1983; Brosgole, Chan, Brandt-Tiven, Miller, and Sanders, 1997; 
Peterson, Kihlstrom, Rose, and Glisky, 1992). 
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to propose a detailed account of the role of 
mental imagery in cognition (see Chapter Three). Nevertheless, it is necessary to provide 
a foundation upon which the nature of the role of mental imagery in creativity can be 
understood. To achieve this a review and revision of an aspect related to the second 
imagery debate (Kosslyn, 1980, 1981; Pylyshyn, 1973, 1983) will be conducted. This 
concerns the construction of a proper definition of mental imagery. 
A common objection to the general study of mental imagery is that a mental 
image can sometimes mean apparently everything and anything to those employing it. 
Certainly, many of the problems associated with the area can be attributed to a failure to 
develop an adequate description of mental imagery. This criticism formed an important 
thrust of Pylyshyn's first attack upon mental imagery research (Pylyshyn, 1973) and is 
acknowledged by many who posit a functional role for mental images (e.g. Kosslyn, 
1980). It is therefore necessary to develop a sufficient account of what a mental image is 
and what a mental image is not. This is a controversial task. As will be shown, many of 
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the experiences traditionally enveloped in the term "mental imagery" can be excluded as 
irrelevant. 
The Picture-in-the-head Metaphor 
The simplest definition of the experience of having a mental image is that it is a 
'picture in the head'. This definition is part of a group of perceptual metaphors that have 
traditionally been used to describe processes related to mental imagery. Other examples 
include, a 'mind's eye' to describe a process akin to seeing, and a 'theatre in the mind' to 
demonstrate the closeness of mental images to the representations of their external 
referents. These metaphors can be traced from Plato to Descartes, and later to the work of 
the British Empiricists (e.g. Berkeley, Hume, and Locke) who viewed mental images as 
the bedrock of all mental representation; Hume, for example, referred to the mental image 
as the "mother of representations" (Flew, 1964). 
In all of these metaphors the underlying aim is to de~cribe the perceptual quality 
of having a mental image. In the context of British Empiricism it also describes a doctrine 
of thinking which posits a dichotomy between perceptual and linguistic processing. These 
terms are couched in Cartesian conceptions of knowledge representation and, even as 
metaphors, are an easy target for physicalist arguments against mental imagery. Block 
(1983) lists three common objections to the mental imagery construct that are essentially 
derived from the picture-in-the-head metaphor. These are: the noseeum objection, that if 
you look inside somebody's head you do not see a picture; the Leibniz Law objection, that 
for a thing to be identical to another thing it must share all of the properties; and the 
paraphernalia objection, that to have a picture-in-the-head would require an internal eye to 
see the picture, ad infinitum. All of these objections apply specifically to the picture-in-
the-head metaphor and the quotation below is typical of the physicalist arguments used 
against them: 
"Whatever mental images may be .. There is no small theater in the head 
where these images are projected on a screen, and there is nobody there 
to look at them anyway." (Goodman, 1986, p.359). 
Although the picture-in-the-head metaphor can easily be refuted by physicalist 
arguments, and it enjoys frequent usage by iconophobes (see Kosslyn, 1980), it is rarely 
used by those who advocate a role for mental imagery in information processing. Indeed, 
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Kosslyn (1980) claims that the picture-in-the-head account can be summed up as a straw 
man and of little relevance to modem research into mental imagery. 
The problem with the picture-in-the-head metaphor is that it arises from a 
misunderstanding of what a person means by a picture-in-the-head. Block (1983) provides 
illumination as to how this misunderstanding arose. When a person claims that their 
mental image is like a picture-in-the-head they do not mean that it is like a picture 
hanging on a wall. Likewise, when a person states that they can see a 'real' picture they do 
not have a picture-in-their-head. What they are really trying to say is that the experience 
of having a mental image is similar to the experience of seeing a picture. Viewed in this 
way the picture-in-the-head account of mental imagery can be seen for what it is, a 
metaphor that aids understanding. To take the metaphor too literally is to misconstrue and 
misapply the use of metaphor. However, if the aim is theory precision then the use of this 
metaphor is inappropriate when attempting to defme mental imagery. 
More Recent Conceptions: The Misuse of the Percept Metaphor 
While the picture-in-the-head definition of mental imagery is rarely used, it shares a 
common currency with its successors in that it describes mental imagery as a percept-like 
experience. This has become the accepted definition of mental imagery. While Watson 
was driven to rejecting the existence of mental images in his behaviourist manifesto 
(Watson, 1913) even those "modern iconophobes" who dismiss mental images as 
epiphenomenal experiences acknowledge their relationship to percepts. Pylyshyn, for 
example, in his second seminal critique of mental imagery, explicitly acknowledges the 
conscious experience as perception-like: 
"The study of mental imagery continues to be a major concern III 
cognitive psychology. Since regaining acceptance about 15 years ago, 
the study of processes underlying the sort of reasoning that is 
accompanied by perception like experiences has become one of the most 
focal points of the new mentalistic psychology." (Pylyshyn, 1981, p.16). 
Thus, contemporary conceptions of mental imagery continue to view it as a percept -like 
experience. There are still the occasional uses of metaphorical thinking especially when 
the term is linked to the role of mental images as explanatory constructs (Pylyshyn, 1973). 
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Generally though, the metaphorical uses can be reinterpreted, as Block (1983) suggests, or 
ignored because they go beyond an initial defInition. 
In surveying the variety of defInitions of mental Imagery proposed by the 
"iconophiles", two inadequate ways of defming mental imagery emerge. The fIrst way is 
to ignore the need to defIne mental images. This is the operational method of defIning 
mental images. Kosslyn (1980, 1994), for example, simply asks the reader to picture the 
shape of a dog's ears. Shepard (1966) requires the reader to count the number of windows 
in their house. Finke (1985) asks the reader to visualize a recent acquaintance. 
Presumably, this method is deemed to be suffIcient enough to demonstrate the similarity 
between mental imagery and perception. Unfortunately it falls short of defIning a 
resemblance or even why there should be a resemblance. Consider, for example, the 
sufficiency of such a demonstration if the same rule were applied to a definition of 
language. Furthermore it fails to encompass the enormous range of types of mental 
imagery, many of which vary markedly from the simple examples given. 
The second method is to describe mental images in such a way that no real defInition is 
given at all. An example of this is given by Finke who defInes a mental image as: 
"The mental invention or recreation of an experience that in at least some 
respects resembles the experience of actually perceiving an object or an 
event, either in conjunction with, or in the absence of, direct sensory 
stimulation." (Finke, 1989, p.2). 
If the ambiguity in the initial premise is ignored, a fIrst reading of this account might give 
the impression of being reasonably lucid. Finke evidently believes it is sufficient. In fact 
he goes on to state that it, "... is a convenient working definition for the scientifIc 
investigations that will be reported here" (Finke, 1989, p.2). All that can really be 
concluded from the statement, however, is that mental imagery 'resembles' perception. 
Nothing much is said of how mental images resemble percepts, or more importantly how 
they differ from percepts. The reference to sensory stimulation provides little insight as it 
lacks specificity. In summary, it goes no further than describing mental images as being 
similar to percepts. 
Finke's perceptual defInition of mental imagery is commonplace in the field. Most 
accounts rarely go beyond defining the experience of having a mental image as being 
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similar to perceiving. Of course, it could be argued that there really is no need to go 
beyond the percept-like description of mental imagery. According to this argument the 
terms 'mental' and 'image' provide the basic ingredients for defining the phenomenon. In 
other words, the term 'mental imagery' is sufficiently self-descriptive. However, there are 
several reasons, both general to mental imagery and specific to the current chapter, why it 
is necessary to go beyond this basic description. 
The first problem with employing only a cursory account of mental imagery is 
that it is very easy to make category mistakes when describing the different forms of 
mental imagery. The vagueness of mental imagery can result in either an over-
generalization or an under-generalization of the term. Horowitz (1970), for example. 
makes the over-generalization mistake when providing a classification of mental images. 
Many of the examples he provides (e.g. visual illusions) are clearly more representative of 
perceptual images than mental images. This error is grounded in a misunderstanding of 
the nature of perception which Horowitz appears to assume is always veridical. Such a 
'realist' view of perception would not be expected from constructivist approaches to 
perception (e.g. Gregory, 1970; and, Rock, 1983), but even the direct perception of 
Gibson (1979) would not go so far as to state that percepts are defined as 'what is out 
there' and therefore everything else is a mental image. Although this is not stated by 
Horowitz it is one possible conclusion to be drawn from his classification system. 
The under-generalization problem is never made explicit but is fundamental to the 
imagery debate. Typically it employs an intentionality criterion. Either, requiring 
somebody to image a house or implying another intentionality criterion ('the mental 
invention or recreation') leads to a contraction in what is defined as a mental image. 
Though rarely made explicit, the evidence to support an intentionality criterion in modem 
mental imagery research is very compelling. The best known experimental protocols for 
image generation and manipulation (mental rotation, mental scanning, and illusions) have 
generally ignored all forms of mental imagery but images associated with thought. The 
best known theoretical approaches also appeal mainly to thought images (Kosslyn, 1980, 
1994; Paivio, 1971; Shepard, 1984) and even the best documented accounts of the role of 
mental imagery in creativity emphasize the role of thought images (Finke, 1989, 1990: 
and Shepard, 1978a). In summary, under-generalization and a narrowness in definition 
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and methodology are rife in the field of mental imagery. Part of the reason for this appears 
to be the persistence of the percept-like metaphor. 
The second problem is related to Pylyshyn's (1973) attack upon the use of mental 
images as explanatory constructs. One of Pylyshyn's original arguments against mental 
imagery being used in scientific investigation was that the concept was too vague. He 
went on to claim that a primitive explanatory construct must be clearly and precisely 
defined in order for its operations to be fully understood; logical predicates, it was argued, 
were well defined. Kosslyn (e.g. Kosslyn and Pomerantz, 1977), countered this critique of 
mental imagery by stating that in its formative years it was not necessary for a term to be 
well defined. Miller (1978) claims that the differences between Pylyshyn and Kosslyn 
emerge from differing priorities; Pylyshyn is concerned with theory development and 
Kosslyn with theory demonstration. Perhaps Kosslyn was right in his assumption that new 
areas need time to develop but it is now twenty-two years since he argued in favour of the 
vagueness of the mental imagery construct. Mental imagery is in its fourth decade of 
research since the 'cognitive revolution' and yet the underlying theory remains 
speculative and incomplete. This is not because researchers have failed to demonstrate the 
existence of mental imagery so it must be assumed that there was (and still is) some 
element of truth in Pylyshyn's criticism concerning the lack of theory precision. 
A compelling reason why mental imagery requires a precise definition is related 
to any potential role of mental imagery in creativity. As was noted, there are many reports 
of the use of mental imagery in creativity (Daniels-McGhee and Davies, 1994; Ghiselin, 
1952; and, Paivio, 1983) and in the last decade an experimental protocol which 
demonstrates the emergence of creative forms and inventions in an imagery task (Finke, 
1990). If mental imagery plays a role in creativity then it must be more than a percept-like 
experience; or at least have some properties that are different from those of perception. 
This is because even the most ardent advocate of the constructivist approach would not 
venture to propose a creative role for the process of perception. For example, Rock 
(1983), who views perception as an intelligent process states that he does not regard 
percepts as having the property of creativity. The following account by Rock of the 
problem solving abilities inherent in perception testifies to this: 
" 'Inference' seems an apt description of what is going on here because 
the system must infer or deduce a conclusion given certain premises. As 
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in syllogistic reasoning (or general predicate logic) the terms in different 
premises are related to one another. Yet even in such cases it would not 
seem appropriate to describe the process as creative problem solving any 
more than it would when we draw the conclusion based on transivity that 
if a>b and b>c, then a>c." (Rock, 1983, p.l3). 
The fact is that any theorist who claims that mental imagery is important in the 
creative process must assume that mental imagery involves more than perception per se. 
There must be something additional or different that enables the creative process to occur. 
Yet, rarely do researchers go beyond the basic percept-like definition. The suggestion that 
the reader picture his/her house, scan an image, or rotate an image all suggest a stable 
entity or activity that excludes fluidity, flexibility and originality, the hallmarks of 
creativity . 
Only a small sample of definitions of mental imagery have been provided here. 
Nonetheless, these examples illustrate the general types of problems inherent in the 
research area. Given these difficulties it is hardly surprising that mental imagery is 
frequently deemed to be a vague term. What is required is a thorough consideration of the 
aspects that combine to make a mental image and, more importantly, to investigate what 
makes mental images different from percepts. 
Percepts and Mental Images 
As there has been a strong historical association between the constructs of perception and 
mental imagery the first objective must be to evaluate this relationship. That is, for what 
reasons has perception been chosen as the most apt analogy for mental imagery? Once 
these reasons have been clarified it will be possible to describe the relationship between 
percepts and mental images and, in so doing, create a dichotomy between the two types of 
experiences. The method adopted here is to define the concept of a percept and from this 
position conduct a contrastive analysis between the two types of experiences similar to 
that proposed by Baars (1988) in his development of a theory of consciousness. First, 
however, it is necessary to uncover the reasons mental images have been associated with 
percepts. 
There are several reasons why imagery theorists have emphasized the association 
between perception and mental imagery. The predominant reason has little to do \vith the 
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phenomenological experience of having a mental image and a lot to do with the debate 
pertaining to the representation of mental images. This hypothesis posits an ··equivalence" 
between percepts and mental images. One motive for this is the belief that if it can be 
demonstrated that a mental image has both a structure and/or function equivalent to (or, at 
least, similar to) perception then it can be concluded that mental images are analogical 
representations. The problem with this supposition is that it cannot necessarily be assumed 
that percepts are analogical representations (Block, 1983). 
Despite knowing the Block argument against the perceptual equivalence 
hypothesis there is an additional underlying motivation to demonstrate a relationship 
between mental imagery and perception. The connection between perceptual equivalence 
and analogical representation was suggested by Py lyshyn (1973) in his 'tacit inference' 
critique of mental imagery experiments. Mental representation lies in the background of 
all imagery-perception studies and there is a direct correspondence between the positions 
of analogicaillogical representation and perceptual/artifact explanations of perceptual 
equivalence. It is, after all, far easier to conceive of analogical representations within a 
perceptual system than outside of it. If there is truth in Anderson's (1978) claim that the 
imagery-propositional debate is irresolvable, there is nowhere else to turn. 
Though the emphasis of the research is upon the development of a cognitive 
model of mental imagery as functionally and/or structurally equivalent to perception, the 
original justification for using a perceptual analogy for imagery was the 
phenomenological similarity of the two experiences. This stems from the position of the 
British empiricist philosophers, Bume and Locke. The experiential similarities between 
mental imagery and perception suggest a shared form of representation in consciousness, 
namely, an analogical one. In other words, mental images, like percepts, are part of a 
group of phenomena that are expressed in a non-linguistic or non-propositional mode (or 
what at least appears so to the experiencer). To "have a visual image" is akin to seeing yet 
it is not seeing because there is no immediate external referent out there to see. 
As a motivation for studying the association between mental imagery and 
perception, the latter reason seems more justified than the former but it doesn't carry the 
same implications for it admits to a difference between the two experiences. In reviewing 
the research into the shared properties of mental images and percepts, Finke (1985) 
outlines three theoretical stances: structural theories; functional theories; and interactive 
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theories. All emphasize the former reason as opposed to the latter. A by-product of this 
emphasis upon architectural structure and function is that it has become an article of faith 
for the exponents of mental imagery to advance the similarities between perception and 
mental imagery and to downplay the differences. In this circumstance it is difficult to 
impart a distinction between the two experiences. While there are striking 
phenomenological resemblances between mental images and percepts, there are also very 
obvious differences. 
The Function of Perception 
Definitions of perception are as problematic as those of mental imagery and equally 
dependent upon the theoretical ideology underlying them. Nevertheless, it is the author's 
belief that there is at least enough known about perception - and sufficient conformity - to 
distinguish it from mental imagery on the basis of function. 
The traditional concept of perception is of an information receiving device, a 
"window' through which the external world is given. Reformulations, however, have 
rejected the notion of the perceiver as a passive recipient of sensations. Contemporary 
conceptions of perception all agree that the individual is active in the 'seeing' process. In 
essence there are two contrasting schools of thought, one which focuses upon the 
experience of perceiving (Gregory, 1966; Marr, 1982; and Rock, 1984), and the other 
which emphasizes an action-oriented direct perception (e.g. Gibson, 1950, 1979). Both 
approaches imply a function for perception, though this is not made explicit in the 
ecological approach. 
The former approach is very clear about the function of perception, claiming that 
perception serves to provide meaning to the external world, what Rock (1984), following 
Bartlett (1932), refers to as the constraint of effort after meaning. Here perception is seen 
as constructive in the sense that a hierarchical information process (a bottom-up approach) 
is carried out on a two-dimensional retinal image (e.g. Marr's 2-1/2 dimensional sketch: 
Marr, 1982). The ecological approach also posits a function for perception. According to 
Gibson (1979) the role of perception is information pickup. Not the picking-up of 
individual stimuli but of a stimulus flux. This leads to an act-based psychology in which 
behaviour and environment are closely wedded. 
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Although there are major differences between these two approaches, in both 
accounts one can find essentially the same factor that serves to distinguish a percept from 
a mental image. In both cases the central defining characteristic of perception is that it is 
compelled by its purpose. Whether it is to discern meaning (the computational approach) 
or to act upon the environment (the ecological approach) perception cannot be detached 
from its function. Furthermore, these are not consciously determined processes, as is the 
case with thought-invoked images, but are evolutionarily driven automatic processes. 
In both approaches therefore perception cannot be separated from the constraint of 
purpose and it is this circumstance that creates the phenomenological characteristics of 
perception. At a functional level it is not thinking that governs the appearance of a percept 
but automatic processes operating on the optical array. In the case of the computational 
approach perception can therefore be said to be subservient to the proximal stimulus. In 
the ecological approach there is also subservience, but according to this model, perception 
is the slave of stimulus flux. Here lies the rule for differentiating percepts from mental 
Images. 
Distinguishing Mental Images from Percepts 
How should mental imagery be understood in this context? The method chosen here is to 
investigate the correspondence between mental images and percepts as being analogous to 
the correspondence between inner speech and actual speech. This is useful because it is 
far easier to conceptualize the correspondence and the distinction between the two forms. 
In both cases there is a shared phenomenal representation and an identical method of 
conceptualization. In the case of inner speech and actual speech the phenomenal 
representation and conceptualization are linguistic; with mental imagery and perception 
the phenomenal representation are pictorial. An earlier statement of this analogy was 
presented by Marks (1977, Figure Two, p.278) in discussing a model of consciousness 
and visual cognition. 
There are further resemblances between mental images and inner speech on the 
one hand and perception and speech on the other. For example, both speech and 
perception have specific functions, whereas inner speech and mental imagery do not. 
Speech and perception also have designated organs through which their functions are 
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achieved: the vocal tract and any number of sensory channels. Conversely, inner speech 
and mental imagery do not require an organ in order to be instantiated. 
Clearly, there are differences between mental imagery and perception, just as 
there are obvious differences between inner speech and actual speech. However, just as 
inner speech is defined in the context of its more discernible counterpart, so too is mental 
imagery. This does not mean that inner speech is actual speech but that it is language 
without speaking. Thus, mental imagery can be defined as anything that is expressed in 
the form of a percept but is not a percept. This is obvious, yet it is seldom the case that 
perception is considered in this way by mental imagery theorists. This, then is how mental 
images should be understood. 
Finally, it may be argued that mental images are instantiated from a proximal 
stimulus/stimulus flux; just as inner speech is instantiated by communication. However 
there are fundamental differences. With a mental image the perceptual stimulus acts only 
as a cue and the proceeding experience is constructed from knowledge rather than the 
immediate environment. Thus, percepts and mental images can be seen as two discrete 
categories of a phenomenological experience. Percepts are a set of experiences that are 
constrained by an effort to find meaning and/or act-upon the environment. Mental images 
are anything else that activates analogical representation. In other words, phenomena 
which trigger the same representations (or codes) that are triggered by perception, but in 
the absence of perception. They range from 'looking at' experiences (e.g. dreaming, 
hallucinations) that are similar to percepts, but do not possess the condition of 
interpretation of proximal stimuli/information pickup, to the intelligent 'looking for' 
experiences conjured during goal-oriented operations (e.g. mental transformations). 
In summary, mental images have traditionally been associated with percepts. The 
main reason for this is that they share the same system of phenomenal representation. 
Perception is concerned with information interpretation (the computational approach) or 
information pick up (the ecological approach). In both cases percepts are constrained by 
their function. While mental images resemble percepts they differ in ways that are similar 
to the differences between inner speech and actual speech. Fundamentally, they are not 
generated by stimulation of a sensory organ, and as such do not have the accompanying 
constraints. Just as inner speech is language code activation without actual 
communication, mental imagery is perceptual code activation without actual perceiving. 
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The Consequences of the New Definition of Mental Imagery 
The consequences of applying this definition of mental imagery to the present 
thesis are advantageous. By recognizing both the similarities and the differences behveen 
mental images and percepts it is possible to avoid confusion caused by category mistakes 
and also by under or over-generalization. This also has an important effect on the 
investigation of the role of mental imagery in creativity; recall that even the most ardent 
supporters of intelligent perceptual processing have to deny that perception is creative 
(Rock, 1983). In effect, the majority of experiences that are cast as either sensations or 
percepts according to the present definition have very little association with creativity. 
Only mental imagery, it is argued, which is unconstrained by the functional characteristics 
of perception, can possibly playa role in creative processes. 
As was noted, some of the errors that have occurred in defining mental images 
can be attributed to a misunderstanding of perception (e.g. Horowitz'S, 1970, 
classification). The earlier consideration of perception highlights an error regularly made 
when apportioning phenomenological experiences to perception. This is to assume that 
perception is simply a window through which the external world is passively represented. 
As has been shown, neither of the dominant paradigms construe perception in this way. 
Thus, if a criterion has to be invoked then it is far better to employ that of function (i.e. 
'effort after meaning' or 'information pick-up'). Experiences such as illusions may not be 
'out there' but it would be very difficult to argue that they do not arise from the function of 
perception, regardless of the approach adopted. 
If the rule is applied that percepts are constrained by function and that mental 
images are those experiences which share the same mode of representation but lack this 
constraint, then many of the experiences which are commonly referred to as mental 
images require re-classification. For example, almost all of the experiences classified as 
'images that interact with perception' in Horowitz's (1970) classification (i.e. illusions, 
perceptual distortions, deja vu experiences, and after-images) are not classed as mental 
images according to the description given above. However, phenomena such as 
hallucinations, dreams and hypnagogic images remain within the category (despite in 
many cases lacking intentionality) as they are not constrained by sensory interpretation. 
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For some theorists the elimination of these experiences as mental images may 
seem inappropriate. After-images, for example, have occupied a primary position in the 
research into mental imagery. For example A.Richardson (1969) devotes an entire chapter 
to them in his review of mental imagery. However, if the study of mental imagery is to 
progress then a clear definition is required and this inevitably entails a strict 
differentiation between mental images and percepts rather than a blurring of the 
distinction. 
This definition of mental imagery has important advantages to the study of mental 
imagery and creativity. The eliminated categories of experience have the same properties 
attributed to percepts and it is therefore an advantage both empirically and theoretically to 
eliminate them from investigation. A further justification for this decision is that these 
experiences are rarely linked to creativity. In contrast, those experiences that remain 
within the definition of mental imagery are frequently associated with creativity. 
Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to provide a definition of mental imagery that would 
enable progress to be made in future empirical investigation of imagery and creativity. In 
reviewing the previous work it was found that most definitions use perception as an 
analogy for mental imagery. However, these approaches do not explain in what particular 
ways a mental image corresponds to, and can be differentiated from, a percept. 
A contrast analysis was used to derive a working definition of mental imagery. 
Initially it was found that the correspondence between percepts and mental images resides 
in their shared mode of representation, that is, phenomenologically they are both 
presented to the individual in an analogical form. What distinguishes percepts from 
mental images is the function of perception, namely, to derive a meaning from the 
immediate environment or to pick up information in the environment. Thus, a mental 
image is an experience that shares the same structural experience as a percept but is not 
necessarily constrained by its function. It is this characteristic of unconstrained 
representation that promotes the engagement of mental imagery in creative activities. 
The advantage of this definition is that it provides a clear differentiation between 
mental imagery and perception. This is at the minimal cost of eliminating many 
experiences that have traditionally been incorporated into the mental imagery framework. 
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These include: illusions, deja vu experiences, perceptual distortions, and after-images. 
The close resemblance of these experiences to perception itself reduces their relevance to 
the imagery-creativity issue. The author believes that the ground has been cleared of some 
of its confusing elements. Future research can focus on the most productive line of inquiry 
- how mental processes can enjoy the benefits of analogical forms of representation while 
remaining free from the constraints of perception. This, then, defines the role of mental 
imagery in creativity. 
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Chapter III 
A Classification of Mental Imagery 
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Introduction 
Chapter Two dealt with the problem of the perceptual equivalence hypothesis in 
the context of the role of mental imagery in creativity. One of the main issues identified 
was the problem of theory precision noted by Pylyshyn more than twenty-five years ago. 
An attempt was made to partially rectify this problem through the development of a more 
precise definition of mental imagery. It was concluded that mental images are experiences 
that share the same phenomenological nature as percepts but are not constrained by the 
function of interpretation or acting upon a proximal stimulus. 
The aim of the present chapter is to provide an overview of a wide range of 
mental images and to develop a classification system in which these images can be 
understood. The classification system is based upon the definition presented in Chapter 
Two. This categorization is important because it provides the basis for new empirical 
research and ultimately decides how mental images are to be understood and investigated 
in the creative process. 
The Utility of Classification Systems 
Psychology prospers through classification. Structure acts as a foundation for 
investigation and all future research is understood in its context. It enables progression 
and the development of coherent information gathering and exchange (Foss, 1995). 
During the resurgence of interest in mental imagery in the 1960s several attempts were 
made to develop a system for understanding the various types of mental imagery. 
However, since the mid 1970s research has virtually ignored the many different types of 
mental images. Consequently, mental images have become understood in the context of a 
few experimental protocols; a review of mental imagery in any general textbook in 
cognitive psychology testifies to this (Eysenck and Keane, 1997; Reed, 1992; Solso, 
1991). 
Alternative areas of mental imagery have been studied and in many instances they 
have developed into fields in their own right, but the findings have not been reported as 
part of the mental imagery literature. Put simply, the parts that make up the area have not 
been brought together to form a general body of knowledge from which mental images, 
and their characteristics, can be suitably assessed. This situation causes difficulties in 
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trying to construct a classification of mental imagery and its role in the creative process. 
Normally, the task would require a general review of the research conducted in the subject 
area. However, in the present circumstances it entails the updating of programmes 
developed more than twenty-five years ago (Horowitz, 1970; McKellar, 1957, 1972; 
A.Richardson, 1969). 
Previous Classification Systems 
The most thorough reviews of mental imagery experience have been undertaken 
by Horowitz (1970), McKellar (1957, 1972), and A.Richardson (1969). All of them offer 
a broad set of experiences that together form a body of occurrences labeled as mental 
images. The review from Morris and Hampson (1983) defines the research field from the 
perspective of cognitive psychology. The approaches reviewed in the present section are 
those provided by Horowitz and Morris and Hampson. Horowitz (1970) classifies mental 
images according to four mutually inclusive categories: vividness, context, interaction 
with perception, and content. Morris and Hampson (1983) list the most well known forms 
of mental imagery and define these on three dimensions: intentional/passive; 
intrapsychic/extrapsychic; and real/not real. Although the classifications provided by 
these two sources highlight the multifarious nature of mental imagery neither fulfills the 
aims set out in the previous section. 
Horowitz's review represents the most thorough attempt to detail all the forms of 
mental imagery. He does not attempt to distinguish the forms of mental imagery because 
of the problem arising from the development of mutually inclusive sub-ordinate 
categories. As he states: 
"Because an image expenence can be described from so many 
perspectives, it is often confusing to try to give it one general label. For 
example, a vivid image of one's body while falling asleep can be called 
hypnopompic because it occurs in the context of falling asleep, 
pseudohallucinatory because it is very vivid, or autoscopic because the 
contents are of the physical self." (Horowitz, 1970, p.6). 
Consequently, Horowitz provides a set of categories through which mental images can be 
described rather than grouped. This is a useful enterprise for his purpose (the use of 
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mental imagery in clinical research) but it is not sufficient for the present classification 
procedure. 
Aside from the issue of exclusivity there are several problems with using 
Horowitz's classification in the thesis. The definition given in Chapter Two means that 
many of the mental images classified by Horowitz are no longer relevant. This is 
particularly true of Horowitz's third category, "Images which interact with perception". 
Furthermore, as the aim of the thesis (to investigate the role of mental imagery in 
creativity) embodies a small element of the total research into mental imagery there are 
few references to it in Horowitz's review. 
The second classification system selected here was developed by Morris and 
Hampson (1983). They distinguished and defined a selection of mental images on the 
basis of three dimensions. Justification for these dimensions is based upon the notion that 
they provide a useful distinction. As Morris and Hampson state: 
"Among the dimensions upon which mental images differ are three 
which help to clarify the common distinctions between types of imagery. 
These three dimensions are, firstly, the intentional/passive role of the 
individual in the creation of the image, secondly, the experience of the 
image as being out there as part of the real world, or as existing 
"internally" in a different form from real objects, and thirdly, the belief 
that what is being experienced is part of the real world, or is created in 
some way by the individual's mental apparatus." (1983, p. 65). 
Morris and Hampson's attempt to differentiate mental images seems to have 
located dimensions that 'carve-the-joints'. As with Horowitz's classification there are 
many useful aspects of the Morris and Hampson categorization. The three dimensions 
adopted by Morris and Hampson provide much insight into the different experiences of 
imaging. However, Morris and Hampson's classification is not suitable for the present 
thesis because they only list six broad categories of mental imagery. 
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Table 3.1. Discrete Category Members of the Super-Ordinate Attribute, Visual 
Mental Imagery 
Primary Feature Secondary Feature 
Dream Associated Somnabulistic 
Not Somnambulistic 
Wake Asssociated 'Looking-at' 
'Looking for' 
Types of Mental Image 
Dream Images 
Hypnagogic Images 
Hypnopompic Images 
Sensory Deprivation Images 
Lucid Dream Images 
Scintillations 
Daydream Images 
Hypnosis Images 
Meditation Images 
Flashbacks 
Pseudohallucination Images 
Psychotic Images 
Psychedelic Images 
Memory Images 
Mental Rehearsal Images 
Questionnaire Study Images 
Experimental (Perceptual Equivalence) 
Images 
Synaesthesia Images 
The Development of a Classification System/or Mental Imagery 
The first aim in developing a classification system is to determine one or more 
generic attributes that define all of the members of the category. Obviously, these 
fundamental attributes are not 'written in stone' but depend upon the conceptual basis from 
which the area is to be understood (Willingham and Preuss, 1995). Fortunately, the aim of 
the present thesis, to investigate the role of mental imagery in creativity, does not conflict 
with a general conceptual basis. Thus, the initial aim of this section is to develop a super-
ordinate construct for mental imagery. 
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The super-ordinate construct which links all the forms of mental imagery was 
outlined in Chapter Two. It was proposed that mental images can be specifically defined 
as percept-like experiences that are not constrained by stimulus interpretation or pick-up. 
According to this account there are numerous expressions of mental imagery. However, 
there are also a finite set of experiences that are commonly found in the literature and it is 
the goal of the present chapter to define and categorise these experiences. The following 
forms of mental imagery (see Table 3.1) have been selected according to four criteria: 
they are frequently reported; they are often visual; they are frequently researched; and, 
they may be associated with creativity. 
Having developed a super-ordinate construct that identifies the members of the 
category of visual mental images it is necessary to develop sub-ordinate attributes. In 
attempting to carve nature at its joints it is clear that the term 'dream-associated' is 
frequently used to describe many forms of visual mental imagery (Horowitz, 1970). 
Conversely, the 'dream-associated' characteristic appears to be a very inappropriate form 
of description for many other forms of visual mental imagery. Thus, it appears that a 
wake-like/dream-associated distinction could provide a useful sub-classification of visual 
mental images. As some mental images that are described as 'dream-associated' (e.g. 
hypnosis images, meditation images, and daydream images) do not occur in the sleeping 
state, it is possible to further sub-divide 'dream-associated' mental images into two 
discrete categories. Those directly associated with sleeping (somnambulistic) and those 
indirectly associated with sleeping (non-somnambulistic). 
If 'dream-associated' mental images can be split according to two discrete 
categories then it should also be possible to do the same for non 'dream-associated' 
mental images. In considering the many types of mental imagery that appear in this form, 
the clearest way in which they can be distinguished is through an intentionality criterion. 
This is similar to Morris and Hampson's intra-psychic/extra-psychic dimension but has 
borrowed the phenomenological terms 'Looking for' and 'Looking at' (Ellis, 1995). 
'Looking for' mental images are best described as experiences that are intentionally 
produced and have agency. 'Looking at' mental images appear to the experiencer without 
voluntary control and have no agency. This enables the researcher to differentiate the 
categories. These forms of mental imagery are presented in Table 3.l. 
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This classification is not perfect as some of the experiences do not sit comfortably 
in the positions assigned. For example, there are question marks about the nature of the 
visual mental images experienced during sensory deprivation. Research has demonstrated 
that reported visual experiences occur very early on in the sensory deprivation period 
(Zubek, 1969) and short-duration sensory deprivation tasks do not involve very much 
sleep (Suedfeld, Ballard, Baker-Brown, and Borrie, 1985-86). Furthermore, the 
psychedelic images (particularly those which are opium-induced) may sometimes be 
defined as 'dream-associated' (Julien, 1995). However, in all cases it is argued that these 
are the most representative category assignments for the experiences and that this 
categorization is robust enough to facilitate a review of the role of mental imagery and 
creativity. In the following section each member of the categories listed in Table 3.1 will 
be discussed. 
Dream-associated Mental Images Characterized by their Somnambulistic Nature 
The forms of mental imagery discussed in this section are defined by their 
occurrence in the sleeping state. These forms of mental imagery are very vivid and often 
have a narrative content. Although there are many examples of their role in creativity 
there has been little empirical research into 'dream-associated' somnambulistic mental 
images and creative thinking. The forms of mental imagery discussed are: dreaming 
images, hypnopompic and hypnagogic images; lucid dreaming images; and sensory 
deprivation images. 
Dream Images 
Dreams are atypical mental images, they are rivaled only by hallucinations in their 
vivid and delusional qualities, and have an incomparable narrative content (Seligman and 
Yellen, 1987). It is therefore hardly surprising that they have procured a special status 
amongst the world's religions and that psychoanalysts should be so interested in there 
informational status. However, since the discovery of their association with REM-sleep 
the nature of dreaming has been drawn into the realms of scientific inquiry (Aserinski & 
Kleitman. 1953). There have been many laboratory studies of REM-sleep and much is 
known about the physiological correlates of dreaming (Empson, 1994). For example. it is 
now known that the vast majority of people experience dreams during REM sleep and that 
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dreams occur in adults between three and five times every night and that the high level 
visual areas in the brain are activated during sleep (Hobson, 1988). It is also established 
that the occurrence of REM-sleep is associated with brain stem activation and that dreams 
are accompanied by Pons-Geniculate-Occipital (PGO) waves of cortical activity (Hobson. 
1988). 
Hobson and McCarley (1977; Hobson, 1988) have used the available 
physiological information to develop a model of the dreaming brain based primarily upon 
the known areas of activation during REM-sleep, namely, the higher level sensory and 
association cortical regions. Hobson and McCarley hypothesize that two groups of 
neuronal populations in the brain stem (the aminergic neurons and the reticular neurons) 
act as an on-off switch. Together they determine whether activation occurs in the brain. 
Hobson (1988) speculates that the aminergic neurons act as the 'on switch' and the 
reticular neurons act as the 'off switch'. When one of these populations of neurons is 
active then the other is inhibited. 
During the dreaming phase a sensory-input blockade is achieved through the 
active inhibition of the peripheral central nervous system and occlusion of higher level 
sensory and associative regions of the brain (Hobson, 1988). These factors produce the 
characteristics of dreaming. This is accompanied by a motor-output blockade (in the brain 
stem and spinal cord) which stops the dreamer from carrying out the dream. 
Hobson (1988) has also identified five factors that characterize the dreaming state. 
These are: hallucination; delusion; disorientation; intensification of emotion; and amnesia. 
The hallucinatory aspect of dreaming is caused by the activation of sensori-motor brain 
circuits. Hobson claims that: 
"If the higher-level neurons of the visual system are subjected to the 
same type of phasic excitatory signal that they "see" during the waking 
state, they will process that signal as if it came from the outside world." 
(Hobson, 1988, p.21 0). 
The delusional qualities of dreaming are hypothesized to be a consequence of the 
brain's inability to find an orientational referent from the internal signals generated; 
without external cues to act as a referent the brain is dependent upon internal sources. 
Disorientation is caused by the use of a different information processing mode and the 
multi-sensory array of information processed. The intensity of emotions occurs because of 
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signal activation in the limbic system and is predominantly anxiety related (Hobson. 1998; 
Revonsuo, 1998). Finally, it is claimed that the amnesic nature of dreaming results from a 
failure to activate a record mode during the dream state. 
Recent research into dreaming has generally supported and added to Hobson and 
McCarley's activation-synthesis hypothesis. The trend is toward a model of the dreaming 
brain as a self-organizing system with unique phenomenological characteristics. For 
example, brain imaging PET studies have found a reduction in pre-frontal cortical 
activation during dreaming (as compared to waking). As this area is supposed to be 
involved in planning, logic and volitional processes during waking it is hypothesized that 
these processes are reduced during dreaming (Hobson, 1998). 
Working in the best traditions of the identity approach this research is building a 
picture of the dreaming brain that correlates with the phenomenological experience of 
dreaming. One recent approach (Combs, Kahn and Krippner, 1998) has even attempted to 
reconcile the differences between the neuroscientific approach and psychodynamic 
models of dreaming. Using the self-organizing principles of attractor systems Combs et 
al., (1998) argue that the Freudian narratives and symbols are produced from stable 
attractor pattern organization following the bifurcations caused by cholinergic induced 
PGO waves. 
The only study relating dreaming to creativity was the finding by Austin (1971) 
that divergent thinkers had a greater recall of dreams than convergent thinkers. Although 
there has been little empirical research into dreaming and creativity there are numerous 
reports of the occurrence of creative insights during dreaming. The best known example 
in the arts is Coleridge's report of waking after an opium induced dream with the 
composition of his epic poem, Kubla Khan complete. In science there are also reports of 
creativity. Here are several examples cited by Ochse: 
"Dreams and hypnagogic states are apparently fertile fields of inspiration 
for scientists. Cannon and Helmholtz reported having repeated 
experiences of answers to their problems on waking. On one such 
occasion Cannon had an idea as to how he might construct a device for 
automatically recording the clotting of blood. Hirschel 'discovered' the 
planet Uranus through a dream; Leibnitz dreamt of the basic idea 
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underlining his conception of a world system; and Niels Bohr dreamt of 
his atom model." (1990, p.196). 
In summary, a considerable amount of research into the psychophysical correlates 
of dreams has resulted in a dynamic model of the dreaming brain in which it is 
hypothesized that activation and inhibition are governed by competing neuronal 
populations (Hobson, 1998). Because the dreaming state does not lend itself easily to 
empirical research there have been few studies that have shown a role for dreaming in 
creativity. However, there are many anecdotal reports which suggest that dream images 
provide a rich source for creative ideas. 
Hypnagogic & Hypnopompic Images. 
Hypnagogic images are characterized by their appearance just before sleep and 
hypnopompic images by their occurrence immediately after sleep. Most researchers treat 
the two types of experiences as identical, differentiating them only on the basis of the 
context in which they occur. The term hypnagogic was first applied by Maury in 1848 
(IT.E.Richardson & Mavromatis, 1985). The hypnopompic stage was later distinguished 
from the hypnagogic state by Myers in 1903. 
Early research into the incidence of hypnagogic imagery by Muller in 1848 (cited 
in McKellar, 1957) suggested that it was a rare phenomenon; only 12% of those surveyed 
claimed to have experienced hypnagogic imagery. However, later studies have found that 
a large number of people report the experience. For example, a study by A.Richardson, 
Mavromatis, Mindel, and Owens (1981) found that 75% of those sampled reported 
hypnagogic images in the past. Demographic research shows a greater preponderance of 
hypnagogic images in females (McKellar, 1977) and children (Kanner, cited in 
A.Richardson, 1969). 
The association between hypnagogic and hypnopompic images and self-reported 
historical creativity is strong. The best known example, Kekule' s use of mental imagery in 
the creative process, has already been described in the first chapter of the dissertation. 
Another well known example is provided by Poincare. As he states: 
"Often this feeling [of illumination] deceives us without being any the 
less vivid, and we only find out when we seek to put on foot the 
demonstration. I have especially noticed this fact in regard to ideas 
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coming to me in bed while in a hypnagogic state." (Poincare cited in 
Ochse, 1990, p.253). 
Several researchers provide reVIews of the use of hypnagogic imagery in 
historical creativity (Ahsen, 1988, 1992; Mavromatis, 1987; McKellar, 1957, 1995). 
Those individuals who have reported insightful ideas during the hypnagogic stage include: 
scientists (Edison and Faraday), writers and film-makers (Cocteau, Coleridge, Dickens, 
Goethe, Keats, Neitzche, and Wordsworth), composers (Brahms, Puccini, and Wagner) 
and the Surrealists (Breton, Dali, and Ernst) 
Empirical research into hypnagogia and creativity is hindered by the failure to 
develop operational measures of both hypnagogic and hypnopompic images. This is 
unfortunate as the anecdotal reports suggest that both hypnagogic and hypnopompic 
images could offer a fruitful line of investigation. However, it is not surprising given the 
problems concerning the operationalisation of the variables. 
Sensory Deprivation Images 
The study of sensory deprivation was initiated at the McGill laboratories in the 
early 1950s (Suedfeld, 1969a). The early research provoked much interest because of the 
reports of hallucinations (Zuckerman, 1969). Although it was suggested that perceptual 
isolation produced a 'model psychosis' later investigation has questioned the validity of 
the initial conclusions (Reed, 1979). Zuckerman's (1969) review of mental images 
produced during sensory deprivation found that: visual mental imagery is enhanced; 
reported visual sensations are most frequently found during the first hour of sensory 
deprivation; and that, the mental images produced bare a closer resemblance to non-
pathological images than to psychotic ones. While some studies dispute Zuckerman's 
conclusions (Suedfeld et al., 1985-86) the general findings tend to support him (Forgays 
and Forgays, 1992). 
While participants using short-term sensory deprivation techniques claim that it 
improves creativity (Suedfeld, Metcalfe, and Bluck, 1987) no outstanding creative acts 
have arisen from the procedure. However, the conditions provided during short-term 
sensory deprivation (Restricted Environmental Stimulation Technique) suggest that this 
technique could be employed to investigate the role of mental imagery in creativity. This 
assumption is based upon converging lines of evidence that suggest that mental images 
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compete with percepts for appearance in consciousness (Antonietti and Columbo, 1997; 
Craver-Lemley and Reeves, 1992; Singer, 1966; and, Zuckerman, 1969). Furthermore, it 
is possible to provide participants with test materials in these environments. Thus, short-
term sensory deprivation provides a useful technique for investigating the mediating effect 
of perceptual competition in the role of mental imagery in creativity. Further information 
is provided in Chapter Ten. 
Lucid Dreaming Images 
Lucid dreaming is the experience of being aware of dreaming. A large proportion 
of people claim to have had lucid dreams (50%, Blackmore, 1991) and researchers claim 
that people can learn to lucid dream using very simple techniques (LaBerge, 1985). 
Furthermore, Green and McCreery (1994) suggest that awareness of lucid dreaming is 
often sufficient to produce lucid dreams. While the contents of lucid dreams are very 
similar to ordinary dreams (Gackenbach, 1988) there are many differences between the 
two states. Green and McCreery (1994) outline four major abilities which distinguish the 
lucid dream from the non-lucid dream: control, reflectiveness, imagination, and 
memorability. Furthermore, research into the subjective reports of ordinary, vivid, and 
lucid dreaming suggest that lucid dreams have a greater visual, auditory, and kinesthetic 
content (Gackenbach and Shillig, 1983). It has also been observed that lucid dream 
frequency is correlated with dream recall frequency (Gackenbach, 1988) and that more 
females volunteer themselves as lucid dreamers than males (Wolpin, Marston, Randolph, 
and Clothier, 1992). 
The central question in lucid dreaming is, do these dreams occur during REM 
sleep? The differences between lucid and non-lucid dreams led early researchers 
(Hartmann, 1975) to conclude that they must occur outside of REM sleep. It seemed 
logical to assume that the qualities of lucid dreaming were too similar to an ordinary 
waking state to predict a REM model (LaBerge, 1985). The main problem for those lucid 
dream researchers who believed that it appeared during REM sleep was the sleep paralysis 
that appeared during this period. This was circumvented by Hearne in 1978 when he 
exploited the fact that eye muscles are not paralyzed in REM sleep (Green & McCreery. 
1994). Hearne's discovery of REM based lucid dreaming was further supported by 
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concurrent research carried out by LaBerge and colleagues (LaBerge, Nagel, Dement and 
Zarcone, 1981). 
Lucid dreaming has developed into a burgeoning industry in the past decade 
(LaBerge, 1998) with workshop sessions included at conferences (e.g. Tuscon, 1998) and 
Internet pages offering devices to assist the lucid dreamer in their so called 'self-healing' 
process (Holzinger, Bolitschek; Saletu, Schmeiser-Rieder, Popovic, and Zeitlhofer, 1998). 
As part of the New Age market, it is hardly surprising that claims should be made about 
improvements in creative thinking during lucid dreaming. However, although several 
studies have found a positive association between lucid dreaming frequency and 
creativity, the results are inconsistent (LaBerge and Gackenbach, 1986). 
'Dream-associated' Mental Images Characterised by their non-Somnambulistic Nature 
The following forms of mental imagery occur in a waking state but have a 
'dream-associated' quality. These mental images tend to occur in undirected thinking 
states which have been variously defined as altered states of consciousness (Hilgard, 
1992; Naranjo, 1972/1990). There are many examples of the use of mental imagery in 
historical creativity. There have also been several attempts to empirically validate the 
association between the variables. The forms discussed in the present section emerge 
from: dream scintillations, daydreaming, hypnosis, and meditation. 
Dream Scintillation Images 
The term 'dream scintillation' was first used by Forbes (1949, cited in McKellar, 
1972) to describe mental images that were similar to those found in hypnagogic states but 
occurred during waking (McKellar, 1972). Some people report having dream scintillations 
after exercise precipitating a fatigued state. Retrospective reports of dream scintillations 
suggest that they appear passively to the imager. They are intrapsychic (Saul, cited in 
Horowitz, 1970) and they are not considered to be real by the person having them. There 
have been no studies reporting a link between dream scintillations and creativity. 
Daydream Images 
Daydreaming forms a primary part of those mental states classified by Aristotle as 
undirected thoughts (Gilhooly, 1990) . Undirected thinking is characterized by apparently 
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free flowing ideas emerging into consciousness. These ideas appear involuntarily and 
frequently take on the form of vivid visual images. In a recent study of situations in which 
mental imagery occurs Antonietti and Columbo (1997) found that daydreaming 
represented the most likely situation in which mental images were reported. 
Interest in daydreaming resulted from the work of Singer and McCraven in the 
1960s. Their study in 1961 found that 96 percent of their sample reported having 
daydreams every day. These daydreams took the form of clear visual images of people, 
objects, and events. Other studies have found that daydreaming: occurs at 90 minute 
cycles throughout the day (Kripke and Sonnenschein, 1978); is related to anticipating and 
planning future events; and competes with external task demands (directed thinking) for 
appearance in consciousness (Singer and Antrobus, 1972). 
One area of research that highlights Singer's (1975) model of competing internal 
and external sources is childhood daydreaming. The development of imagination in 
children encompasses a wide range of creative forms of musing. In a recent review of over 
sixty reports of 'paracosms' (imaginary private worlds) Cohen and MacKeith (1991) 
provide a descriptive classification of the many ways in which a child's imagination 
evolves. The imaginations defined are listed in Table 3.2. Paracosms provide a particularly 
rich source of creativity in the field of literature. Cohen and MacKeith (1991) list many 
historically creative individuals whose work reflects the evolution of complex and creative 
imaginary worlds (e.g. Tolkein, Borges, Castenada, Lessing, Charlotte, Anne, and Emily 
Bronte, and Asimov). Undoubtedly, the complex world of paracosms provides a rich 
source of information for novelists of this genre. 
The disorganized and fragmented nature of daydreaming has led to much 
speculation about its role in creativity (Singer and Antrobus, 1972). However, there are 
few direct referents to daydreaming in the literature on creativity; even Kekule's omnibus 
report is better explained as a hypnagogic experience. Nevertheless much can be surmised 
from the "bath-bed-bus" creativity syndrome (Boden, 1990). Empirical research into 
daydreaming frequency and divergent thinking has shown a relationship between the two 
variables in specific environments (Tushup and Zuckerman, 1977). 
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Table 3.2. Cohen and MacKeith's (1991) Classification of Children's Imaginings 
Imaginings Forms 
Simple Creative Behaviours Transmutory 
Personally Acting a Part 
Animistiic 
Inventing people 
i. Imaginary conversations 
ii. Imaginary companions 
Being a machine 
Being a [non-human] living thing 
Being another [and particular] person 
Enacting an incident 
Imagined Participation in the Hearing a story 
Action of Stories of Others Reading a story [to oneself] 
Invented Stories 
Hypnosis Images 
Producing a play with a standard plot 
Free-floating daydreams 
Pre-sleep serial stories 
Daytime structured short stories and dramas 
Paracosms 
Hypnosis has the most colourful and obscure history in which the phenomena 
alternately mimic epilepsy, hysteria, and analgesia. From Mesmer's 'animal magnetism' 
to Puysegur's 'artificial somnambulism' two themes emerge. The first of these, hypnotic 
therapy, evolved from Charcot's work on hysteria in the nineteenth Century. The second, 
hypnotic anaesthesia, arose from the surgical procedures practised by Elliotson, Braid, 
and Esdaile during the same period (Rowley, 1986). In the twentieth Century hypnosis 
was finally picked up by psychologists interested in explaining it, as opposed to applying 
it. 
The contemporary debate in experimental hypnosis concerns its position as a state 
of consciousness. Although there are variations on the general method used to investigate 
whether hypnosis produces an altered state of consciousness the standard experimental 
protocol compares the behaviour and reports of so-called 'reals' and 'simulators'. The 
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'reals' are selected from a population of high susceptible participants and the 'simulators' 
from a population of low susceptible participants (based upon a hypnosis scale). The 
alternative procedure is to use verificational procedures, such as conformity to age-related 
behaviour during age regression experiments (Wagstaff, 1981). The main experiences and 
behaviours investigated are: age regression, amnesia, analgesia, and trance logic. Each is 
briefly discussed below. 
The wilder claims of former life regressions (e.g. the Bridey Murphy case) and 
deep trance infant regressions yielding age-specific Babinski reflexes are rejected by 
social state (Wagstaff, 1981) and special state theorists (Hilgard, 1977). Less dramatic 
claims of the reinstatement of certain age-specific abilities during hypnosis, such as 
Piagetian stages (Reiff and Sheerer, 1959) or the ability to use eidetic imagery (Walker, 
Garratt, and Wallace, 1976) have been challenged on methodological grounds (Hilgard, 
1977; Spanos, 1986). In summary, research into age regression has failed to support the 
special state hypothesis. 
Amnesia is one of the most popularised phenomenon reported in hypnosis. The 
general experience is a post-hypnotic amnesia for events occurring during the hypnotic 
procedure. Research into spontaneous amnesia has found discrepancies between 'reals' 
and 'simulators' with the latter over-exaggerating the frequency of the phenomenon 
(London cited in Wagstaff, 1981). However, spontaneous amnesia is not regarded as an 
appropriate area of investigation (Spanos, 1986). Kihlstrom (1985) claims that differences 
between 'reals' and 'simulators' have been found in a wide range of amnesia studies 
including: source amnesia, disorganised recall, and recognition ability. This claim has 
been challenged on individual differences and methodological grounds (Coe, 1989; 
Spanos, 1986). 
Anaesthesia is the most spectacular phenomenon to arise from hypnosis and 
studies of the use of hypnosis as a form of pain relief (the hidden observer effect) formed 
the basis for the best known theory of hypnosis, namely, Hilgard's neodissociation model 
of hypnosis (Hilgard, 1973, 1977, 1992). Hilgard's (1973) fundamental observation was 
that during pain studies (e.g. those using a cold-pressor test) participants were able to 
report a hidden pain dissociated (or at least in the third person) from conscious awareness. 
Several researchers have noted the problems with hidden observer studies. Of particular 
note are issues concerning: instruction expectancy effects (Spanos, 1983, 1986), the 
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deployment of cognitive coping strategies (Spanos, Oller head, and Gwynn, 1986), 
compliance (Spanos, Perlini, Patrick, Bell, and Gwynn, 1990) and positive and negative 
pre-task expectations (Spanos, 1986). 
The concept of trance logic was first noted by Orne (1959). He found that 
hypnotic susceptible individuals exhibited logically incongruent behaviour and reports 
during hypnosis. He concluded that there are critical differences between hypnosis and 
sham behaviour. Orne (1959) identified two particular forms of trance logic that 
distinguished 'reals' from 'simulators', namely, double hallucination and transparency 
reports. Several problems have been found in the study of double hallucinations and the 
empirical research does not altogether support his claim for trance logic (Johnson, Maher, 
and Barber, 1972; Sheehan, Obstoj, and McConkey, 1976). However, Marks, Baird and 
McKellar (1986) used a matched controlled design in which 'reals' and 'simulators' were 
both highly hypnotically susceptible. This study observed both double hallucination and 
transparency effects in the 'reals' but not the 'simulators'. Also, research into 
transparency effects has shown that 'reals' consistently exhibit more forms of 
transparency than 'simulators'. Even Spanos (1986) accepted this but he explains it 
through artifacts (e.g. differential task demands and individual differences in imagery 
ability). 
The Issue concernIng the status of the hypnotic expenence has important 
ramifications for the present classification system. While it remains unresolved hypnotic 
images will continue to be classified as 'dream-associated J experiences occurring in a 
non-somnambulistic state. Whatever the resolution, mental imagery has a strong 
association with hypnosis. It is an important feature of the hypnotic state and most 
hypnotic scales include a measure of self-reported mental imagery (e.g. the Stanford 
Hypnotic Susceptibility Scale, Weitzenhoffer and Hilgard 1959). Consequently, many 
studies have found that high susceptibility to hypnosis correlates with high self-reported 
mental imagery (Bowers, 1978; Crawford, 1982; Hilgard, 1979; Sutcliffe, Perry, and 
Sheehan, 1979). Research has also found that performance differences on cognitive and 
perceptual tasks in high and low hypnotically susceptible participants can be partially 
explained through imagery ability (Bowers, 1978; Crawford, 1982; Glisky, Tataryn, and 
Kihlstrom, 1995; Wallace, 1990; Wallace, Allen and Weber, 1994). 
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Aside from Rachmaninov's use of hypnosis to cure his depression (Rowley, 
1986), there is no association between historical creativity and hypnosis. There are a few 
theoretical and empirical reports of the use of hypnosis in the creative process (Bowers, 
1978; Suler, 1980). Bowers measured several factors associated with hypnotizability and 
assessed these in the context of divergent thinking. She concluded that the most important 
determinant in the relationship between hypnotizability and divergent thinking 
performance was effortless experiencing. She also claimed that effortless experiencing 
accounted for the relationship between self-reported mental imagery and divergent 
thinking. Bowers' (1978) research provides a useful source of information about the 
association between imagery, hypnosis, and creativity. 
Meditation Images 
Meditation sits comfortably below the section on hypnosis. The experiences 
reported during meditation are very similar to those found in hypnosis (e.g. enhanced 
mental imagery, hallucinations, free floating fantasy, a regression to unconscious 
processing, and effortless experiencing). Likewise, both areas are associated with the 
psychoanalytic concepts of primary and secondary thinking and the inevitable link 
between primary process thinking and creativity (Suler, 1980). 
There are numerous methods used to achieve a meditative state. The two best 
known forms are Transcendental Meditation and Zen meditation. The former uses a 
mantra (e.g. chanting 'rama') to invoke a meditative state and the latter uses a koan (e.g. 
'what did my face look like before I was born?'). Other meditative techniques employ: 
visual and tactile focusing (e.g. watching a candle, or constantly touching an object); 
breathing exercises (e.g. controlled counting). focusing upon an idea (Christian 
meditation); movement techniques (e.g. gritting teeth, or stomach movements); sitting 
quietly; and mindfulness. 
Given the array of meditation techniques how can a single definition be arrived 
at? While there appears to be a clear distinction between several forms of meditation 
(ideational/non-ideational thinking; constricted/dilated perceptual focusing) Naranjo 
(1972/1990) claims that all forms have the same path and goal. The path is to achieve a 
'concentrated state' and the goal is to reach a 'special state of mind'. 
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Some psychodynamic models of meditation explain the effects in terms of a right-
hemisphere primary process phase (Davidson, 1976). The right hemisphere model is 
appealing because there is some evidence that it plays an important role in the synthesis of 
emotions and spatio-visual tasks (Fenwick, 1990). Furthermore, increased right 
hemisphere activity has been found in meditation studies (Fenwick, 1990). However, 
Fromm (1981; cited in Fenwick, 1990) argues that primary process thinking occurs only 
in the early stages of meditation. A further feature of the psychoanalytic approach is a 
clear distinction between meditation and the ego-driven normal state of consciousness. 
Self-reports of negative sensations and thoughts during meditation (which often 
lead to a sense of well being) have led cognitive-behavioural theorists to posit a 
systematic desensitization hypothesis (Delmonte, 1990). It is proposed that meditation is 
superior to other relaxation methods because it produces decrements in somatic arousal 
and allows a reciprocal inhibition of the stimuli through the use of imagery techniques. 
Thus, meditation allows the user to develop a comfortable therapeutic process in which 
they can set an agenda. The main problem with this approach is that recent reviews of 
"experimental-control' studies suggest that meditation does not reduce arousal levels more 
than ordinary relaxation (Holmes, 1984, 1990). However, these findings have been 
challenged on methodological and interpretational grounds (Shapiro, 1985, West, 1985, 
1990). 
The relationship between meditation and creative thinking was popularized 
through the work of the Maharshi Mahesh Yogi and others in the 1960s. Ochse (1990) 
connects some of the strange behaviours of creative people to the use of meditation: 
'"Several tales told about the extraordinary habits of famous creators 
reveal that some of them did regularly use techniques somewhat like 
those mentioned above [meditative focusing tasks]. For example, Kant 
would stare fixedly through his window at a tower in the distance. 
Schiller liked to have the smell of rotten apples on his desk while he was 
writing poetry." (1990, p. 230). 
Although there have been few reports of the use of actual meditation in historical 
creativity an association can be indirectly made through the phenomenologically similar 
experiences reported during hypnagogia. Mavromatis (1987) in a review of the 
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relationship between meditative and hypnagogic experiences argues that they share the 
same cognitive and perceptual disruptions. 
Non Dream-associated Mental Images Characterised by their 'looking-at' 
phenomenology 
The mental images described in the previous sections were characterized by their 
'dream-associated' appearance. As was noted in Chapter Two these forms of mental 
imagery are rarely included reviews of mental imagery in cognitive psychology (e.g. 
Eysenck and Keane, 1997; Reed, 1991; and, Solso, 1991). These texts follow the standard 
experimental literature (Finke, 1989; Kosslyn, 1980, 1994; and, J.T.E. Richardson, 1999) 
in focusing upon non 'dream-associated' mental images. However, the non "dream-
associated' images discussed in the following section are also rarely discussed in the 
experimental literature. These forms of mental imagery are characterized by their 'looking 
at' status. That is, the sense of neither controlling nor owning the mental image. The first 
two areas discussed (flashbacks and pseudohallucionations) have not been associated with 
creativity. The second two areas (psychotic and psychedelic images) have been linked 
with historical creativity. 
Flashback Images 
The term flashback is used to refer to mental images that have been re-formed 
some time after the drugs effects have worn off. Since the 1960s information has been 
accumulated about the effects of hallucinogenic drugs on later psychotic episodes. It is 
estimated that up to 15% of regular users of LSD experience persistent flashbacks. These 
toxic reactions following hallucinogen use tend to occur in those with pre-disposed 
psychotic personality disorder (Smith and Seymour, 1994; Vardy and Kay, 1995). 
The term flashback has also been used to explain the re-experiencing of mental 
images during post-traumatic stress disorder. It is unlikely that the experiences formed as 
a consequence of the use of psychedelic drugs are the same as those experienced as a 
response to post-traumatic stress disorder. The most obvious difference is the emotional 
context underlying the two types of flashbacks. Other ways in which they differ might 
concern the persistence of the flashback after the initial experience, the direct antecedents 
to the flashback, and the physiological correlates of the flashback. The reason they are 
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known collectively is because they are both examples of mental images recalled from 
specific past experiences. Flashbacks are produced involuntarily by the individual. They 
appear extra-psychically but are not perceived as real by the imager. There is no reported 
relationship between flashbacks and creativity. 
Pseudohallucination Images 
The distinction between pseudohallucinations and hallucinations is determined by 
the experiencer's belief about the source of the image. The term is useful to the extent that 
many people experience images that have a 'looking-at' quality but are known by the 
individual not to be real. In the general population the occurrence of pseudohallucinations 
has been associated with periods of isolation and monotonous sensory stimulation (e.g. 
long-distance driving and single-handed sailing; Whitlock, 1987). A further condition in 
which pseudohallucinations occur is immediately after the loss of someone. 
In the past decade there has been a resurgence of interest in a condition first 
reported by Charles Bonnet in 1769 (cited in Shultz and Melzack, 1991). This condition, 
the Charles Bonnet Syndrome, is characterized by a preponderance of visual 
pseudohallucinations. It is normally found in older people and is associated with 
concomitant visual impairments. A description of the pseudohallucinations experienced in 
Charles Bonnet syndrome is provided below: 
" ... Monsieur Lullin, at the age of 89 (eleven years after cataract surgery), 
began to see astonishing images of men, women, carriages, and 
buildings. The figures appeared in movement: approaching, receding, 
becoming larger or smaller, disappearing then reappearing. Buildings 
would rise in front of his eyes, showing their exterior construction. 
Tapestries in his apartment would change and become those of a "richer 
taste". At other times the tapestries would be covered in paintings of 
scenic views. These visual images appeared with his full knowledge that 
they were not actually physically present." (Shultz and Melzack, 1991, p. 
809-810). 
There have not been any reports of the use of pseudo hallucinations in creativity. It 
could be surmised that the close relationship between these images and perception offers a 
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logical reason as to why they are not linked to creativity. As noted in Chapter Two, 
perception may involve intelligent processing, but it is not creative (Rock, 1983). 
Psychotic Images 
Reports of auditory and visual hallucinations provide a key diagnostic criterion 
for a range of psychotic disorders. The basic criterion for a hallucination is the production 
of an image that has experiential properties normally associated with perception. These 
are: the appearance of being outside the hallucinator; the ability to be selectively attended 
to; the property of being able to appear and disappear without the determination of the 
hallucinator; and the ability to deceive the hallucinator into believing that what they are 
seeing is real (A.Richardson, 1969). Finally, hallucinations can only be described as such 
if they occur in a waking state; this excludes dreams, hypnagogic images, and 
hypnopompic images. 
The majority of accounts of hallucinations are reported in those suffering from 
psychotic disorders. These are normally auditory hallucinations and take the form of 
audible thoughts; voices arguing; and, voices commenting (Davison & Neale, 1990). 
Other reports of hallucinations have been related to: the use of hallucinogens (Miller & 
Gold, 1994; Smith & Seymour, 1994); post-traumatic stress disorder (Davison & Neale, 
1990) alcohol withdrawal (Goodwin, 1981); high fever, stroboscopic stimulation, and 
extreme exhaustion (Rycroft, 1981). These forms of hallucinations are not discussed here. 
Studies of the reported incidence of psychotic hallucinations in the general 
population have been estimated at 10% (Sedgwick, 1894; and Menninger, 1949; both 
cited in McKellar, 1972). The relationship between hallucinations and other forms of 
mental imagery has been the subject of interest in recent research (Bentall, 1990). These 
studies have found that hallucinations are associated with similarly vivid and extra-
psychic experiences such as hypnopompic and hypnagogic images (Jakes and Hemsley, 
1987) but not with less vivid and intrapsychic experiences occurring during waking states 
(Chandiramani and Varma, 1987). 
In certain conditions psychotic hallucinations have been associated with 
creativity; particularly those arising from psychedelic experiences (e.g. Coleridge). 
Recently there has also been a resurgence of interest in creativity and hallucinations 
originating from an endogenous form. Post (1994). studied the biographies of 291 
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historically creative individuals and concluded that there were above average rates of 
psychopathology. While some (Jamison, 1993; Storr, 1972) claim a direct link between 
creativity and psychopathology (i.e. that madness leads to creativity) the argument is hard 
to maintain when exogenous predictors (stress induced arousal) of psychotic 
hallucinations are taken into account (Bentall, 1990). Furthermore, Eysenck (1995) claims 
that schizophrenics are only capable of creativity when their condition is not exhibited. 
Psychedelic Images 
The reasons for using psychoactive drugs can be categorized into four groups: 
ritual/cultural; medicinal/therapeutic; occupational/functional; and, social/recreational 
(World Drug Report, 1997). While the first category (ritual/cultural) was largely 
responsible for the introduction of organic psychedelic drugs and the second category 
(medicinal/therapeutic) for the introduction of synthetic psychedelic drugs the main 
reason for using psychedelic drugs in the 1990s is for recreational purposes. 
There are many drugs that produce psychedelic images. The best known are 
lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD), mescaline, psilocybin, N,N-dimethyltrypamine (DMT) 
and 3,4,( +)methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA). Others include myristicine, 
bufotenine, harmine, hyoscine, and cannabis (Maisto, Galizio and Connors, 1991; Shaw 
and Crossland, 1981). As LSD, MDMA, and DMT are the most commonly used 
psychedelics the following section will focus upon these. Although mental images are a 
central feature of the psychedelic experience there are a range of cognitive and emotional 
factors that effect the individual. The most notable of these are differences in: time 
perception, social interaction, defensiveness, emotion, aggression, speech, obsessiveness, 
restlessness, and impulsivity (Julien, 1995; McDowell and Kleber, 1994; Strassman, 
1998). 
Psychedelics interact with a range of neurotransmitters but those that effect 
serotonergic neurons appear to produce the strongest effect (Julien, 1995). It is only 
recently that the mechanism and site of action has been understood (Aghajanian, 1994). 
Research has found that hallucinogenic effects are associated with the postsynaptic 5-HT2 
receptors found predominantly in the loecus coerulus and the cerebral cortex. 
The best known serotonergic hallucinogen (LSD) was developed by Hofman in 
1938. The average dosage required to produce hallucinogenic effects is 0.025 to 0.050 
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mg. This means that LSD is 200 times more potent than psi10cybine and 4,000 times more 
potent than mescaline. LSD produces very minor physiological effects and the estimated 
lethal dose is 14mg (280 times greater than the average dose). In the 1960s and 1970s 
there was a great deal of enthusiasm about the potential of psychedelic drugs to enhance 
creativity. During this period several studies were conducted into the potential of 
psychedelic drugs to heighten creativity (Barron, 1969, McKellar, 1957). The results from 
these studies suggested that the drug could be used to enhance creativity. However, since 
the 1960s there has been a considerable amount of cynicism about the enhancing abilities 
of these drugs (Martindale, 1981). 
The most commonly used noradrenergic synthetic is Ecstasy (MDMA). MDMA 
was discovered by the Merck Company in 1914. It was experimented with in the 1950s 
but only became popular in the 1970s as a psychotherapeutic 'insight' drug. Ecstasy 
remained legal until 1985 when it was classified as a Schedule I drug following a mass 
advertising campaign in Texas. Ecstasy is the drug of the 'rave' culture. There have been 
no attempts to study the effects ofMDMA on creativity. 
In the past decade the natural psychoactive preparation, Ayahuasca, has become a 
popular alternative recreational psychedelic. Ayahausca is a brown-reddish drink brewed 
from a mixture of plants found in South America. While these plant extracts contain a 
range of psychedelic drugs the compound DMT produces the dominant effect. Although 
DMT has the same molecular interaction as LSD (and produces similar effects) there is no 
cross-tolerance between the two drugs (Riba and B arb anoj , 1998). As a mixture of many 
substances the effects of Ayahausca are less intense than DMT. Like many of these 
psychedelic drugs Ayahausca has been associated with 'insight' experiences (Shannon, 
1998). However, there is no empirical support for this association. 
Non Dream-associated Mental Images Characterised by their 'looking/or' Nature 
The forms of mental imagery discussed in the final category of mental images 
have expansive research literatures. These forms of mental imagery can be broadly 
classified as 'cognitive psychology' mental images. The labels attributed to these mental 
images are artificial in the sense that they may refer more to the researcher's aims than to 
the actual status of the mental image. For example, 'questionnaire images' are grouped 
together because they represent those instruments used by researchers interested in the 
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phenomenological status of mental images. Similarly, the label 'experimental images' 
refers to a diverse range of mental images that test the perceptual equivalence hypothesis 
discussed in Chapter Two. As a collective, however, they can all be characterized by their 
"looking at' status. 
As these forms of mental imagery have traditionally been associated with 
cognitive psychology it is not surprising that the majority of research into the role of 
mental imagery in creativity has been carried out using these measures of mental imagery. 
A further reason why they have been used to investigate mental imagery and creativity 
may be because their non "dream-associated' and 'looking at' status makes them 
amenable to investigation. The two main protocols used to investigate mental imagery and 
creativity employ the mental images discussed in this section. These are the individual 
differences approach which uses "questionnaire images' and the image generation 
approach which uses the emergence properties of some of the "experimental images'. 
Memory Images 
Research into the role of mental imagery in memory has focused upon a variety of 
factors that influence the individual's performance on a memory task (Morris and 
Hampson, 1983). Areas that have been extensively researched include: the imageability of 
the stimuli; the representation of the stimuli; the strategy for memory; and, individual 
differences in memory. The subject is so expansive, and the interaction between the areas 
so complex, that it is not possible to give a full review in the present section. Instead a 
cursory summary of each area will be provided. 
Much memory research has focused upon the nature of the to-be-remembered 
material (e.g. distinctiveness, meaningfulness, familiarity, word length). Early 
experimental research found that performance on paired associate tasks was mediated by 
mental imagery (Paivio, 1963, 1965, 1969, 1971; Paivio and Madigan, 1968; Paivio, 
Yuille, and Madigan, 1968). Furthermore, later research has shown that imageability is 
distinguishable from concreteness and that emotionality is independently linked to 
imageability (Benjafield, 1987; J.T.E. Richardson, 1975, 1999). 
The use of imagery instructions to facilitate memory performance has been a 
subject of interest since Yates' (1966) examined the method of loci. The most frequently 
used imagery strategies are the keyword method, the method of loci and the peg-word 
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mnemonic. In its simplest form the keyword strategy involves the construction of a mental 
image to accompany the to-be-remembered item. Paivio demonstrated the effectiveness of 
this strategy in a simple experiment on imagery and pronunciation instructions (see 
Paivio, 1989). He found that the participants performed twice as effectively when asked to 
form an image than when asked to pronounce a word. Atkinson (Atkinson, 1975; 
Atkinson and Raugh, 1975) found that performance in second-language learning was 
increased when the participants were instructed to image foreign language words with 
their own language equivalents. In one study they found that participants who used the 
key-word strategy learned an average of 72% of 120 Russian words compared to a control 
group that learned only 46% of the words (Atkinson and Raugh, 1975). 
The basic strategy employed in the method of loci mnemonic is to place the to-be-
remembered items in relation to objects in a room (if a speech is given) or along a 
particular route. Whilst doing this the person forms an image at each given position and 
these images and localities then serve as cues for aiding recall. Empirical research into the 
effectiveness of the method of loci has shown that the mnemonic is most effective when 
learning oral material (De Beni, Moe, and Cornoldi, 1997). Disruption of the mnemonic, 
using concurrent visuo-spatial tasks, has been used to support and evaluate Baddeley's 
concept of a visuo-spatial scratch pad (Baddeley and Leiberman, 1980; Logie, 1986). 
The peg-word mnemonic (or 'one bun' mnemonic) is similar to the method of 
loci. The aim of the peg-word method is to literally 'hang' the to-be-remembered items in 
a numbered order. As the words are hung they are then imaged with their ordered 'one 
bun' associates. Baddeley and Lieberman (1980) showed that performance on the method 
of loci was disrupted more than the peg-word mnemonic when participants performed a 
concurrent spatial tracking task. Logie (1986) showed that performance on the peg-word 
mnemonic was similarly affected when the participants' performed a visual matching 
task. These studies suggest dissociable visual and spatial systems (Logie, 1989; Logie and 
Marchetti, 1991). 
The final area reviewed concerns individual differences in imagery ability 
(questionnaire studies are discussed in the next section). Studies of eidetic imagery have 
been reviewed by A.Richardson (1969) and later by Haber (1979). They concluded that 
eidetic imagers are very rare and that this ability normally disappears in adulthood. 
Techniques used by people with extra-ordinary memory skills have often been linked to 
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mental imagery. For example, Luria found that his subject (Shereshveskii) used 
synaesthesia to enhance his memory abilities (McKellar, 1997). 
Research into the clinical use of mental imagery strategies in brain damaged 
patients has been reviewed by 1.T.E.Richardson (1999). Richardson (1999) concluded that 
mnemonic training procedures following brain damage result in significant improvements 
in memory. Although initial studies of brain damage focused upon a right-hemisphere 
hypothesis, research findings since the 1970s have shown that mnemonic techniques 
improve memory impairments in both left and right hemisphere damaged individuals 
(Richardson, 1999). 
Where attempts have been made to link memory to creativity they have focused 
on the application of specific problem solving heuristics that may (or may not) facilitate 
the creative process (Stein, 1989). For example, there has been a lot of research into the 
successful and unsuccessful transfer of problem solving heuristics (Gick and Holyoak, 
1980; Holyoak and Koh, 1987). However, this research has little bearing upon mental 
imagery. Furthermore, very few imagery researchers proposing a role for mental imagery 
in creativity note the mediating effects of memory. However, the ability to form mental 
images from past experience seems essential to the creative process at least in the 
preparatory stage and in some circumstances (architecture, the arts, or even mathematics) 
in the actual productive phase (Paivio, 1983). 
Paivio (1983) offers several insights into mental image representation and 
creativity. He argues that the visual code has many advantages over the verbal code (e.g. a 
greater capacity, economy of organization, stronger accessibility, and better 
retrieveability). Perhaps his strongest case, however, is the demonstration of the aesthetic 
appeal of the image and its subsequent adoption by many creative writers and artists. As 
he states: 
"Imagery provides a rich storehouse of concrete memories that constitute 
our knowledge of the world. It provides an integrated way of organizing 
such information and ready access to the various components. It is also 
highly transformable or manipulable with relative freedom from the 
linear constraints that characterize language. Imagery is therefore the 
system par excellence for creative work, for unconstrained leaps of 
imagination." (Paivio, 1989, p.269). 
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However, Paivio (1983) makes no specific reference to how the experimental protocols 
adopted in memory research could be used to investigate creativity. Two possible areas of 
memory research that may show a role for mental imagery in creativity are the 
imageability and mnemonic studies. Both of these are theoretically dependent upon an 
associationistic model of creativity (Mednick, 1962). For example. the role of 
imageability in 'associate' and 'solution' words may be an important predictor of 
performance in the original remote associates task and the dyad of triad version developed 
by Bowers, Regehr, Balthazard, and Parker (1990). Conversely, the loose associations 
produced in some mnemonic strategies may facilitate creativity through the use of 
'thought-diversifying strategies' (McGuire, 1997). This research links well with 
Hargreaves and Bolton's (1972) unexplained finding that divergent thinking abilities 
correlate with paired-associate learning performance. 
Rehearsal Images 
A recent body of research has linked mental rehearsal to the activation of the 
motor system and peripheral regions (Marks and Isaac, 1995). Inevitably, much of the 
applied research is based on the use of mental imagery in sport (Kremer and Scully, 
1994). Consequently, the following review concentrates upon this particular area of 
mental rehearsal. 
Although athletes have employed psychology in sport for a very long time it is 
only in the past three decades that it has become an integrative part of sports science 
programmes (Cox, 1994). These programmes have employed cognitive intervention 
strategies designed specifically to enhance sporting performance. An important element of 
interest is in techniques designed to enhance motor processes. Mental imagery, as practice 
and elaboration, sits comfortably alongside goal setting, relaxation training and self-talk as 
an established form of skills training (Hardy, Jones, and Gould, 1997). 
The use of mental rehearsal as an aid to performance enhancement seems to be 
widespread in elite athletes. A typical mental imagery programme follows a very similar 
format to a clinical application. One study of the use of mental rehearsal found that 70% 
of Olympic athletes reported using mental rehearsal (Ungerleider, Golding, Porter, and 
Foster, 1987). The accumulation of research into mental rehearsal has resulted in an 
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impressive array of findings. These are summarized by Cox (1994) in her review of 
mental imagery in sport (see Table 3.3). 
Table 3.3. Cox's 10 Principles Associated with the Application of Mental Imagery to 
Sport 
1. Imagery skills can be developed 
2. Effectiveness of imagery is dependent upon a positive attitude towards imagery 
3. Advanced athletes benefit the most from using imagery 
4. Imagery is more powerful when combined with effective relaxation 
5. Imagery can be used in the first person (internal) or the third person (external) 
6. Imagery is more potent in performance enhancement in self-reported High Imagers 
7. Negative outcome imagery results in greater decrements in achievement than positive 
outcome imagery 
8. Those who use imagery enhance their performance more than those who do not 
9. Imagery is widely used by sports people 
10. The better a person is at using imagery the more effective is the imagery 
There have been no studies of the role of mental imagery in creative sports 
performance. In assessing a possible relationship between mental rehearsal and creativity 
two operational problems need to be considered. The first is the problem of defining 
creativity within sport and the second is the development of tools that adequately measure 
this creativity. Clearly, it would not be possible to assess the effects of mental rehearsal on 
creativity using standard divergent thinking tasks. To understand the role of mental 
rehearsal in creativity it would be necessary to use experts to assess creativity (and skill) 
following the use of imagery training techniques. 
Questionnaire Images 
The main philosophical problem with mental images is that they are private 
experiences that are inaccessible to observation. Conversely the main practical problem 
with mental images is that they are private experiences that do not produce consistent and 
replicable findings. Hence, the resurgence of interest in mental imagery research resulted 
from the development of consistent and interpretable measures of mental imagery in 
68 
memory and spatial tasks (Paivio, Yuille and Madigan 1968; Shepard and Metzler, 1971). 
However, some characteristics of mental imagery are not amenable to behavioural 
observation and could not be properly represented in behavioural tasks. In these 
circumstances it is necessary to develop measures of self-reported mental imagery that are 
consistent and replicable. The most commonly reported characteristics of mental imagery 
investigated are vividness, control, and preference. Each is briefly discussed below. 
As traditional philosophical (e.g. Empiricism) and practical (e.g. memory 
mnemonics) applications of mental imagery have emphasized the brightness and clarity of 
mental imagery it is not surprising that the vividness of imagery was the first aspect to be 
empirically investigated. Galton's interest in visual imagery led to the development of his 
"Breakfast Table Questionnaire" and was followed by Betts' 150 item questionnaire (The 
Betts' Questionnaire upon Mental Imagery). 
The Betts' QMI remained the standard measure of the vividness of mental 
imagery until the resurgence of interest in self-report measures of imagery occurred in the 
1960s. The first modification of the Betts' QMI was carried out by Sheehan (1967) who 
produced a shortened 35 item version. Later, Marks (1972) returned to Galton's original 
emphasis upon visual imagery when he developed the Vividness of Visual Imagery 
Questionnaire (VVIQ). Marks (1972) produced 16 to-be-imaged items reported in an 
'eyes open' and 'eyes closed' format. Marks (1972, 1973) hypothesised that participants 
with high self-reported vividness of visual imagery would perform better than those with 
low self-reported vividness of visual imagery on a prompted picture recall task. Since 
Marks' original study a vast amount of research has been carried out into the relationship 
between the vividness of visual imagery and cognitive performance. Assessments of the 
criterion validity of the VVIQ have reviewed over 150 studies (Marks, 1985, 1989, 1995, 
1998; McKelvie, 1995). These agree that the VVIQ achieves optimal predictive validity 
with other self-report measures and shows acceptable criterion validity on cognitive and 
perceptual tasks (McKelvie, 1995). 
The control of mental imagery also formed an important element of Galton' s 
empirical observations and was used by Jaensch as a key factor in his model of 
personality (A. Richardson, 1969). The best known measure of the control of imagery was 
developed by Gordon (1949) as a predictor of racial stereotyping (The Gordon Test of 
Visual Imagery Control: TVIC). She found that people with low control (autonomous 
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imagers) were more likely to produce racially stereotyped images than those with high 
control (controlled imagers). Following 15 years of clinical application A.Richarsdson 
(1969) produced a modified version of the TVIC that could be used as a continuous 
variable. As a result the TVIC has become a common adjunct to measures of vividness of 
mental imagery in self-report studies (McKelvie, 1995). 
Given the nature of the TVIC it would be expected that it measures some form of 
spatial ability and that this would be reflected in tests of association with both spatial 
ability tasks and mental transformation tasks. However, research has found no association 
between the TVIC and measures of spatial ability (Di Vesta, Ingersoll, and Sunshine, 
1971 ; Ernest, 1977). 
Although there have been no thorough reviews of the functional utility of the 
TVIC many studies have been carried out into the various forms of reliability and validity. 
Despite A.Richardson's adjustment of the TVIC scores on this scale are more susceptible 
to ceiling effects than other self-report measures of imagery (Hiscock, 1978; Kihlstrom, 
Glisky, Peterson, Harvey, and Rose, 1991; A.Richardson, 1972). Research has shown that 
the TVIC has acceptable internal reliability and good test-retest reliability (Ashton and 
White, 1974; White, Sheehan and Ashton, 1976). Factor analyses have shown three or 
more factors emerging from the 12 item test (Kihlstrom et aI., 1991). 
There have been several attempts to modify or elaborate upon the TVIC (Absen, 
1985, 1993; Lane, 1977). Absen (1993) developed a parental filter version of the TVIC 
(AA-TVIC) and Lane (1977) used the format of the Betts' QMI to develop a multi-modal 
measure of the control of mental imagery. Although Lane (1977) found that the seven 
modality-specific groupings all loaded on a single factor the other factors were not 
modality specific. 
The notion that individuals have a preference for visual or verbal processing is as 
old as the concept of vividness (Richardson, 1969) and was investigated by Bartlett 
(1932) in his 'ways of thinking' studies. In the last three decades several researchers have 
developed self-report measures of cognitive style. Two of the best known measures of 
verbal and visual preferences are Paivio's (1971) Individual Differences Questionnaire 
(lDQ) and A.Richardson's (1977) Verbaliser-Visualiser Questionnaire (VVQ). A brief 
review of each is given below. 
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The IDQ consists of 86 items that are roughly split into statements pertaining to 
verbal thinking (e.g. 'I enjoy doing work that requires the use of words') and visual 
thinking (e.g. 'I find it easy to visualize the faces of people I know). The participants are 
required to answer 'True' or 'False' to the statements and the scores are collated for 
cognitive preference. The IDQ has been used far less frequently than the self-report 
measures of vividness and control of visual imagery. Paivio' s original study investigated 
the association between the IDQ and a wide range of imagery and verbal measures. Paivio 
(1971) found that the imagery component of the IDQ loaded with other self-report 
measures of imagery (e.g. vividness and control) and that the verbal component loaded 
with vocabulary tests. Hiscock's (1978) 72 item version of the IDQ showed similar 
associations. Hiscock (1978) also found that females tended to respond higher on the 
mental imagery items than males. As this sex difference contradicted the findings from 
spatial ability studies (Maccoby and Jacklin, 1974) some researchers questioned the 
validity of self-report measures (Ashton and White 1980). However, later research has 
shown that self-report scales measure preference for non-spatial mental imagery 
(Harshman and Paivio, 1987). 
A shortened form of the IDQ was developed by A.Richardson (The Verbaliser-
Visualizer Questionnaire: VVQ) to study cognitive style and hemispheric asymmetry 
(A. Richardson, 1977). He found that participants made more leftward eye movements 
when they were performing the imagery component of the VVQ. However, this finding 
has not been consistently replicated and it is now accepted that non-spontaneous eye 
movements do not predict hemispheric processing activity (J.T.E.Richardson, 1999). The 
VVQ has not fared well in analyses of reliability and validity. In a recent study Antonietti 
and Giorgtti claimed that, "Most studies have failed to support the notion that the VVQ 
predicts the actual use of a verbal or visual code in thinking" (1996, p.60). 
Questionnaire images hardly resemble the kinds of images reported by historically 
creative individuals. The key distinction being that the participant is required to construct 
a fixed image from memory or imagination. However, they may act as a measure of 
general abilities in image production and they do offer the opportunity of creating 
alternative questionnaires that may be tailored to those aspects considered important in 
creativity research. 
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There have been many studies of the relationship between self-reported mental 
imagery and divergent thinking (e.g. Bowers, 1978; Campos and Gonzalez, 1993; Forisha, 
1981; Khatena, 1975; Parrott and Strongman, 1985; and, Shaw and DeMers, 1986). All of 
these studies have used an individual differences approach to investigate the role of 
mental imagery in creativity. In these studies it is hypothesized that those who report 
mental imagery that is vivid or easy to control will perform better on a divergent thinking 
task than those who report mental imagery that is non-vivid or difficult to control. A 
literature review of empirical studies employing self-report measures of mental imagery 
(see Chapter Four) shows that this is the dominant method used to study the role of mental 
imagery in divergent thinking performance. The majority of the studies have investigated 
the association between the vividness and control of mental imagery and performance on 
Torrance's tests of creative thinking (Torrance, 1974). This area of research requires 
further examination. 
Experimental Images: The Perceptual Equivalence Hypothesis 
A criterion for mental imagery discussed in Chapter Two was that an image 
resembles the qualities of its modality-equivalent percept. Many researchers believe that 
this basic criterion logically entails a representational equivalence (Block, 1983). That is, 
that imagery and perception have the same (or equivalent) mechanisms. Consequently, a 
host of experimental studies have been developed to verify perceptual equivalence. The 
debate over the representational status of mental images has led to a flurry of 
experimental protocols that subsume the literature on mental imagery. For example, in a 
recent literature review (using PsychLit) of one of these experimental protocols (mental 
rotation) over 100 citations appeared in the past three years. 
Studies of the overflow and acuity of mental images have been carried out to 
assess the perceptual equivalence hypothesis. Kosslyn (1978), measured the angle at 
which 'overflow' occurred through a 'stop the mental walk' protocol. He concluded that 
the point of overflow was linearly determined to an object size equivalent to perceptual 
overflow. However, more recent research has found non-equivalence (Hubbard and Baird. 
1988) and explanations for equivalence need to account for evident experimental task 
demands (Mitchell and Richman, 1980). Acuity studies (i.e. studies that measure the level 
of resolution of the visual field) have shown equivalent decrements in spatial frequency 
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resolution tasks (Finke and Kurtzman, 1981). This finding has also been challenged on 
methodological grounds (Intons-Peterson and White, 1981). 
The study of anomalous perceptual experiences in the 1960s were intended to 
demonstrate that perceptions are often constructed from past experiences (Gregory, 1966). 
The finding that the perceptual system regularly misinterprets specific forms of sensory 
information has resulted in similar studies being carried out in mental imagery to test the 
perceptual equivalence hypothesis. For example, Wallace (1984) found similar size 
deceptions when the Ponzo illusion was visualised. However, research employing the 
more complex ambiguous figures tasks (e.g. The Jastrow duck/rabbit figure) by Chambers 
and Reisberg (1985) does not support an equivalence hypothesis. However, later attempts 
have succeeded in demonstrating an equivalence for complex tasks when more specific 
instructions are given to the participants (see Kosslyn, 1994). Finally, recent research has 
also demonstrated the phi phenomenon effect when imaging (Brosgole, Chan, Brandt-
Tiven, Miller, and Sanders, 1997). 
The mental rotation task was developed by Shepard and Metzler (1971) to test an 
hypothesised imaginal and physical transformational equivalence. Shepard and Metzler 
(1971) presented participants with pairs of three-dimensional shapes at different 
orientations from each other. The aim of the task was to state whether the shapes were 
identical or a mirror reversal. Shepard and Metzler found an inverse linear relationship 
between the time taken to perform the task and the angular distance between the shapes. 
They concluded from these findings that there was a transformational equivalence 
between imaged and physical rotation. 
Since Shepard and Metzler's (1971) demonstration of the mental rotation effect an 
enormous number of confirmatory findings have been found (Finke, 1989; Kosslyn, 
1994). Although alternative accounts have been put forward to explain the effect (e.g. 
tacit inference, reference frame strategy, and eye-movement) the volume of diverse 
experimental confirmations and the participants' claims about using mental imagery to 
perform the task supports the isomorphic transformation equivalence proposed by 
Shepard (1984). This conclusion is also strongly supported by neuropsychological studies 
which report increased activation in visuo-spatial regions when participants perform the 
mental rotation task (Kosslyn, 1994). 
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With the exception of the mental rotation task Kosslyn's (1973) mental scanning 
protocol is the most frequently cited mental imagery task. Kosslyn (1973) found that 
image scanning was governed by the same spatial metric found in perceptual search tasks; 
that is, an inverse relationship between time and distance. The prototypical mental 
scanning task was carried out by Kosslyn, Ball, and Reiser (1978) in response to research 
demonstrating non-spatial effects (Lea, 1975). In this experiment the participants were 
shown a map of an island and required to memorise it to a level where they could 
demonstrate a competent knowledge. They were then asked to image a black speck 
moving at a constant speed between objects located at different places on the island. This 
experiment showed a near perfect association between the distances between the objects 
and the time taken to complete the task. 
Although the image scanning protocol predicts the same geometric principle 
underlying Shepard's (Shepard and Metzler, 1971) image rotation experiments there are 
crucial differences between the tasks. For example, the scanning paradigm requires 
explicit instruction and a greater reliance upon short-term memory. Furthermore, the 
scanning task yields a phenomenal (as opposed to a behavioural) measure of imaging 
ability. Nevertheless, the image scanning protocol has been subjected to the same 
criticisms as the mental rotation protocol. These include, experimental task demand and 
expectancy accounts (Intons-Peterson, 1983; Mitchell, and Richman, 1980; Richman, 
Mitchell, and Reznick, 1979) and cognitive penetrability explanations (Pylyshyn, 1981). 
One consequence of these criticisms has been the development of new 
experimental designs that further support the equivalence hypothesis (Denis and Kosslyn, 
1999). For example, Denis and Carfantan (1985,1986) showed that the participants were 
not generally aware of the outcome of scanning experiments. Furthermore, Finke and 
Pinker (1982) designed a scanning protocol which minimised demand characteristics 
whilst still showing the same spatial metric and Jolicoeur and Kosslyn (1985) showed that 
experimenter effects did not confound the basic spatial metric. 
Having established a robust image scanning effect research has been drawn to 
understanding the neural correlates of image scanning. Neurological investigations into 
image scanning have followed from the experimental cognitive research and have 
generally been used to assess a hypothesised shared image-percept neural substrate. 
Whilst some research has identified activity in areas used in perception (e.g. occipital, 
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parietal, and sensori-motor regions) when participants perform an image scanning task the 
findings are not conclusive (Denis and Kosslyn, 1999). 
While there has been a considerable amount of research into self-reported mental 
imagery and divergent thinking performance the individual differences approach to the 
study of mental imagery in creativity has not investigated the mental imagery tasks 
discussed in this section. This is surprising given Shepard's (1978) claim that mental 
transformation is a key aspect of creativity. However, this may reflect the underlying aim 
of these experiments which is to demonstrate the existence of a shared form of 
representation. This is very different from the self-report studies which tend to focus upon 
the ways in which people differ in the processing of information (Marks, 1972, 1973). 
As the objective of the experimental protocols listed in the present section is to 
show that mental imagery is perceptually equivalent in all individuals it is hardly 
surprising that investigations of the use of mental imagery in creativity postulate strategies 
rather than individual differences. In the past decade demonstrations of the use of mental 
imagery in creativity have used a protocol that that requires the generation and synthesis 
of stimulus parts into creative composite forms (Finke, 1990, 1996; Finke and Slayton, 
1988; Finke, Ward, and Smith, 1989, 1992). These methods (referred to in the present 
thesis as the image generation approach) have found that participants are capable of 
producing creative responses to tasks which necessarily involve the use of mental 
imagery. Although these tasks are not representative of the experimental protocols 
presented in this section they share the same emphases upon the generation, 
transformation, and interpretation of mental images. The image generation approach is 
comprehensively reviewed in Chapter Seven. 
Synaesthesia 
Synaesthesia is defined as the transference of one mode of sensory information to 
another. This can take the form of a conceptual translation or an image translation. The 
most commonly cited example of synaesthesia is 'colour hearing'. This is the 
representation of auditory sensations as both sounds and colours. In some individuals an 
extremely vivid form of synaesthesia is experienced involuntarily; this may be the case for 
a large number of individuals during hypnagogic and hypnopompic states (Mavromatis, 
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1987). Synaesthesia has also been reported following the ingestion of such hallucinogenic 
compounds as mescaline, marijuana and LSD (McKellar, 1997). 
Early twentieth century research reported that between 1-10% of the popUlation 
claimed to have synaesthesia (Domino, 1989). Later research, however, has shown that 
approximately 20% of the population report synaesthesia (McKellar, 1997). Unusual 
synaesthetic images that are immediately identifiable have been linked with eidetic 
imagery and its consequent memory facilitation; Luria's studies of the journalist 
Shereshveskii are often cited in this context (McKellar, 1997; Richardson, 1969). 
McKellar (1997) also reports the use of synaesthesia as a mnemonic in occupations which 
require a complex form of information storage and retrieval. Ahsen (1997) reports several 
cases of synaesthesia during phosphene application. McKellar (1997) suggests that 
synaesthesia may also be used to control pain (visual-analgesic synaesthesia). 
Furthermore, research into synaesthesia shows that mild sensory transference is common. 
For example, L.E.Marks (1978,1982) investigated how the sounds of some pseudowords 
were associated with particular geometrical features. He found that pseudowords like 
'maluma' produced round visual representations, whereas others, like 'takete' produced 
angular representations. 
While few people experience the kind of synaesthesia reported by Luria's subject 
the presentation of synaesthetic material is common. Given the popularity of many 
synaesthetic presentations (e.g. Walt Disney's Fantasia, sound and light shows, and even 
firework concerts) it would appear that many people enjoy and comprehend the 
synaesthetic experience. Furthermore, the prevalence of synaesthetic idioms (e.g. the 
colour-temperature idiom) suggests that they are a useful way of defining emotional 
relatedness. 
Synaesthesia, with or without mental images, appears to be an implicit skill (that 
can be learned) used for artistic creation. Some art forms (e.g. dance) are based upon the 
transference of information from one sensory modality to another. The transference from 
an auditory to a visual mode is quite frequently reported and there are many examples of 
composers (e.g. Berloiz, Debussy, and Wagner) reporting the experience of synaesthetic 
images (McKellar, 1997). Similarly, many poets have exploited the aesthetic qualities of 
synaesthesia. Extracts from Bauderlaire, Shelley, Poe, Rimbaud, Tennyson, and Fitzgerald 
demonstrate the use of synaesthesia in literature (Marks, 1982: McKellar, 1997). Several 
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researchers have carried out studies into synaesthesia and creativity (Domino, 1989; 
L.E.Marks, 1982). For example, Domino (1989) found that those who reported 
synaesthesia performed significantly better than controls on four measures of creativity. 
Conclusion 
The aIm of the present chapter was to develop a classification system that 
distinguishes and describes different kinds of mental images. A review of the literature 
showed that there had been no previous attempts to do this in the context of creativity. It 
also showed that a general classification of mental imagery had not been attempted for 
more than decade. Consequently, it was necessary to construct new sub-ordinate 
categories and to define discrete members of each of these categories. The first distinction 
between mental images was made on the basis of their association with the dreaming 
state. This resulted in the selection of nine distinguishable forms of mental imagery 
associated with the dreaming state and nine forms of mental imagery not associated with 
the dreaming state. These categories were further broken into two sets and each was 
individually reviewed in the context of its possible role in creativity. 
The findings from the review show that there are many forms of mental imagery 
that have been associated historically with creativity. These appear in both of the maj or 
sub-ordinate categories but are more prevalent in the 'dream-associated' category. 
However, empirical investigations into the role of mental imagery have concentrated on 
mental images that are characterised by their non 'dream-associated' status and which 
have a 'looking at' status. Thus, although the empirical literature seems to be driven by 
the anecdotal reports of historically creative individuals (e.g. Finke, 1996; Forisha, 1981; 
Shepard, 1978a) the methods used differ from the historical record most evidently in their 
use of non 'dream-associated' mental images. Even though this is counteracted by a 
smaller number of reports of the use of deliberate waking images (see Chapter One) the 
disparity requires further consideration. Therefore, it will be necessary to address this area 
at some stage in future investigation. Initially, however, the research needs to closely 
follow methods where a substantial empirical literature already exists. 
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Table 3.4. Examples of Historically Creative Individuals Who Have Reported the 
Use of Mental Imagery in the Creative Process 
Area Creative Individual 
Science & Philosophy 
Art, Film & Sculpture 
Literature 
Music 
Bohr, Cannon, Crick, Edison, Einstein, Faraday, Helmholtz, 
Hirschel, Kant, Kekule, Leibnitz, Neitzche, Poincare, 
Tesla, 
Breton, Cocteau, Dali, Ernst, Hitchcock 
Asimov, Baudelaire, Borges, Castenada, Coleridge, 
Dickens, Fitzgerald, Goethe, Keats, Lessing, Poe, Rimbaud, 
Schiller, 
Shelley, Tennyson, Wordsworth. 
Beethoven, Berlioz, Brahms, Debussy, Mozart, Puccini, 
Wagner 
The review of the role of mental imagery in creativity presented in this chapter provides 
the bedrock for the empirical research presented in the following chapters. As all of the 
minor categories of mental imagery show some evidence of a role in creativity, it is not 
possible to select a specific area and state that this is the particular source of creativity. 
Instead, the empirical investigations that follow must extend and add to the research that 
has been carried out in the past. The method of investigation that has been most frequently 
employed in the previous research is the individual differences approach. This method 
starts from the premise that people differ in their abilities to produce mental images and 
that these differences have an impact on how creative an individual is. As the previous 
research has shown that there is a relationship between self-reported mental imagery and 
divergent thinking performance, further investigation could be made using new methods 
of inquiry. This research is presented in Chapters Four, Five, and Six. 
Although the individual differences approach has been adopted there is no reason 
why alternative methods cannot be married to this approach. The image generation 
approach, for example, has shown that people are capable of generating creative responses 
from imagery-bound tasks (Finke, 1990, Finke, Ward, and Smith., 1992). This method has 
the advantage of demonstrating a clear link between mental imagery and creativity. 
However, it has not been demonstrated how individuals differ in their performance on this 
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task. For example, there have been no attempts to explain the hypothesised roles of image 
generation, transformation and synthesis in predicting performance on the task. Thus, the 
individual differences approach could be applied to the image generation approach as a 
method for further understanding both methods. That is, it may show how imagery 
abilities determine creativity in an imagery-bound task. This research is presented in 
Chapters Seven, Eight and Nine. 
Finally, the major failing with both of the approaches presented so far is that they 
have not taken into account the primary source of evidence for the role of mental imagery 
in creativity. This is that those who have produced historically creative ideas tend to 
report the use of mental imagery in conditions where internal source demands (' dream-
associated' states) dominate external source demands (Singer, 1975). Evidently, further 
research into the role of mental imagery in creativity needs to be undertaken. One method 
that may be selected to investigate the role of external source demands in predicting 
performance on a creativity task is to vary the amount of congruous and incongruous 
perceptual information (Flowers and Garbing, 1989). The results from this type of 
research could provide valuable information about the role of mental imagery in 
creativity, especially if it is investigated from an individual differences perspective. This 
research is presented in Chapter Ten. 
In conclusion, the present chapter has indicated how mental images can be 
distinguished from each other on the basis of whether they appear to the imager as 
'dream-associated' or not. Furthermore, 'dream-associated' mental images can be 
categorised according to whether they are experienced in a sleeping state or not and non 
'dream-associated' mental images can divided into those which have a 'looking af status 
and those which have a 'looking for' status. This classification may not be perfect, but it 
does provide a basis upon which the various forms of mental imagery can be assessed and 
evaluated in the context of the creative process. 
A review of the literature shows that the majority of anecdotal reports of mental 
imagery and creativity occur in 'dream-associated' mental states. This is contrasted with 
the primary experimental methods for investigating the role of mental imagery in 
creativity (the individual differences approach and the image generation approach) which 
require participants to create mental images in a fully alert mental state. The conclusion 
from the present review is that the individual differences approach provides a valuable 
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source of information about the role of mental imagery in creativity. However. in its 
present form it may be too narrow to enable a full empirical understanding of mental 
imagery and creativity. Therefore, the individual differences approach could fruitfully be 
applied to other empirical methods (the image generation approach) and also to an area 
where there is a paucity of research into the role of mental imagery and creativity, the 
interaction of mental imagery, perceptual source demands, and creativity. 
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Chapter IV 
A Meta-Analytic Investigation into the Relationship Between Self-report 
Measures of Mental Imagery and Performance Measures of Creativity 
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Introduction 
In the reVIew carried out in Chapter Three it was found that empirical 
investigation into the role of mental imagery in creativity has evolved into two 
independent protocols. The first of these, the individual differences approach, has focused 
upon the association between self-reported mental imagery and well established divergent 
thinking measures. The second, the image generation approach, employs protocols that 
aim to investigate the use of mental images in creative thinking by the experimental 
method. Of the two methods used to investigate mental imagery and creativity, the 
individual differences approach has both the longest history and the greatest reliance upon 
traditional statistical procedures. Consequently many studies have been carried out using a 
range of mental imagery and divergent thinking predictors. As these studies normally 
employ conventional hypothesis testing procedures it is possible to carry out a systematic 
empirical investigation into the individual differences approach. 
Traditionally a review of mental imagery and divergent thinking studies 
necessitates the selective sampling of empirical and non-empirical evidence relevant to 
the hypothesis under investigation (Forisha, 1981). This method is useful when the 
research area is new but when a sufficient number of studies have been conducted the 
researcher can avoid selectivity in favour of a systematic investigation into the hypothesis 
of interest. This technique, involving the weighted summation of the results from many 
research papers, is called a "meta-analysis". The main advantage with using this approach 
is that it provides the researcher with a reliable estimate of effect size. Other advantages 
include the detection of optimal predictors and an assessment of the homogeneity of 
research findings. 
Although meta-analytic reVIews provide a unIque and powerful source of 
empirical information, their use is not without controversy. Combining studies can lead to 
very erroneous conclusions if the selection procedures are not thoroughly considered. For 
example, selecting research papers on a broad ad hoc basis can lead to what Glass (1978) 
refers to as 'counting apples and oranges'. Other problems concern an inevitable 'loss of 
information', distinguishing 'good' from 'bad' studies and the general masking of 
contradictory information (Rosenthal, 1991). These problems cannot be avoided but their 
impact can be limited by the use of carefully chosen selection criteria. 
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In summary, mental imagery and creativity have traditionally been investigated 
from an individual differences approach. The advantage with this method is that enables 
the researcher to empirically test a hypothesis according to the conventional hypothetico-
deductive testing procedures. However, when a sufficient number of studies have been 
carried out alternative methods can be used to evaluate specific effect sizes. As a large 
number of studies into the relationship between mental imagery and creativity have been 
carried out the aim of the present chapter is to undertake a meta-analytic review of their 
research [mdings. 
The Relationship Between Anecdotal Evidence and Empirical Research 
It is evident from the previous chapters that the stimulus for empirical research 
into the role of mental imagery in creativity is the anecdotal literature on the use of mental 
imagery in historical creativity. However, although many researchers acknowledge the 
different forms of mental imagery implicated in the creative process (e.g. F orisha, 1978) 
their research does not reflect the variability of imagery contexts. Instead research focuses 
upon mental images that are generated in the waking state and which have a 'looking-for' 
status; in the sense that they are generated and introspected upon. Prior to evaluating these 
studies it is interesting to assess the types of mental imagery that have been associated 
with these anecdotal reports of historical creativity; it is especially relevant given that all 
of the studies to be reviewed use these reports as a primary justification for the study of 
mental imagery and creativity. This can be carried out by performing a simple citation 
count on the most frequently reported anecdotes of the use of mental imagery in creativity 
in six publications (see Table 4.1). 
Of the anecdotal reports cited in the six publications only four were discussed by 
more than two of the authors. Einstein's use of mental imagery stands alone as an 
example of the type of mental imagery (waking-state and deliberate) that the individual 
differences approach aims to investigate in creativity research. In the other three reports 
mental images occurred in circumstances far removed from the individual differences 
measures used by imagery-creativity researchers. Typically, they were found in such 
contexts as: daydreaming, drug-induced states, hypnagogic and hypnopompic states, and 
dreaming. It is only when the less frequently cited examples are introduced that thought 
images receive a greater prominence in the creative process. 
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Table 4.1. Frequently cited anecdotal reports of the use of mental imagery lD 
creativity (minimum citation = 2) 
Author Citations Type of Imagery Classification 
Coleridge 4 opium induced dream-associated 
Einstein 3 experimental wake-like 
Kekule 4 hypnagogic dream -associated 
Poincare 2 daydream dream -associated 
Frequency of citation is derived from six publications which discuss the role of mental imagery in creativity: 
Finke (1991); Forisha (1978); Ghiselin (1952); Mavromatis (1987); Paivio (1983); and Shepard (1978a). 
Study One. A Meta-Analytic Review of the Individual Differences Approach to the 
Association Between Self-reported Mental Imagery and Creativity 
Introduction & Selection Criteria 
Despite the relative infrequency of reports of the use of waking thought images in 
the creative process, the individual differences approach persists and the literature review 
of the empirical research shows that it remains the most common way of studying the two 
variables. Typically, these studies utilise an association paradigm in which a self-report 
measure of mental imagery is paired with a divergent thinking measure of creativity and 
both are performed in a standard test room environment. The self-report measure gauges 
an aspect of mental imagery (invariably visual) hypothesised to be necessary for its use in 
the thought process. The most notable examples are: the elaboration of mental imagery 
(Campos and Perez, 1989); the control of mental imagery (Forisha, 1981); and the 
vividness of mental imagery (Parrot and Strongman, 1985). Following the self-report 
measure participants are required to undertake the divergent thinking task in a standard 
test room environment. 
A further characteristic of these studies is their emphasis upon the alleged 
'multifaceted' nature of the role of mental imagery in creativity. This term has become an 
almost inevitable rejoinder to the ensuing findings; in the final set of six papers used in 
the meta-analysis below three of them apply this term. In recognition of the complexity of 
the role of mental imagery in creativity, these studies attempt to incorporate factors that 
may intervene or co-vary with mental imagery and creativity. 
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The initial selection of research papers pertaining to the individual differences 
approach to mental imagery and creativity was based upon computer data-base (PsychLit 
1974-1997, and BIDS 1981-1997) and manual (in the Journal of Mental Imagery) 
searches. Together these searches yielded over 160 papers and books. Fifty-six were 
deemed to be significantly associated with mental imagery and creativity. Of these 30 
were review or theoretical articles and 25 were empirical. Of the 27 empirical papers, 16 
adopted the individual differences approach but only six fitted the criteria listed below. No 
attempt was made to locate unpublished studies but file drawer statistics are provided in 
the discussion section. The six papers selected for this meta-analysis of the individual 
differences approach employ essentially the same method of assessing the relationship 
between mental imagery and creativity. All have adopted the use of self-report measures 
of mental imagery and standard divergent thinking response measures. In addition all 
satisfied the criteria listed. 
Order of presentation. As all of the studies employed self-report measures of 
mental imagery, only those that presented the self-report imagery measures first were 
employed. This requirement was based upon observations of demand characteristics in 
imagery self-report studies (Marks, 1998; McKelvie, 1995. 
Response measures of divergent thinking. Given that all of the studies used a self-
report measure of mental imagery, only studies which employed performance-based 
creativity scores (which were scored according to the authors instructions) with valid 
psychometric properties were included (e.g. Barron's Symbolic Equivalence Test, 1988; 
Torrance's Tests of Creative Thinking, 1972). Justification for this is based upon the 
proper methodological treatment of subjective measures in experimental psychology (see 
Valentine, 1992). Several papers were rejected on these ground (Campos and Gonzalez, 
1993,1994; Durndell and Wetherick, 1977; Kuzendorf, 1982). 
Independence. In order to avoid the problem of multiple reporting only those 
studies which were clearly independent were included in the meta-analysis. A review 
paper by Forisha (1983) was rejected. 
Mistakes, inadequate reporting, and sloppiness. Where non-significant 
associations were not reported and interpretation is not available through sample size and 
probability estimates, a Pearson correlation coefficient of r=0.00 was assumed (Rosenthal. 
1991). Where evident mistakes have been made (e.g. misinterpreted significance tests) the 
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entire body of research from the author has been discarded (Khatena, 1972, 1973, 1975, 
1978, and 1983). 
Table 4.2. Papers and Books Retrieved in Data-base Searches Concerning the 
Relationship Between Mental Imagery and Creativity 
Type Authors 
Theoretical and Ahsen (1982); Anderson and Helstrup (1993); Cauthorne (1985); 
Review Daniels-McGhee and Davies (1994); Ernest (1977); Finke (1989, 
1990, 1995); Finke, Ward and Smith (1992); Forisha (1978); 
Ghisilin (1955); Gardner (1993); Jennings (1991); Mavromatis 
(1987); McKellar (1957, 1995,1997); Miller (1986, 1989, 1992); 
Montangero (1993); Paivio (1983); Partington (1964); Reiber 
(1995); Rothenberg (1979,1995); Shepard (1978ab, 1984); Suler 
(1980); Tweney (1989). 
Empirical Antonietti, Bologna, and Lupi (1997); Bowers (1978); Campos 
and Gonzalez (1993, 1994); Campos and Perez (1989); Dumdell 
and Wetherick (1977); Finke and Slayton (1988); Forisha (1981); 
Hargreaves and Bolton (1972); Johnson (1979); Khatena (1972, 
1973, 1975, 1978, 1983); Kuzendorf (1982); Lindauer (1977); 
Lynn and Rhue (1986); Parrott and Strongman (1985); 
Rothenberg and Sobel (1980); Shaw and Belmore (1982-83) Shaw 
and DeMers (1986); Sobel and Rothenberg (1980); Tushup and 
Zuckerman (1977) 
Many of the problems associated with meta-analytic reVIews have been 
circumvented through circumstance or selection criteria. For example, the 'loss of 
information' problem and the 'counting apples and oranges' issue (Glass, 1978) proved to 
be redundant as the empirical data were homogeneous. Similarly, deciding 'good' from 
'bad' studies was facilitated by a large research literature into the operational validity and 
reliability of imagery questionnaires (Ashton and White 1980; Kihlstrom et aI., 1991; 
Marks, 1995, 1998; McKelvie, 1995). 
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Measures Employed 
Using these criteria six papers were sufficiently rigorous to be included in the 
meta-analysis. The papers and the measures employed are listed in Table 4.3. In the six 
studies the participants' self-reported vividness and control of mental imagery were 
normally hypothesised to be associated with creativity. Marks' (1973) VVIQ was used in 
four of the studies. The alternative revised Betts' Questionnaire upon Mental Imagery 
(Sheehan, 1967) was employed in another study. A measure of self-reported control of 
mental imagery (A.Richardson's revised TVIC, 1969) was used in three of the studies and 
one study employed Slee's (1988) elaboration of mental imagery scale. 
Table 4.3. Authors, Date of Publication(DP), and Measures Employed in the Six 
Studies Included in the Empirical Review 
Authors DP Mental Imagery Divergent Thinking 
Bowers 1978 VVIQ Guilford's Standard 
Consequences 
Campos and Perez 1989 YES Torrance's Figural TTCT 
Forisha 1981 BQMI Torrance's Verbal TTCT 
TVIC 
Parrott and 1985 VVIQ Torrance's Verbal and Figural 
Strongman TVIC TTCT 
Shaw and Belmore 1982-3 VVIQ Mednick's RAT and Torrance's 
Verbal and Figural TTCT 
Shaw and DeMers 1986 VVIQ Torrance's Verbal and Figural 
TVIC TTCT 
The most commonly used measures of creative thinking were those taken from Torrance's 
battery of divergent thinking tests (e.g. Torrance, 1974). These tasks, based upon 
Guilford's structure of intellect model (Guilford, 1967), have been shown to be valid 
predictors of present and future creativity (e.g. Torrance, 1972, 1974, 1988). The other 
measures adopted were Guilford's (1967) Standard Consequences Task and Mednick's 
(1962) Remote Associates Test. Scant information was provided on the administration 
and scoring procedures adopted by the researchers. No attempts were made to assess or 
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control for loquacity effects in the scoring of the originality sub-measure of divergent 
thinking in those papers that used Torrance's TTCT (Hocevar, 1979). 
Results 
Age. While Chapter Three showed that some very specialised forms of mental 
imagery (e.g. paracosms and eidetic imagery) have been linked to specific age groups 
(Cohen and MacKeith, 1991; Haber, 1979), age has not been assessed in these six studies. 
Two of the studies used teenage participants (Campos and Perez, 1989; and, Shaw and 
DeMers, 1986), three used student-aged participants (Bowers, 1978; Forisha, 1981; and, 
Shaw and Belmore, 1982-3), and one used a full adult range (Parrott and Strongman, 
1985). None of the studies provide justification for sample age selection and so it is 
assumed that the age range in these studies reflects sampling convenience. 
Sex differences. It was noted in the previous chapter that sex differences in self-
reported mental imagery have been reported and interpreted by many researchers (Ashton 
and White, 1980; Harshman and Paivio, 1987; McKelvie, 1995; Sheehan, 1967). Though 
there appears to be little theoretical basis for expecting sex-specific associations between 
mental imagery and creativity several researchers have reported such findings. F orisha 
(1981) found an association between self-reported imagery and creativity for males only. 
Conversely, Campos and Perez found a sex-specific association for females only. The 
fact that the other four studies failed to find sex-specific associations suggests that the 
significant findings could be due to statistical error. 
Co-dependent Variables. Many of the papers under review perceived the 
relationship between mental imagery and creativity to be inter-linked with other variables. 
Forisha (1981), for example, considered socio-emotional maturity to effect the association 
between the two variables. Others investigated baseline intelligence (Shaw and DeMers, 
1986), task instructions (Parrott and Strongman, 1985), effortless experiencing (Bowers, 
1978), and verbal ability (Shaw and Belmore, 1982-3). Given the variety of co-dependent 
variables (and the fact that there have been no attempts to replicate the research) it is 
concluded that the only unifying factor is the association between mental imagery and 
creativity . 
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The Meta-Analysis. Of the six papers used in the meta-analysis only one produced a single 
statistical test (see Appendix 4.1). The majority have employed a range of measures of 
mental imagery and sub-measures of divergent thinking resulting in a mean number of 
8.66 statistical tests per study. This variance in both the quantity of tests (see Table 4.3) 
and the ways of assessing the tests needs to be weighted so as to avoid the undue 
influence of anyone study; for example, Parrott and Strongman (1985) report more than 
40 statistical tests from two divergent thinking tasks while Shaw and Belmore (1982-83) 
report three statistical tests from three divergent thinking tasks. The solution adopted in 
the present study is to combine results for a study into a single effect size and significance 
level. 
The combined results from each study were re-calculated into Fisher's r 
coefficients and a total weighted Fisher's r of 0.20 was derived from the six studies. A 
further analysis of the effect size was carried out in order to determine future sample size. 
This showed that sample sizes of 90 ( or above) would produce the minimally acceptable 
(0.70) one-tailed power for individual differences studies. 
Table 4.4. The Method of Mean Results for Six Studies of the Relationship Between 
Self-reported Mental Imagery and Creativity 
Study Tests and Lower Meanr Upper Probability 
Participants Bound Bound 
Bowers 1 (22) 0.17 0.54 0.72 0.003 
Campos and Perez 4 (122) 0 .. 03 0.21 0.37 0.012 
Forisha* 1 (320) 0.07 0.19 0.29 <0.001 
Parrott and 14 (70) -0.19 0.05 0.28 0.413 
Strongman * * 
Shaw and Belmore 3 (67) -0.00 0.24 0.45 0.025 
Shaw and DeMers 24 (141) 0.06 0.22 0.37 0.150 
Total 47(752) 0.13 0.20 0.27 <0.001 
* Provides a composite score 
** Non-significant results were not reported so z = 0.00, r = 0.00, and p = 0.50 is assumed (see Rosenthal, 
1991). 
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The initial analysis of effect size was complemented by further tests of homogeneity, 
directional trend, and overall significance. A test of heterogeneity was not significant 
(X2(5)=4.99, p>0.05) thereby permitting further analysis to be conducted on the combined 
scores. An assessment of directional trend was carried out using a z transformation of the 
proportion of positive signs across the six studies. This was significant (z=4.76, P<O.OOI) 
thereby supporting the observation that the combined Fisher's r coefficients were 
consistently positively associated. As a combined result the lower bound confidence 
interval lies above the standard threshold and the weighted mean value of Fisher's r 
(accounting for 4% of the variance shared between the two variables) is adjudged to be 
marginally supportive of a criterion relationship between the two variables. 
Characteristics of Mental Imagery 
The researchers focused mainly upon two characteristics of mental imagery, 
namely, vividness and control. As three of these studies measured both aspects of mental 
imagery (Forisha, 1981; Parrott and Strongman, 1985; and, Shaw and DeMers, 1986) a 
sufficient number of results are available to enable separate meta-analyses. Five of the 
studies used a vividness measure of mental imagery. The results from these studies are 
presented in Table 4.5. 
Table 4.5. Fisher's r Correlation Coefficients for studies Employing a Measure of the 
Vividness of Mental Imagery 
Author Participants Lower Meanr Upper Probability 
and Tests Bound Bound 
Bowers 32 (1) 0.17 0.54 0.72 0.003 
Forisha 320(3) -0.07 0.04 0.15 0.237 
Parrott & Strongman 70 (7) -0.13 0.11 0.34 0.179 
Shaw & Belmore 67(3) -0.00 0.24 0.45 0.024 
Shaw & DeMers 141(12) 0.10 0.26 0.41 0.001 
Total 630(26) 0.06 0.14 0.22 <0.01 
The overall Fisher's r for those studies employing a vividness measure of mental 
imagery was 0.14. A test of heterogeneity was not significant (X 2(4)=8.11, p>0.05) thus 
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confirming that the results were homogeneous. A combined analysis of the criterion 
validity of the vividness of mental imagery and creative performance was significant 
(z=2.87, p<O.OI). Assessment of confidence intervals showed that the standard was 
exceeded but the judged importance of the criterion relationship was defined as 
'inconsequential' with less than 2% of the variance shared between the two variables 
(Cohen, 1992; McKelvie, 1995). 
Table 4.6. Fisher's r Correlation Coefficients for studies Employing a Measure of 
Control of Mental Imagery 
Author Participants Lower Meanr Upper Probability 
and Tests Bound Bound 
Forisha 320(3) 0.07 0.l8 0.29 <0.000 
Parrott & Strongman 70 (7) -0.18 0.06 0.29 0.307 
Shaw & DeMers 141(12) 0.04 0.20 0.35 0.008 
Total 531(22) 0.09 0.l7 0.25 <0.000 
Though only three studies employed a measure of the control of mental imagery 
one of the studies (Forisha, 1981) contained a sufficiently large sample size to enable 
reliable estimations to be produced. The same procedure was applied to assess criterion 
validity and the results are listed in Table 4.6. Overall the control of mental imagery 
measure showed a slightly stronger association with creative performance than the 
vividness measure. The findings were homogeneous with all of the studies reporting a 
positive association between the control of mental imagery and performance on the 
divergent thinking tasks (X2(2)=1.65, p>0.05). The results, when treated as a combined 
sample, were significant (z=3.27, p<O.OOl). Examination of the confidence intervals 
shows no overlap in the criterion relationship and the overall association (accounting for 
4% of the variance in the two variables) was judged to be of 'marginal' relevance to the 
imagery-creativity hypothesis (McKelvie, 1995). 
Types of Creativity 
Theoretically it would be expected that a person who reports more vividness and 
control of mental imagery would also perform a figural task better than a verbal task. This 
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simple hypothesis was evaluated through separate analyses of the figural and divergent 
thinking scores. The results of these analyses are presented in Tables 4.7 and 4.8. 
Table 4.7. Fisher's r Correlation Coefficients for studies Employing a Measure of 
Verbal Creativity 
Author Participants Lower Meanr Upper Probability 
and Tests Bound Bound 
Bowers 32 (1) 0.17 0.54 0.72 0.003 
Forisha 320(3) 0.08 0.19 0.29 <0.001 
Parrott & Strongman 70 (7) -0.24 0.00 0.24 0.500 
Shaw & Belmore 67(2) -0.02 0.22 0.44 0.036 
Shaw & DeMers 141(12) 0.01 0.17 0.33 0.022 
Total 630(26) 0.11 0.19 0.26 <0.001 
Five studies employed verbal divergent thinking measures as part of their battery 
of tests. All of the findings were in the predicted direction and were sufficiently 
homogeneous to enable a combined analysis (X2(4)=6.00, p>0.05). The combined scores 
were significant (z=4.39, p<O.OOI) with a marginally useful weighted Fisher's r of 0.19. 
Table 4.8. Fisher's r Correlation Coefficients for studies Employing a Measure of 
Figural Creativity 
Author Participants Lower Meanr Upper Probability 
and Tests Bound Bound 
Campos & Perez 122(4) 0.03 0.21 -0.37 0.010 
Parrott & Strongman 70 (7) -0.07 0.11 0.34 0.179 
Shaw & Belmore 67(1) -0.05 0.29 0.50 0.009 
Shaw & DeMers 141(12) 0.10 0.26 0.41 0.001 
Total 400(25) 0.14 0.23 0.32 <0.001 
Four of the six studies provided separate statistical tests for figural divergent 
thinking. The scores were all in the same direction and a chi-square analysis showed they 
were homogeneous (X 2(3)0.71, p>0.05). Overall the scores on the four studies were 
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sig~ificant (z=4.71, p<O.OOl) and the combined weighted Fisher's r showed that the 
association was slightly larger (but not significantly so) for the figural tasks than for the 
verbal task. 
Discussion 
Following database searches and the implementation of conservative selection 
criteria six studies were assessed using a meta-analytic procedure. The results from these 
studies were then collapsed into an overall weighted Fisher's r and tests of homogeneity, 
trend, and significance were carried out. The overall findings suggest that there is a small 
association between self-reported mental imagery and divergent thinking (Cohen, 1991). 
They also show that the results from the six studies are consistently positively associated 
and that the overall effect size is significant; using Rosenthal's (1991) file drawer solution 
44 non-significant results would have to be produced to nullify this result. Separate 
analyses by type of mental imagery showed that the control of mental imagery had a 
slightly larger association with creative performance than the vividness measures. It was 
also observed that stronger effects emerged when figural divergent thinking tasks were 
used, as opposed to verbal divergent thinking tasks. In both cases, however, it is stressed 
that the coefficient differences were not large enough to warrant a theoretical 
interpretation. 
These analyses suggest that there is some empirical support for the hypothesised 
association between self-reported mental imagery and performance on creativity tasks. 
Furthermore, given the conservative selection criteria used in this meta-analysis the 
effects are less susceptible to such artifacts as: social desirability, task demand, or the 
'file-drawer' effect. However, the overall weighted Fisher's r controlled less than 50/0 of 
the variance in the data sets. According to McKelvie's (1995) assessment of the criterion 
validity of self-report measures, this would fall into the lower 'marginal' judgement of 
acceptability. Finally, it should be acknowledged that though the weighted Fisher's r 
reveals a significant relationship between the two variables, it does mask a series of 
problems with the research area. 
The first problem concerns inconsistent and contradictory results when specific 
self-report measures are viewed. This inconsistency was revealed because several of the 
studies utilised more than one measure of mental imagery. The problem is highlighted 
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when comparing Parrott and Strongman's (1985) findings with those of Forisha (1981). 
Both studies used measures of control and vividness of imagery but only F orisha found a 
consistent significant association between the control of mental imagery and creativity. 
Parrott and Strongman (1985), however, found several significant associations between 
the vividness of imagery and creativity where Forisha did not. These findings, masked by 
the meta-analysis, suggest that these inconsistencies need to be resolved before any 
consideration for a third intervening variable is made. 
A similar situation occurs when the findings are divided according to the type of 
divergent thinking task. Divergent thinking tasks are broadly categorised into a verbal or 
figural presentation format. Experimentally (Brooks, 1967; Marks, 1972, 1973) and 
theoretically (Paivio, 1971; Kosslyn, 1980; and Shepard, 1984) it would be expected that 
a stronger association between imagery measures and figural tests would be found. 
However, the results only just conform to this expectation. Of the 47 tests analysed (19 
figural and 22 verbal), eight of the verbal tests and thirteen of the figural tests were 
significant. 
It is possible that both of the problems described above are due in some part to the 
differing ways in which the tasks are measured and understood. For example, two of the 
studies used total divergent thinking scores (Bowers, 1978; Shaw and Belmore, 1982-3), 
three of the studies used the standard three sub-measures (fluency, flexibility, and 
originality) of divergent thinking (Campos and Perez, 1989; Forisha, 1981; and Shaw and 
DeMers, 1986), and one study used added a fourth sub-measure (elaboration) of divergent 
thinking (Parrott and Strongman, 1985). Furthermore, no attempt was made to assess the 
structure of the self-report measures prior to carrying out the study, despite the fact that 
much controversy persists over the validity and reliability of these measures (Ahsen, 
1985; Hiscock, 1978; Kihlstrom et al., 1991; Marks, 1995, 1997; McKelvie, 1995; and, 
1.T.E.Richardson, 1988) 
A final area of uncertainty concerns the range of co-dependent variables under 
investigation by the researchers. The use of these variables is sometimes based upon a 
priori factors such as Shaw and DeMers' claim that a baseline intelligence is necessary 
for the use of mental imagery in creativity; borrowed perhaps from the view that a 
baseline intelligence is necessary for creativity (see Butcher, 1968). Parrott and 
Strongman (1985) claim that the association is determined by a variety of factors such as: 
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task demands, environment, and creative orientation; no reference is made to intelligence. 
Meanwhile, both Forisha (1981) and Campos and Perez (1989), argue that sex differences 
are important in assessing the relationship between mental imagery and creativity. The 
problem is that when viewed collectively they fail to provide a coherent body of 
knowledge. That is, they represent an inability to progress beyond the basic supposition 
that mental imagery is associated with creativity. 
Conclusion 
A meta-analysis was carried out on six studies of self-reported mental imagery 
and divergent thinking selected on the basis of four criteria. Results indicated that there 
was a small association between the two variables and that this effect was consistent 
across the range of studies. While these results show a relevance for continued research, 
they expose some serious problems with the research area. These centre upon the variable 
scoring procedures adopted, a failure to assess the psychometric properties of the self-
report measures, and a general lack of clarity arising from a need to identify why and how 
mental imagery is associated with creativity. 
Given the problems noted in the meta-analysis, it is necessary to carry out further 
investigation into the association between self-reported mental imagery and perfonnance 
on creativity tests. It is proposed that this should start from an uncomplicated assessment 
of the association between the two variables. This could be carried out by selecting the 
two aspects of mental imagery most frequently assessed in the previous research, namely 
the control and vividness of mental imagery, and adding a third creativity-specific self-
report measure of mental imagery. These measures could then be evaluated in the context 
of figural and verbal divergent thinking measures. Initially, however, an assessment of the 
psychometric properties of the self-report measures is required. This is the aim of the next 
chapter. 
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Chapter V 
Individual Differences in Self-Reported Mental Imagery and Divergent 
Thinking Performance. Psychometric and Criterion Validity Analyses. 
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General Introduction 
The results from the meta-analytic procedure carried out in the previous chapter 
suggested that there was a small association between self-reported mental imagery and 
divergent thinking. Closer inspection showed small differences in effect size for the 
characteristics of mental imagery (control and vividness). However, the differences 
between these characteristics were not large enough to warrant post facto explanation. 
Furthermore, it was also found that an expected effect of divergent thinking task format, 
figural or verbal, was less evident than expected on theoretical grounds. 
Following analyses of the previous research a closer inspection of data trends by 
characteristic of mental imagery and form of divergent thinking revealed several 
inconsistencies. Both of the variables under investigation were measured in different 
ways. Mediating variables were not used by later researchers and the results from several 
studies produced striking contradictions pervading every aspect of the methodology. After 
all of these factors had been taken into account, the one consistent empirical observation 
remaining was the simple supposition that mental imagery is in some way associated with 
divergent thinking performance. 
As the basic association between mental imagery and divergent thinking was the 
only reliable inference drawn from the meta-analysis, the aim of the present chapter is to 
assess this relationship as rigorously as possible. That is, to take the basic components of 
the individual differences approach and, where possible, to empirically evaluate their 
psychometric properties. Once this has been realised it should be possible to provide 
additional empirical information about the individual differences approach and to re-
evaluate the association between self-report measures of mental imagery and divergent 
thinking. The areas of interest are those presented in the meta-analytic review, namely, the 
two most frequently assessed characteristics of mental imagery (control and vividness) 
and the standard formats employed in divergent thinking tests (figural and verbal). 
As the predictive validity of divergent thinking measures requires access to 
special populations and the use of longitudinal designs the focus of psychometric 
evaluation in this chapter is upon the self-reported measures of mental imagery used in the 
individual differences approach. The aim of the following studies is to evaluate the 
construct nature and internal reliability of self-report measures of mental imagery. 
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Following this procedure the products can be employed to investigate their association 
with divergent thinking performance. 
Study Two. The Construct Validity and Reliability of the Eyes-Open Version of The 
Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire 
Introduction 
The Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire was developed by Marks 
(1972,1973). It has been used in over 150 studies of mental imagery and was the most 
common self-report measure employed in the studies of imagery and creativity. In the past 
five years it has been the subject of review papers focusing upon its criterion validity (e.g. 
McKelvie, 1994, 1995; Marks, 1995, 1998). Although there has been a large number of 
studies investigating the criterion validity of the questionnaire, the author is unaware of a 
single published study which has independently assessed the internal factor structure of 
the VVIQ. Previous studies of the factor of the VVIQ were unpublished as the apparent 
unitary structure was thought to be of little interest (Marks, 1999, personal 
communication). 
While McKelvie (1995) and Marks (1998) provide excellent reviews of the 
predictive utility and criterion validity of the VVIQ, research into its factor structure 
hardly exists. This is most clearly seen in the small number of factor and principle 
component analyses reported by researchers; one of the main statistical tools used to study 
validity (Tabachnick and Fiddell, 1989). A review of the literature reveals that only two 
factor analytic studies have been cited and the first of these remains unpublished but 
frequently cited via its secondary source (White, Sheehan, and Ashton, 1977). This study, 
carried out by Dowling in 1973, found a single unitary factor, thereby supporting the view 
that the VVIQ measures a single vividness dimension. 
A second study, carried out by Kihlstrom et al. (1991), investigated the TVIC and 
the VVIQ (separate measures were not taken for eyes-open and eyes-closed) in a single 
factor analysis. This research, carried out on over 700 participants, found a four factor 
solution for the VVIQ with factors corresponding to the four item clusters. This study is 
seldom referred to and the majority of researchers continue to adopt a single factor 
concept when scoring the VVI Q. 
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Clearly, the concept of unity is so implicit in the construct that a factor analysis 
was deemed to be of secondary importance to the various issues of reliability. These are 
far more common and cover the full spectrum, including split-half, alpha, alternate-form, 
and test--retest. In McKelvie's (1995) review of the research into reliability he reports 
acceptable to good coefficients for split-half, alpha, and test-retest reliability, but 
unacceptable coefficients for the alternate-form studies, an issue contested by Marks in his 
reply to McKelvie (Marks, 1995). 
In general it can be concluded that the studies reviewed by McKelvie (1995) 
support the underlying theme of a single unitary factor measuring the vividness of visual 
imagery. However, without the fundamental analysis of the factor structure provided by 
principle component or factor analytic statistics, it is not possible to empirically support 
this notion. Furthermore, given the nature of the VVIQ, it would not be unreasonable to 
assume that it involves a variety of aspects of mental imagery and that the usual technique 
of summation (or item averaging) may be inadequate. Indeed this view has been put 
forward by several researchers who have used the VVIQ and have suggested alternative 
scoring techniques (Reisberg and Hauer, 1988; McKelvie, 1995). These include, taking 
the maximum imagery score, the median score or even the modal score. 
In summary, there has been a considerable amount of research into the VVIQ. 
This has tended to focus upon measures of reliability and construct validity which clearly 
show good psychometric properties. However, there has not been a study of the factor 
structure that firmly establishes the usual scoring method. This is the aim of the present 
research which adopts a simple exploratory approach to the construct validity and internal 
reliability of the factor/s underlying the VVIQ. 
Method 
Participants. One-hundred and ninety-eight psychology undergraduates from 
Middlesex University completed the eyes-open version of the VVIQ. Analyses of age and 
sex are included in the results. 
Materials. The VVIQ used in the present research is the 16 item, eyes-open 
version. Marks' original VVIQ consisted of 16 items rated twice, once with 'eyes open' 
and once with 'eyes closed'. Justification for assessing only the eyes-open scores is based 
upon the needs of the future research into creativity where eyes open is the modus 
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operandi. The VVIQ consists of four blocks of to-be-imaged scenes with four 
corresponding item statements (see Table 5.1). The rating procedure for the VVIQ is 
performed per item with a range of 1 ("perfectly clear and as vivid as normal vision) to 5 
("no image at all, you only "know" that you are thinking of an object"). The eyes-open 
version of the VVIQ is presented in Appendix 5.1. 
Procedure. The questionnaire was given to the participants as part of several 
batteries of tests. In all of these studies the eyes-open VVIQ was presented in a test-room 
environment with less than four participants' present. The participants were informed that 
they should complete the questionnaire as quietly, quickly, and honestly as possible. The 
eyes-open version of the questionnaire takes approximately ten minutes to complete. 
Statistical Procedures. Following screening for univariate and multivariate 
normality the internal construct of the eyes-open VVIQ was assessed through a Principal 
Components Analysis (PCA), followed by oblique rotation using oblimin. Internal 
consistency of the factors was assessed using Chronbach's alpha. 
Results 
The average age of the participants was 23.86 with a median age of 22 (7 people 
failed to state their age). The ages ranged from 18 to 47. There was a non-significant 
association between age and VVIQ rating (r(189)=0.016, p> 0.05). Seventy-five males 
and one-hundred and twenty-three females took part in the factor analysis. An 
independent groups t-test showed no significant differences between males and females 
on their VVIQ ratings (t(196)=0.05, p > 0.05). 
Data Screening and Adjustment. The VVIQ was presented to the participants in 
the eyes open only format giving a minimum possible item average score of 1 indicating 
high imagery (an item total score of 16) and a maximum possible item average score of 5 
indicating low imagery (an item summed score of 80). The overall item average score 
produced from the 198 participants was 2.32 with an item average range of 1.89 ("You 
enter the shop and go to the counter. The counter assistant serves you. Money changes 
hands.") to 2.79 ("The precise carriage, length of step, etc. in walking."). A one-sample t-
test showed that the individuals generally rated their imagery as higher than the expected 
average vividness (t(197)=-13.82, p < 0.001). This response leniency is consistent with 
previous research using the VVIQ (see McKelvie, 1995). The scores are very similar to 
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those found in a recent review of 38 studies where VVIQ item means are reported 
(McKelvie,1995: Mean = 2.307, Standard deviation = 0.677). 
Table 5.1. Representation of Item loadings Following an Oblique Rotation (Loadings 
greater than 0.40 Shown) for the Sixteen Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire 
Items (n=198) 
VVIQ Items 
The exact contour of face, head, shoulders and body 
Characteristic poses of head, attitudes of body, etc. 
The precise carriage, length of step, etc. in walking 
The different colours worn in some familiar clothes 
The sun is rising above the horizon into a hazy sky 
The sky clears and surrounds the sun with blueness 
Clouds. A storm blows up, with flashes of lightening 
A rainbow appears 
The overall appearance of the shop from the opposite 
side of the road 
A window display including colours, details of 
individual items for sale 
You are near the entrance. The colour, shape and details 
of the door 
You enter the shop and go to the counter. The counter 
assistant serves you. Money changes hands 
'Nature' 
0.68 
0.47 
0.87 
0.63 
The contours of the landscape 0.75 
The colour and shape of the tree 0.60 
The colour and shape of the lake 0.74 
A strong wind blows on the trees and on the lake 0.78 
causing waves 
'Person' 'Shop' 
0.81 
0.76 
0.86 
0.48 
0.73 
0.83 
0.77 
0.57 
Initial screening of the data set yielded a significant positive skew on six of the 
sixteen items (Items 1,2,4,6,9, and 12) using a z transformation with p < 0.001: 
necessarily conservative due to the large sample size (see Tabachnick and Fidel!, 1989). 
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Square root transformations for five of the six items produced a non-significant ske\\- and 
a logarithmic transformation for Item Twelve resulted in a non-significant skew. 
A Principal Components Analysis (PCA) was used to determine the number of 
factors derived from the 16 items. Three factors, accounting for 58.6% of the variance in 
the data set, were found with an eigenvalue> 1. This contrasted with the Scree method 
which extracted one or possibly two factors (see Appendix 5.2). As the factors were not 
orthogonal (see Table 5.2) a further PCA, with an oblique rotation and a three factor 
solution, was carried out. This produced the most parsimonious solution with clearly 
identifiable groups emerging (see Table 5.1). 
Table 5.2. Correlation Matrix of The Three Factor Solution (n=198) 
Nature scenes 
Shop scene 
Person scene 
0.49 
0.48 
Shop scene 
0.52 
The main factor (accounting for 43.1 % of the variance in the data set) consisted 
of two of the four blocks on the VVIQ. These were items five to eight and thirteen to 
sixteen. This factor was labelled 'Nature Scenes' as this most adequately described the 
eight items. To ascertain inter-item homogeneity the eight items were subjected to a 
Chronbach's Alpha. The total Alpha reliability coefficient was 0.88 with a mean inter-item 
correlation of 0.49 ranging from 0.31 to 0.67. Alpha reliability coefficients when items 
were singularly removed showed that all contributed to the overall reliability of the 
measure (see Appendix 5.3). 
The second factor (referred to as 'Person scene') accounted for 8.7% of the 
variance with four items (those from block one of the VVIQ) loading above 0.4. A 
Chronbach's Alpha analysis yielded an overall reliability coefficient of 0.80 and a mean 
inter-item correlation coefficient of 0.51; ranging from 0.42 to 0.62. Alpha reliability 
coefficients when each item was removed showed that Item Four depressed the overall 
Alpha coefficient. However the scale of the depression was too small to warrant the 
exclusion of the item (see Appendix 5.4). 
The final factor accounted for only 6.8% of the variance. However as four items 
loaded (those from block three of the VVIQ) above 0.4 on the factor and the eigenyalue 
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was greater than one it was included in the final solution. This factor was labelled . Shop 
Scene' as the underlying theme of the to-be-imaged items referred to a shop context. A 
Chronbach's Alpha analysis yielded an overall reliability coefficient of 0.76. Though 
lower than the coefficients produced in the two previous analyses, this is still within the 
acceptable range. A mean inter-item coefficient of 0.45 was found with a range of 0.36 to 
0.52. Chronbach's Alpha Reliability coefficients when each item was removed showed 
that all of the items contributed to the reliability of the scale (see Appendix 5.5). 
Following the PCA and reliability analyses item averages for the three eyes-open 
VVIQ factors were computed. These showed that participants rated the first factor most 
vividly (mean=2.23), the second factor as averagely vivid (mean=2.38) and the third 
factor as the least vivid (mean=2.43). A repeated measures ANOVA was carried out on 
the item average vividness scores for the three factors. This showed that the three eyes-
open VVIQ groupings produced different responses (F(2, 391)=7.90, MSe =0.27, 
p<O.OOl). 
Discussion 
Initial screening of the data showed that the participants' exhibited a response 
leniency similarly reported by previous researchers (see McKelvie, 1995). It also showed 
that scores for the VVIQ were very similar, in the context of response leniency and 
distribution, to those found by previous researchers. In general, however, the VVIQ has 
reasonably good parametric properties and where problems occur (e.g. positive skewness) 
they could be easily resolved through data transformation. 
The most controversial finding from the present analysis is the discovery of a 
three factor solution for the eyes-open version of the VVIQ. As was noted in the 
introduction, previous research using the VVIQ has assumed that the scale represents a 
single factor, namely, the vividness of visual imagery; the Kihlstrom et al. (1991) solution 
needs to be assessed in the context of the control of imagery measure included in the 
analysis. However, the results from the factor analysis are ambiguous as the standard 
methods of determining solutions (i.e. eigenvalues> 1; and the scree plot analysis) do not 
conform and it is necessary to interpret the most elegant solution. While the scree plot 
solution fits better with a priori considerations (based upon combined eyes-open and 
eyes-closed scores), it explains less than 45% of the variance in the data set. 
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Conversely, the eigenvalue method accounts for 590/0 of the variance and when 
the factors were subjected to an oblique rotation a clearly interpretable solution was 
found. Underlying the solution is the notion that in an eyes-open format the vividness of 
visual imagery may vary according to the content of the item and, in the case of the 
VVIQ, the theme of the block of items. Hence, the three factor solution partially 
corresponds with the block contents of the VVIQ. This is further supported by the finding 
that the response averages to the three factors were significantly different. 
In summary, there is no reason to believe that the ratings producing the present 
results differ from those of previous researchers using the eyes-open version of the VVIQ. 
This is because the same range of responses were observed in this study as those found in 
other research (see McKelvie, 1995). When the eyes-open version was assessed through 
the PCA oblique rotation method two possible factor structures emerged. The first, a 
unitary factor, concurred with previous unpublished analyses employing the full version 
of the VVIQ (Marks, 1999, personal communication). The second, a three factor solution, 
concurred with expectations concerning variation caused by the context of the to-be-
imaged items. As a choice is required, the three factor solution has been adopted as an 
interesting and possibly fruitful way of deriving implicit self-report averages. 
Study Three. The Construct Validity and Reliability of the Test of Visual imagery 
Control 
Introduction 
While an understanding of the VVIQ's functional utility has been enhanced by 
some excellent reviews (Marks, 1998; and McKelvie, 1995) the TVIC has received less 
thorough attention. There has, however, been more research into the validity and 
reliability of the TVIC which means that some predictions can be made on the basis of 
prior research rather than common practice. 
There have been many studies of the various forms of reliability and the majority 
of these are reported in White et al. 's (1980) review of the psychometric properties of 
imagery self-report measures. Research into inter-item association has produced mixed 
findings with some researchers reporting good internal reliability (White, Sheehan and 
Ashton, 1976) and others reporting poor internal reliability (Westcott and Rosenstock. 
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1976). Test-retest properties of the TVIC have been defined as adequate (White et al .. 
1977) and alternate-form studies tend to out-perform those of vividness measures 
(McKelvie and Gingrass, 1974). 
There have also been several factor analytic studies of the TVIC the most notable 
of which, in terms of sample size, were those carried out by Ashton and White (1974) and 
Kihlstrom et al. (1991). The former gave 1562 introductory psychology students 
A.Richardson's (1969) 12 item version of the TVIC. An orthogonal rotation revealed that 
the TVIC consisted of three (presumably independent) factors. A later study by Kihlstrom 
et al. (1991) in which 2,075 students completed the revised Betts QMI (Sheehan, 1967) 
with the Richardson TVIC reported a six factor solution with the TVIC loading on four of 
these factors. This study also used an orthogonal rotation so it must be assumed that the 
factors were independent; this is curious given the findings from the studies of internal 
consistency. 
In summarising this brief review of the psychometric properties of the TVIC, it 
can be concluded that the measure generally performs well on assessments of reliability 
but there seem to be problems with its internal structure. Although it was designed to 
assess a single dichotomous factor of imaging (control), the version adapted by 
A.Richardson (1969) appears to have a complex, multi-factorial structure. 
Method 
Participants. One-hundred and sixty seven psychology undergraduates from 
Middlesex University completed the TVIC. The sample consisted of 115 females and 52 
males with a median age of 20, and a range of 18 to 52. Six participants failed to 
complete the questionnaire appropriately and were therefore excluded from all further 
analysis. 
Materials. The original TVIC was rated in a forced choice format with 
respondents giving 'Yes' and 'No' responses to eleven items pertaining to a car. 
A.Richardson (1969) inserted a twelfth item and included an 'Unsure' response. This 
scale is most commonly used by mental imagery researchers and is scored on a scale of ° 
to 24 C'Yes"=2, "Unsure"=l, "No"=O). In the present study the Richardson version was 
used (see Appendix 5.6). 
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Procedure. The questionnaire was given to the participants for self-completion in 
a test-room format. The participants were informed that they should complete the 
questionnaire as quietly , quickly, and honestly as possible. The questionnaire takes 
slightly less time to complete than the VVIQ. 
Statistical Procedure. The aim of the study is to assess the construct validity and 
internal reliability of the TVIC. This is to be achieved by carrying out the same statistical 
techniques that were applied to the VVIQ. 
Results 
The summed item scores for the participants averaged 18 .53 with a standard 
deviation of 5.49. The item means ranged from 1.25 (' a car with a couple inside ') to 1.88 
('a car standing in the road'). Overall these scores are similar to those presented by 
Kihlstrom et al. (1991). As the possible range of item scores was zero to two it is evident 
that the TVIC produces the same ceiling effects found in other measures of self-reported 
mental imagery. 
Figure 5.1. Frequency Counts (Y AXIS) for Participants' Item Mean Scores on the 
Test of Visual Imagery Control Questionnaire 
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Prior to carrying out psychometric tests the data set was screened for univariate 
normality. This screening revealed a consistent negative skew (see Table 5.3) in all of the 
items and problems with kurtosis in six of the twelve items . The data set was not 
amenable to the usual transformation procedures (including reflection and inversion) and 
the total item average also showed significant skew and kurtosis. 
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Table 5.3. An Examination of the Skewness and Kurtosis of the Items from the 
Revised Gordon Test of Visual Imagery Control (n=161) 
TVIC Item Mean St.Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
(se=O.l9) (se=0.38) 
A car standing in the road l.88 0.42 -19.37** 34.00** 
A car in colour 1.62 0.75 -8.37** l.89 
A car in a different colour 1.29 0.88 -3.11 ** 3.84** 
A car upside down l.57 0.76 -7.21** 0.34 
A car upright again l.77 0.61 -12.79** 10.97** 
A car moving on the road 1.61 0.73 -8.05** l.66 
A car climbing a hill 1.61 0.74 -8.11** l.61 
A car climbing over the top 1.55 0.80 -7.00** -0.21 
A car crashing through a house 1.42 0.84 -4.89** -2.47* 
A car moving with a couple inside 1.25 0.89 -2.68* -4.11 ** 
The car falls into a stream 1.57 0.75 -7.26** 0.61 
A car dismantled 1.40 0.86 -4.58** -2.87* 
Item mean 1.54 0.46 -6.58** -3.37** 
*p<O.Ol; **p<O.OOl 
While it is recommended that statistical tests of skewness and kurtosis are 
interpreted cautiously because significant results found with large samples often deviate 
only marginally from the normal distribution (Tabachnick and Fidell, 1989) graphical 
representations of the items and the summed average item score (see Figure 5.1) showed 
that a response leniency was pervasive throughout the measure. As all attempts to 
normalise the data set failed, it was concluded that any multivariate inference drawn from 
the data set would not be reliable and no further analysis was performed. 
Discussion 
The results from the present study do not bode well for the use of this measure in 
subsequent research. The failure to go beyond the basic univariate screening procedure 
suggests that this measure should not be used as a continuous variable. Furthermore, 
given the reasonably large sample size and the similarity between the responses in this 
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and previous studies (e.g. Kihlstrom et al., 1991), it is unlikely that these findings are a 
quirk of this particular study. 
Undoubtedly the problem arises from a response leniency. This is not surprising 
as the TVIC was not designed as an interval scale (Gordon, 1949). However, its 
modification by A.Richardson (1969) means that it can also no longer be used as a 
dichotomous measure of 'controlled' and 'autonomous' imagery. This is because the 
number of respondents who report maximum scores on the TVIC (controlled imagers) 
now represents only a small proportion of the respondents; in the present study it was 
23%. Furthermore, it would not be sensible to return to Gordon's original scoring 
procedure as the addition of (and the participants willingness to use) the 'Unsure' 
response suggests that any measure of mental imagery control should not be of a forced 
choice nature. 
One possible solution to the problem would be to use some form of division to 
create quasi-experimental groupings. Clearly a median split would not be appropriate as it 
would be completely at odds with the original version of the TVIC. Forming blocks of 
graduated imagery autonomy, similar to those used by Khatena (1975) may represent one 
possible solution. However, in order to do this it would be necessary to ignore previous 
factor analytic studies which have found that the TVIC does not measure a single 
construct (Ashton and White, 1974; and, Kihlstrom et al., 1991). 
There are good methodological reasons for disregarding the previous research into 
the construct of the TVIC. One of these is that if the internal reliability studies are taken 
into account (see White et al., 1977) then an orthogonal rotation should not have been 
employed as it does not demonstrate the reality of the data set. In order to test this claim a 
dummy PCA was carried out on the present data set. This showed a similar three/four 
factor solution to that found in the previous research with all of the factors exceeding the 
standard 'oblique' threshold of 0.3 (Tabachnick and Fidell, 1989). Furthermore, while the 
overall scale showed good internal reliability the separated factors demonstrated poor 
reliability. These findings, which should not be statistically relied upon, do show that the 
present data set is very similar to that found in previous studies. They therefore support 
the contention that these studies should not be acted upon in future empirical inquiry. 
In summarising the findings from the present study it has been shown that the 
TVIC does not meet the minimal requirements for a multivariate analysis. This is due to a 
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response leniency inherent in many self-report measures but too extreme in the case of the 
TVIC to allow it to be used as an interval scale measure. Given the inadequacy of the 
TVIC the ideal solution would be to develop a new measure of the control of mental 
imagery. However, as this is beyond the remit of the present research, the alternative 
procedure of blocking for gradations of 'autonomy' will be applied. 
Study Four. The Relationship between the Vividness and Control of Visual Imagery 
and Verbal and Figural Divergent Thinking 
Introduction 
The aim of the present study is to investigate the role of the vividness and control 
of mental imagery in creativity. To do this two performance measures of divergent 
thinking are assessed in the context of the two mental imagery self-report measures whose 
psychometric properties were evaluated in the previous two studies. The variables 
selected as creativity measures are two shortened versions of the Torrance Tests of 
Creative Thinking (TTCT). In the following section hypotheses pertaining to the two 
mental imagery self-reports are discussed. Initially, however, a short review of the TTCT 
is undertaken. 
The Torrance Tests o/Creative Thinking 
The most frequently cited measures of divergent thinking employed by 
researchers of mental imagery and creativity are derived from the battery developed by 
Torrance (e.g. Torrance, 1972, 1974), and called The Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking 
(TTCT). The TTCT is presented in two forms (figural and verbal) and is scored 
according to three abilities: fluency of responses, frequency of responses, and originality 
of responses. Two Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking are employed in the study 
The TTCT follows the factor analytic tradition developed by Galton, Pearson, and 
Spearman, and continued by Thurstone, Burt, Guilford, and Eysenck. The main emphasis 
of the early research focused on intelligence and personality and there was little attempt to 
expand upon the work of Binet, Henri, Terman, and others into creative thinking (see 
Ochse, 1990). This changed following Guilford's APA address in 1950 and his 
considerable work into the sub-divisions of intelligence. Guilford (1967) claimed that 
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intelligence consisted of three factors: operation, content, and production. Operation. it 
was argued, could take place in five specific ways: cognition, memory. divergent 
production, convergent production, and evaluation. Divergent production referred 
specifically to Guilford's concept of creative production. Thus, Guilford considered 
creativity to be distinguishable from other forms of intelligence as it was expressed 
through divergent production. Guilford's further contribution to the factor analytic 
approach was his decision to divide the operation of divergent thinking into four forms of 
problem solving ability: sensitivity to problems; fluency; flexibility; and originality. 
The TTCT, developed by Torrance in the 1960s and 1970s, followed very much 
in the tradition of Guilford's concept of divergent production. Torrance (1974) adopted 
Guilford's abilities approach to problem solving through the development of four 
divergent thinking (DT) sub-measures applied across a basic figural/verbal dichotomy. 
Three of these (fluency, flexibility, and originality) were derived from Guilford and a 
fourth (elaboration) was developed by Torrance himself. 
Guilford's application of his structure of intellect model resulted in the use of 
timed-tests to measure creativity. These have been questioned by researchers in respect of 
their predictive and construct validity (Wallach & Kogan, 1965; Barron and Harrington, 
1981). Though there are probably numerous reasons why Torrance's tests have 
superseded those of Guilford as the most frequently used measure of DT (e.g. easy 
availability, extensive use, breadth of tasks, and comprehensive scoring materials) the fact 
that Torrance had attempted to address the predictive and construct validity of his battery 
makes it very attractive to a quantitative approach (see Torrance, 1974, 1988). These 
studies suggest that his tests have the ability to both distinguish creative and non-creative 
individuals and to predict future real-life creative performance. This may explain why the 
Torrance Tests were selected by researchers interested in the role of mental imagery in 
creativity . 
The Vividness of Visual Imagery 
On the basis of several sources of information it is now possible to come to some 
conclusions concerning the relationship between the self-reported vividness of visual 
imagery and creativity. Firstly, it has been noted that many historically creative people 
claim to have employed mental imagery in the development of their ideas. Clearly 
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vividness is an important dimension of visual imagery as the clarity of the image is an 
essential component in the interpretation procedure. Secondly, the VVIQ has a long 
history of use in individual differences research. It has also been used in a large number 
of criterion studies utilising performance measures of cognitive ability (see McKelvie, 
1995). Furthermore, the meta-analytic procedure showed that it has been used in a number 
of studies of mental imagery and creativity (e.g. Parrott and Strongman, 1985). Thirdly, 
research from the present chapter has established good construct validity with three 
related but distinguishable factors emerging from an oblique rotation. These scales also 
yielded good internal reliability coefficients. 
What is not clear from the meta-analytic review is which forms of divergent 
thinking format (figural/verbal) and measures (fluency, flexibility, or originality) are 
related to imagery vividness. Unfortunately, the data from previous research using the 
VVIQ and the TTCT has not been consistent enough to establish a pattern of content and 
ability. Furthermore, the results from the factor analysis yielded a new form of 
measurement of the VVIQ. As these have not yet been subjected to research linking them 
to cognitive response variables it is not possible to establish which factor/s may be of 
relevance. 
The Control of Visual Imagery 
Theoretically the ability to control mental images seems to have a paradoxical 
association with creative thinking (Richardson, 1969). It could be speculated that 
autonomous imagery allows for the generation of new ways of representing and thinking 
about a problem. Alternatively, it may be assumed that the ability to control an image 
would be crucial in the development of new ideas. This paradox is briefly discussed 
below. 
The notion that autonomous imagery is useful for the generation of creative ideas 
has the greatest anecdotal and theoretical support in the literature. It receives support from 
the anecdotal literature both in the association between creativity and psychopathology 
(see Barron, 1990; Eysenck, 1995; and, Post, 1994) and through studies of the association 
between autonomous imagery and psychopathology (e.g. Gordon, 1950). Furthermore, 
autonomous imagery is prevalent in the forms of mental imagery most commonly 
associated with creativity (McKellar, 1957) and notable in the representational 
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redescriptions of Coleridge, Dali, Edison, Kekule, and others (e.g. Ghiselin, 195~. 
Mavromatis, 1987, and Rothenberg, 1995). Complementary to these accounts is the 
psychodynamic perspective which focuses upon the emergence of unconstrained and 
uncritical ideation in primary process thinking (e.g. Suler, 1980). Finally, a study by 
Khatena (1975) found that autonomous imagers had higher scores on a creative self-
perception scale (Khatena, 1975). 
Alternatively it could be argued that the control of mental imagery could facilitate 
the use of mental imagery in creativity. This claim is based upon the notion that 
autonomous mental imagery may inhibit logical thought processes. This argument derives 
from a commonly held assumption that arbitrary ideas emerge and are value tested (e.g. 
Boden, 1990; and, lohnson-Laird, 1993). It receives tentative anecdotal support in the 
reports of Einstein and others who claim to have had much control of their mental images 
(Shepard, 1978a). 
The meta-analytic review supported the interpretation that there is a positive 
association between control of mental imagery and creativity. F orisha (1981) found an 
association between the amount of self-reported control of mental imagery and 
performance on a divergent thinking task. Likewise, though Parrott and Strongman 
(1985) and Shaw and DeMers (1986) did not find as many significant associations their 
data consistently reported associations in this particular direction. These results may be a 
consequence of the context in which the creativity task is performed (the standard test 
room format) which would favour controlled mental imagery. 
Finally, it should be noted that all of the studies reviewed in the meta-analysis 
treated the control measure of mental imagery as a continuous variable. In contrast the 
analyses from the previous study showed that the only realistic way of employing the 
TVIC is to treat it as a trichotomous variable. As this finding questions the validity of the 
results presented in the meta-analysis the hypothesis that there is a positive association 
between the control of mental imagery and divergent thinking is less secure. 
Having reviewed the hypothesised relationship between the measures used in the 
present study two hypotheses can be made. The first of these is that there will be a 
straight-forward linear association between the vividness of mental imagery and 
performance on the divergent thinking tasks. The effects of self-reported control of mental 
imagery are less clear-cut. According to the review undertaken two diametrically opposed 
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hypotheses could be put forward. The first of these posits a role for unconstrained imagery 
and the second argues that manipulation, synthesis, and transformation all require a highly 
constrained imagery. Although the meta-analysis supports the latter interpretation the 
problems found with the measure of control used by researchers suggests that a two-tailed 
interpretation is required. 
Method 
Participants. Sixty-two females and twenty-eight males studying psychology at 
Middlesex University took part in the study. The age of the participants ranged from 
eighteen to forty-three with a median age of twenty-one and a mode of nineteen. 
Design. In keeping with the previous research into the role of mental imagery in 
creative thinking the study employed a simple correlational design in which participants' 
scores on the three eyes-open VVI Q factors were correlated with their scores on the 
divergent thinking tasks. Here all hypotheses were one-tailed with the prediction that the 
higher the self-reported vividness of mental imagery the better the performance on the 
divergent thinking tasks. Provided the appropriate psychometric properties are present, no 
quartile-split analyses will be conducted. 
An independent groups design was used to investigate the role of control of 
imagery in divergent thinking performance. Participants were assigned to one of three 
quasi-experimental groups on the basis of their scores on the TVIC (high autonomy = 18 
or less; low autonomy = 18 to 23; and controlled imagery = 24). Divisions were based 
upon the larger sample analysis derived from the previous research. The dependent 
variables were the six sub-measures of divergent thinking as 'blind' rated by two judges. 
Materials. The same versions of the VVIQ and TVIC as those used in the factor 
analytic studies were employed. Further details can be derived from the two studies 
previously conducted. 
The TTCT Parallel Lines task (PL) was developed by Torrance (1974) as part of a 
battery of figural creativity tasks. The aim of the task is to produce as many pictures as 
possible using parallel lines as the main structure of the picture. The shortened version of 
the task takes 5 minutes to administer. The PL task is then scored by two judges on the 
basis of fluency, flexibility, and originality. If an inter-rater reliability coefficient greater 
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than FO.7 is found then the scores are collapsed and three performance sub-measures of 
fluency, flexibility, and originality are derived. 
The TTCT Unusual Uses task (UD) was developed by Torrance (1974) as part of 
a battery of verbal creativity tasks. The aim of the task is to produce as many uses for a 
specified object (e.g. a cardboard box) as possible. Further details are identical to those 
given for the PL task. 
Procedure. Participants volunteered for the study through internal advertisement. 
Once they had agreed to take part in the study the participants were tested individually in 
small cubicles. In all cases the participants were initially required to complete the VVIQ 
and TVIC. When they had completed the questionnaires they were asked to perform the 
two TTCT tasks. Once all of the data had been collected the divergent thinking scores 
were blind marked by two judges on the basis of the scoring guide provided by Torrance 
(1974). Inter-rater reliability coefficients for all of the sub-measures exceeded the 
recommended 0.7 criterion. Subsequently, the scores were collated and six composite 
measures of divergent thinking obtained. 
Results 
Analyses of age and sex differences were carried out for the imagery and 
divergent thinking measures. Chi-square analyses showed no significant differences for 
the three TVIC groups for sex (X2(1)=0.08, p>O.OS) and age (X2(2)=2.41, p>O.OS). There 
was also a non-significant differences between males and females on their scores on the 
VVIQ (t(88)=-0.26, p>O.OS) and a non-significant association between the VVIQ and age 
(rs(8S)=-0.lS, P>O.OS). An expected significant association was found between the VVIQ 
and the TVIC (rs(88)=0.43, p<O.Ol). Evaluations of sex and age differences in the three 
VVIQ factors and the divergent thinking measures also revealed no significant effects. 
The collapsed scores for the sub-measures of the figural and verbal divergent 
thinking tasks (see Table S.4) show that the participants were able to perform the two 
tasks reasonably well. They produced more responses on the verbal task (The Unusual 
Uses Task) but showed a greater originality on the figural task (The Parallel Lines Task). 
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Table 5.4. Mean and Standard Deviation Values (in Brackets) for the Sub-Measures 
of the Two Divergent Thinking Tasks By self-reported Control of Mental Imagery 
(n=90) 
DT Tasks High 'A' Low 'A' 'Controlled' Total 
(n=25) (n=224) (n=37) 
The Parallel Lines Task 
Fluency 8.28(3.71 ) 7.13(2.77) 7.00(3.27) 7.46(3.23) 
Flexibility 6.88(3.56) 6.29(2.42) 6.49(2.70) 6.58(2.83) 
Originality 11.80(7.45) 9.96(6.27) 9.76(6.35) 10.22(6.64) 
The Unusual Uses Task 
Fluency 1 0.28(4.03) 1 0.04(4.61) 10.46(3.83) 1 0.22(4.04) 
Flexibility 7.56(2.69) 7.33(2.93) 7.30(2.69) 7.30(2.75) 
Originality 4.60(3.71) 3.96(3.51) 2.95(1.82) 3.90(3.l7) 
Key - 'A' = Autonomous 
As distributions for the VVIQ tend to be positively skewed they were screened for 
skew and kurtosis. This showed that two of the three factor groupings yielded a significant 
positive skew. Given the problems of using skewed data sets in correlational studies a 
square root transformation of the three factors was carried out. This resulted in non-
significant skews for all three factors. As these transformations did not alter the findings 
in subsequent correlational analyses they are presented in brackets throughout the results 
section. 
The Eyes-Open Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire 
Results of a multiple correlational analysis showed a consistent association 
between the eyes-open VVIQ factor scores and the DT scores (see Table 5.5). However, 
only four of the eighteen correlations were significant and these were not specific to any 
sub-measure of divergent thinking. Nevertheless the correlations are within the range of 
findings from previous research in both mean effect size (Fisher's r = 0.13) and the 
direction of the correlations as assessed through a z approximation of the binomial 
distribution (z=4.25, p < 0.001). 
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Table 5.5. A Multiple Correlational Analysis of the Self-report Eyes-Open VVIQ 
Factors and The Sub-Measures of Figural and Verbal Divergent Thinking (n=90) 
DT Tasks 'Nature' 'Person' • Shop' 
The Parallel Lines Task 
Fluency 
Flexibility 
Originality 
The Unusual Uses Task 
Fluency 
Flexibility 
Originality 
*p < 0.05 (one-tailed) 
-0.15 (-0.16) 
-0.13 (-0.14) 
-0.06 (-0.07) 
-0.15 (-0.15) 
-0.1 0 (-0.1 0) 
-0.21 * (-0.23*) 
-0.16 (-0.17) -0.18* (-0.19*) 
-0.15 (-0.16) -0.12 (-0.13) 
-0.03 (-0.04) -0.20* (-0.21) 
-0.08 (-0.08) -0.20* (-0.19*) 
-0.05 (-0.05) -0.10 (-0.10) 
-0.12 (-0.12) -0.11 (-0.11) 
As transformations of the VVIQ scores resulted in non-significant skew and 
kurtosis for all three of the factors Kihlstrom et al. 's (1991) quartile split recommendation 
was not implemented. This is based upon the assumption that provided the parametric 
properties of the measures are met the issue of co-linearity (as defined by the 
accumulation of Fisher r values) supersedes concerns over response leniency. Overall, the 
results from the present research show that the self-reported vividness of mental imagery 
is minimally associated with the two measures of divergent thinking employed. 
The Test o/Visual Imagery Control 
To assess whether participants with controlled imagery performed better or worse 
than those with either 'low' or 'high' autonomous imagery six independent groups 
ANOVAs were conducted. These are presented in Table 5.6 with their transformed Fisher 
r values (Rosenthal, 1991). 
Analyses of the differences between the three levels of self-reported control of 
mental imagery failed to produce any significant results. An examination of the means for 
the three groups showed that the general trend on the six sub-measures was toward a 
greater performance in those scoring low on the TVIC (autonomous imagers). The total 
Fisher's r value (as defined by the meta-analytic study) into the control of mental imagery 
and creativity is -0.10. 
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Table 5.6. Reported F -tests and computed Fisher's r Coefficients For the TVIC 
Groups on the Six TTCT Sub-Measures 
DT Task 
Parallel Lines Task 
Fluency 
Flexibility 
Originality 
Unusual Uses Task 
Fluency 
Flexibility 
Originality 
Discussion 
F -test (2,85) 
F=1.20, MSe=10.69 
F=0.26, MSe=8.39 
F=0.78, MSe=44.43 
F=0.04, MSe=16.96 
l •. 
F=0.17, MSe=7.97 
F=I.82, MSe=9.30 
Fisher's r 
-0.01 
-0.02 
0.10 
0.07 
0.29 
0.15 
An initial screening of the data showed good inter-rater reliability for the DT 
measures. Consequently, the scores from the two judges were combined and averages 
computed for the six DT measures. Following separate analyses for the two self-report 
measures it was found that there was a small (but consistent) association between mental 
imagery and divergent thinking. The weighted Fisher's r coefficients are smaller than 
those found by previous researchers. 
Analyses of the hypothesis that there would be an association between the three 
eyes-open VVIQ factor scores and the six divergent thinking measures followed the 
conventional correlational format. Results from the study showed significant correlation 
coefficients in four of the eighteen tests. When combined the Fisher's r revealed a small 
association. Although these results do not suggest a major role for the vividness of visual 
imagery in divergent thinking they do reveal an element of consistency as all of the 
coefficients were in the predicted direction. 
As the second study found that the TVIC was not a continuous variable, three 
groups of Imagers were derived from the scale and significance tests were computed using 
six independent groups A VOV As. At the beginning of this study two opposing 
hypotheses were put forward to explain a possible link between the control of mental 
imagery and divergent thinking performance. While no firm conclusions can be drawn as 
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non-significant findings were reported, the trend was toward better performance in the 
autonomous imagery group. This finding contrasts with those found in previous research 
which treated the TVIC as a continuous variable (e.g. Forisha, 1981). 
In examining why the present study failed to produce the 'marginal' effect size 
drawn from the meta-analysis several methodological reasons emerge. The first of these 
relates to the self-report measures employed; the problems with the TVIC have already 
been explained so will not be addressed further. It could be argued that the use of the 
eyes-open version of the VVIQ did not allow the participants to fully express their 
vividness of mental imagery (Marks, 1995). While this is a valid point it does not explain 
the reduction in effect size because several of the studies employed in the meta-analysis 
also used an eyes-open version of the VVIQ (e.g. Shaw and Belmore, 1982-83). 
Furthermore, it is sensible to use a measure of mental imagery that matches the mode of 
operation used to complete the divergent thinking measures. 
An alternative methodological critique of the present study concerns the use of 
shortened versions of the divergent thinking tasks. As previous research has shown that 
the use of mental imagery in cognitive tasks requires a greater amount of elaboration 
(Denis, 1982) a shortened version of the divergent thinking tasks may have inhibited the 
use of mental imagery. This issue, addressed in the fifth study, is important but does not 
explain why the effect size is smaller in the present study as several studies employed 
similar tasks in the meta-analysis (e.g. Shaw and DeMers, 1986). 
One issue became apparent through the observation of the two self-report measure 
scores. If the nature of the two measures is considered then it is evident that the VVIQ 
plays a secondary role as a test of the ability to produce a mental image; in that 
responding with a five to any image is a statement of the individual's inability to produce 
an image. The TVIC, however, does not provide this information because people can have 
a low score for two reasons, either because they cannot manipulate their imagery or 
because they do not have any imagery. As the VVIQ scores tend to be correlated with the 
TVIC scores (a Spearman's rank correlation coefficient of 0.43 was found in the present 
study), it must be concluded that at least some of those people who report being unable to 
control their imagery fail to do so because they have no imagery for the particular item. 
However, there are also a sizeable proportion of people who report vivid imagery but no 
imagery control (31 % in the present study). In essence the autonomous imagery groups 
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might be reporting truly autonomous imagery or they might be reporting no imagery. This 
problem is of vital importance to any study of the criterion validity of the TVIC and 
further reinforces the claim made in the previous study that a new measure of the self-
reported control of mental imagery needs to be developed. 
In summary inspection of the results from this study do not provide any 
compelling evidence for the usefulness of the vividness of visual imagery in creativity, at 
least, not under the conditions of measurement emplyed here. The total Fisher's r shows 
that the measures accounted for less than 2% of the variance in the data set. However, 
these findings are very much in the mould of previous research using the VVIQ and 
TTCT (e.g. Shaw and DeMers, 1986). The main conclusion is that researching the 
vividness of mental imagery and creativity requires a better consideration of the variables 
under investigation. At present the effect size is so small that research is driven by power 
and sample size requirements. 
The coefficients derived from the eyes-open vividness scores were small and 
conformed to the findings of the meta-analysis. The imagery control measure, however, 
produced the opposite findings to those reported in the meta-analysis. If this is a 
consequence of the way in which the control measure is treated, then it shows a lack of 
linearity. If it is because of the paradoxical status of imagery control in creativity, then it 
reinforces the need to develop a measure of imagery control that can differentiate the 
usefulness of control and autonomy. 
Study Five. The Construct Validity and Reliability of the Vividness of Poetry Imagery 
Questionnaire (vpIQ). 
Introduction 
The research presented so far in this chapter has used two of the standard imagery 
questionnaires to investigate individual differences in imagery ability. In light of the 
failure to show anything more than a small but consistent association between self-
reported mental imagery and divergent thinking, the following studies aimed to develop a 
measure that is related to both imagery and creativity. 
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Although the VVIQ and the TVIC have been used to measure a wide range of 
subjective and objective measures of cognitive ability (see McKelvie, 1995, Marks, 1995; 
and, White et aI., 1977), recent research has started to tailor mental imagery self-report 
measures to specific contexts (e.g. o 'Bryan-Doheny, 1993). Ahsen (1985, 1990, 1993), 
for example, has taken the basic VVIQ format and applied a 'parental filter' to assist his 
understanding of the dynamic nature of mental imagery. Marks and Isaac have developed 
the Vividness of Movement Imagery Questionnaire (Isaac, Russell, and Marks, 1986) to 
assess individual differences in perceptual motor skills (e.g. Isaac and Marks, 1990, 
1994). Given the small associations derived from the imagery and creativity research so 
far the same principle may prove fruitful. 
The initial question, however, is upon what basis should a questionnaire be 
developed? A questionnaire that provides examples of the use of imagery in creativity 
would be useful but, as there are so many circumstances and ways of generating creative 
ideas, this would not be feasible (Hanard, 1997; Hocevar and Bachelor, 1989; McGuire, 
1997). The alternative procedure is to design an instrument that measures a facet of 
mental imagery that is particularly relevant to creativity. The aim of the following studies 
is to develop and assess an imagery questionnaire with stimulus attributes that are related 
to both imagery and creativity. The area selected is creative writing which provides a 
wealth of imagery-linked literature (Barron, 1988; Fleckenstein, 1992; Jennings, 1991; 
Spender, 1952). 
In considering the sources of literature that may be employed as a means of 
assessing the vividness of figurative literature, it is necessary to consider the 
circumstances in which imagination imagery is both employed and evoked. There are 
many forms of literature that encourage its use and evocation. However, the literature 
suggests that mental imagery is most frequently employed in short prose as a device to 
cultivate creativity (Fleckenstein, 1992) and to reinforce emotional responses (Jennings, 
1991). Anecdotal reports suggest that a great number of poets use mental imagery as a 
special form of symbolism (Paivio, 1983) and the number of poets reporting the use of 
imagery in creativity exceeds that of any other literary grouping (e.g. Baudelaire. Blake. 
Coleridge, Spender, and Yeats). 
Imagery has long been an important ingredient of poetry and is represented very 
strongly in many styles. For example, the use of Kennings (e.g. ring-giver for king) in 
120 
both Old English and modem Poetry yield particularly evocative forms of imagery. 
Consider, for example, the richness of mental imagery in John Updike's play upon the use 
of the Kenning in his poem "Winter Ocean": 
Many-maned, scud-thumper, tub 
of male whales, maker of worn wood, shrub-
ruster, sky mocker, rave! 
portly pusher of waves, wind-slave. 
(John Updike, 1960, Taken from Miller and Greenberg, 1981) 
Other devices used in poetry which are rich in figurative language include 
synaesthetic prose (e.g. "The yellow fog that rubs its back upon the windo\v-panes"; 
T.S.Elliot) , similes (e.g. "For hope grew round me, like the twining vine, and fruits, and 
foliage, not my own, seemed mine"; S.T.Coleridge) , metaphors ("Come, fill the cup, and 
in the fire of spring your winter garment of repentance fling"; E.Fitzgerald), a synedoche 
in which a part (e.g. hand) is used to define the whole ("The hand that sways the king 
beguiles the state"; W.Shakespeare), an apostrophe in which a person or thing is 
addressed ("With how sad steps, 0 moon, thou climb'st the sky"; Sir P.Sidney) and, in the 
use of two opposing meanings to create a new meaning (an Oxymoron) such as 
W.B.Yeats reference to the new Republic of Ireland as, "A terrible beauty is born" (all 
cited by Miller and Greenberg, 1981). 
Though lacking empirical support there is a considerable amount of anecdotal 
evidence that imagery is an important ingredient in certain forms of poetry. The devices 
used in poetry could be dependent upon imagery in both their development and the force 
of their expression. Consider, for example, Murray's review of Peter Redgrove's poetry 
anthology: 
"In dreamlike or visionary poems such as the "Poems of Parasyn", the 
poems ride on glittering wings of vivid imagery wasps on fallen apples 
"thick as cobbles" are seen to "mine deep and invisible their galleries of 
fruit". (Murray, 1994, p.23). 
So how can figurative poetry be understood in the context of conventional mental 
imagery research? Although there has been a considerable amount of research into the 
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effects of imageability on cognitive processes it has focused upon paired stimuli learning 
or text processing and memory (Benjafield, 1987; Denis, 1982; Marschark and Hunt, 
1989; Paivio, 1971; Paivio, Yuille and Madigan, 1968). The effects of the imageability of 
figurative poetry have received scant attention despite their obvious appeal to "learned' 
and thespian pursuits and the implicit association with mneumonic strategies. Indeed 
poetry receives barely a mention in the mental imagery literature and it is only when 
broad searches are undertaken that imagery emerges in literary reviews (e.g. Alvarez, 
1994; Bull, 1995; Leighton, 1996; and, Murray, 1994). This is unfortunate as a wealth of 
'stimuli' awaits investigation. 
An additional advantage with using poetry as the stimuli for the rating scale is that 
these are in essence qualified products of the creative process. As there is a large 
theoretical and empirical body of research into aesthetic preference and creativity 
(Eysenck, 1995) a measure of the vividness of imagination imagery may also be indirectly 
accessing the preference for complex and artistic imagery that has been linked with 
creativity (Kuzendorf, 1982; Lindauer, 1977; Sobel and Rothenberg, 1980). 
The aim of the present study is to develop a self-report measure of the vividness 
of visual imagery that uses a particular creative product which is thought to be associated 
with the use of mental imagery in both its development and aesthetic appeal. To achieve 
this it is necessary to select extracts of figurative poetry that use devices that evoke mental 
imagery. These can then be presented to participants in a format that is very similar to the 
VVIQ. However, before a measure can be used to assess a proposed relationship between 
mental imagery and creativity it is necessary to understand its construct validity and 
internal reliability. 
Method 
Participants. One-hundred and ninety-four psychology undergraduates from 
Middlesex University completed a measure of the vividness of figurative poetry imagery. 
Analyses of age and sex are included in the results. 
Materials. The questionnaire was developed in the same format as Marks' VVIQ 
(Marks, 1972, 1973). Vividness ratings ranged from 1 ("Perfectly clear and vivid") to 5 
("No image at all, you only "know" that you are thinking of an object"). Sixteen items 
were presented in four blocks, derived from four extracts of figurative poetry. The first of 
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these was a full version of Nikki Giovanni's "Winter Poem", the second was an extract 
from Robert Herrick's "To the Virgins, to Make Much of Time", the third was an extract 
from T.S.Elliot', "The Love Song of J.Alfred Prufrock" and the fourth was an extract 
from Richard Crashaw's "An Epitaph upon a Young Married Couple Dead and Buried 
Together". All of the samples were selected from Miller and Greenberg (1981). The 
questionnaire items are presented in Table 5.7. 
Procedure. The questionnaire was given to the participants for self-completion at 
a time when they felt comfortable. The participants were informed prior to completing 
the questionnaire that they should complete the task on their own. They were also 
informed that they should complete the questionnaire as quietly, quickly, and honestly as 
possible. The questionnaire takes approximately fifteen minutes to complete. 
In order to complete the vividness ratings the participants are required to read 
each passage twice. In the first reading they are asked to read the extract in full and 
simply construct imagery associated with it. This is followed by a second reading in 
which the elements of the poem are broken down and imagery ratings are made for each 
item (see Table 5.7). 
Statistical Procedures. Following screening for univariate and multivariate 
normality the internal construct of the VPIQ was assessed through a Factor Analysis (the 
Alpha Factoring technique), followed by oblique rotation using oblimin. Internal 
consistency of the factors was assessed using Chronbach's alpha. 
Results 
One-hundred and ninety-four participants (125 females and 68 males) with a 
median age of23 (ranging from 18 to 48) took part in the study. Combined scores for the 
sixteen items did not correlate with age (r(192)= -0.05, p > 0.05) and a non-significant 
difference between males and females was observed (t(191)=1.39, p > 0.05). The VPIQ, 
presented in the same format as the VVIQ produced an overall item average of 2.36 with 
items ranging from 1.66 for item one ("a snowflake falling on your brow") to 3.35 for 
item six ("old time flying"). An assessment of response bias yielded a significant result 
(t(193)= -13.31, P < 0.001) similar to that found for the VVIQ in Study Two. Screening 
for skewness and kurtosis (see Study One for procedural details) resulted in four square-
root (Items 5,8,15, and 16) and two logarithmic (Items 1 and 13) transformations. 
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As previous factor analyses presented in this chapter utilised a straight-fonvard 
Principal Components Analysis (PCA) the same procedure was adopted in the present 
study. However, as no sensible interpretations could be derived from a PCA a Factor 
Analysis (FA) was conducted. All the results reported are produced from the less 
conventional, but equally applicable, Alpha Factoring technique. 
Table 5.7. Representation of the Primary Item loadings following an Oblique Rotation 
(loadings of less than 0.4 are suppressed) on the Sixteen VPIQ Items (n=194) 
Item 
A snowflake falling on to your brow 
A web of snow engulfing you 
Squeezing snow into spring rain 
Turning into a flower 
Gathering rosebuds 
Old time flying 
A flower smiling 
A flower dying 
Mermaids riding seaward on the waves 
Combing the white hair of the waves 
Seagirls wreathed with seaweed red 
and brown 
Being woken to drown 
Dead 
Lying under a sheet of lead 
Sleeping through the stormy night 
Waking into a light 
Contemporary 
Poetry 
0.66 
0.46 
0.46 
0.49 
0.70 
0.68 
0.63 
0.50 
Traditional 
Epitaphic 
0.82 
0.65 
0.72 
0.53 
Traditional 
Metamorphic 
0.51 
0.55 
0.75 
0.56 
The Scree Plot and eigenvalues produced one or four factor solutions. As the four factor 
solution accounted for the most variance in the data set it was further analysed. This 
solution accounted for 57.90/0 of the variance in the data set. When the item loadings were 
suppressed at 0.4, however, none of the items loaded on the third factor. Consequently, 
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the third factor was removed and all further analyses were conducted on the remaining 
three factors. 
The first factor ('Contemporary Poetry) accounted for 34.4% of the variance and 
loaded above 0.4 on eleven items. As three of these items loaded greater on the other 
factors only the interpretable eight items (derived from the first and third blocks) \vere 
selected for reliability analyses. A Chronbach's Alpha on the items revealed sufficient 
internal reliability (0.77) with all of the items contributing to the internal consistency of the 
factor (see Appendix 5.8). 
The second factor (,Traditional Epitaphic') accounted for 9.3%> of the variance in 
the data set with six items loading above 0.4. As two of these items had greater loadings 
on other factors they were not selected for further analyses. The primary loadings were all 
derived from the fourth block. A Chronbach's Alpha analysis was satisfactory (0.75) with 
all of the items contributing to the internal reliability of the measure (see Appendix 5.9). 
The final factor ('Traditional Metamorphic') accounted for 6.8% of the variance 
with four items, pertaining to the Robert Herrick poem, loading primarily on this factor. 
Reliability analysis using Chronbach's Alpha met the minimal standard (Alpha = 0.69) 
with all of the items contributing to the internal reliability of the measure (see Appendix 
5.10). 
Table 5.8. Descriptive Statistics for weighted Item average scores on the three factors 
derived from the VPIQ (n=194). 
Factor Mean St. Dev. Ql Q4 
Contemporary Poetry 2.49 0.73 2.00 3.00 
Traditional Epitaphic 2.02 0.86 l.25 2.75 
Traditional Metamorphic 2.37 0.86 l.75 2.94 
Following the Factor and reliability analyses mean and quartile scores were 
derived for the three factors by simple addition and weighted division. These showed that 
the second factor (,Traditional Epitaphic') produced the highest vividness ratings and the 
first factor (,Contemporary Poetry') the least vivid imagery. A repeated measures 
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ANOVA confirmed that the three factors produced significantly different responses to 
justify their separate use in further analyses (F(2,382)=33.94, MSe = 0.34, p < 0.001). 
Discussion 
The aim of the study was to evaluate the construct nature and internal reliability 
of a self-report measure of vividness of mental imagery that utilised novel and aesthetic 
images from poetry. Initial screening of the measure showed similar vividness ratings to 
those observed for the eyes-open VVIQ. As expected a response leniency was found with 
participants reporting a greater amount of vividness than non-vividness for the items. It is 
therefore recommended that criterion studies should carry out transformation procedures 
to smooth the effects of skewness. 
Whilst the VPIQ differs in the content of imagery its design was constructed to 
map the format of Marks' eyes-open VVIQ. It was important to maintain the 
meaningfulness of the block format and essential that a five-point scale (enabling a 'no 
image' response) was employed. Although initial problems of factor analytic 
interpretation were found it was eventually possible to derive a solution that was 
comparable to that found in the eyes-open VVIQ analysis. Though four factors were 
derived from the factor analysis one of these failed to load on any of the items. The three 
remaining factors met the minimal standards for internal reliability and were shown to 
differ enough from each other to warrant their combined use in future research. 
While this measure is not quite as easy to characterise as Marks' eyes-open 
VVIQ, it does have the same multivariate characteristics suggesting the use of its three 
factors as continuous variables. Furthermore, given that it is a vividness measure its 
relationship with cognitive performance measures can be readily hypothesised. In 
summary, a measure of aesthetic imagery has been developed and assessed for internal 
validity and reliability. Alhough the findings are less satisfactory than those found for the 
more generic eyes-open VVIQ, it demonstrates sufficient validity and reliability to be 
used as a predictor of creativity. 
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Study Six. A Criterion Study of the VPIQ and Two Torrance Tests of Divergent 
Thinking 
Introduction 
The aim of this study was to assess the relationship between the three VPIQ 
factors and the six sub-measures of divergent thinking employed in the previous study of 
criterion validity. As this is a new measure of the self-reported vividness of mental 
imagery, hypotheses about which factor is most relevant cannot be made. However. it is 
predicted (and hoped) that the overall association between the VPIQ and the divergent 
thinking measures will be stronger than that found with previous self-report measures. 
The discussion in Study Three suggested that the observed associations between 
the self-report imagery measures and the two divergent thinking measures may have been 
smaller than those previously found because a shortened version of the divergent thinking 
tasks was used. The use of mental imagery in creativity could require a greater amount of 
elaboration of the stimulus materials resulting in longer latency requirements. As this 
effect has been shown in previous cognitive performance studies investigating the role of 
the vividness of mental imagery (Denis, 1982), both the shortened and the standard form 
tasks were used in the present study. 
Method 
Participants. Sixty-eight females and twenty-four males studying psychology at 
Middlesex University took part in the study. However, the data for one participant on the 
Parallel Lines part of the TTCT was lost. The age of the participants ranged from 
eighteen to fifty-two with a median age of twenty-four. 
Design. A simple correlational design was employed where the participants' self-
report scores on the three VPIQ factors were correlated with their scores on the six sub-
measures of divergent thinking derived from the two divergent thinking tasks by each 
version of the TTCT. All hypotheses were one-tailed with the prediction that vividness 
will be positively correlated with performance. Where necessary univariate 
transformations were performed and presented. 
Materials and Procedure. The VPIQ was presented in a test-room format to small 
groups of participants (1-4). Details of the VPIQ were presented in the previous study. 
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The Parallel Lines Task and the Unusual Uses Task were presented in the standard and 
shortened formats. Details are given above. The same procedure was applied as that given 
in the Study Three. 
Results 
Like the VVIQ the factors derived from the VPIQ tend to be positively skewed. 
Initial screening of the three factors derived from the questionnaire showed that only the 
second factor was skewed and that the problem was easily rectified using a square root 
transformation. Inter-rater reliability coefficients for the two judges exceeded 0.7 in all 
cases. The collapsed scores for the sub-measures of the figural and verbal divergent 
thinking tasks show that the participants' shortened form scores were comparable with 
those found in the previous study (see Table 5.8). 
Table 5.8. Basic Descriptive Statistics For the Sub-Measures of the Two Divergent 
Thinking Tasks. 
Divergent Thinking Shortened form (n=44) Standard form (n=48) 
Measure Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. 
The Parallel Lines Task 
Fluency 9.87 4.32 14.77 5.08 
Flexibility 8.29 3.40 11.67 3.36 
Originality 13.41 6.88 21.85 8.95 
The Unusual Uses Task 
Fluency 10.20 4.18 15.10 4.92 
Flexibility 7.31 2.51 9.01 2.94 
Originality 5.57 3.47 8.51 4.40 
Results for the multiple correlational analysis are presented in Table 5.9 for both 
the shortened and standard versions of the divergent thinking tasks. Overall Fisher's r 
values for the two versions were 0.13 for the shortened version and .11 for the standard 
form. As the participants' performed comparably on the two versions the scores were 
analysed using partial correlations. These are also presented in Table 5.9. 
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The overall findings from this study are very similar to those found in the study of the 
eyes-open version of the VVIQ. The direction of the associations was consistent but the 
strength of association was small in all cases. Of the eighteen associations derived from 
the partial correlations four were significant. Observation of the findings shows that the 
VPI Q factors were more likely to be associated with the verbal measure of divergent 
thinking. Overall the combined scores produced a total Fisher's r coefficient value of 
0.12. 
Table 5.9. Multiple Correlations for the Shortened, Standard and Combined forms 
(Where the factor Time is Partialled out of the Correlation) of the TTCT with the 
VPIQ 
DT Task Shortened form (n=44) Standard form (n=48) Combined (n=92) 
FI F2 F3 FI F2 F3 FI F2 F3 
PL Task 
Fluency -0.05 -0.17 -0.05 -0.01 -0.05 -0.22 -0.01 -0.10 -0.15 
Flexibility -0.00 -0.07 -0.01 -0.01 -0.08 -0.21 -0.01 -0.07 -0.13 
Originality -0.14 -0.22 -0.10 -0.05 -0.29* -0.15 -0.08 -0.26** -0.13 
UUTask 
Fluency -0.24 -0.34* -0.05 -0.05 -0.00 -0.19 -0.13 -0.17 -0.13 
Flexibility -0.22 -0.33* -0.13 -0.18 -0.08 -0.11 -0.20* -0.21 * -0.11 
Originality -0.20 -0.24 -0.21 -0.09 -0.16 -0.02 -0.14 -0.20* -0.07 
. 
-(F 1: Contemporary Poetry; F2: Traditional Epitaphic; F3: Traditional Metamorphic) 
*p<O.05 **p<O.Ol (one-tailed) 
Discussion 
Initial tests for inter-rater reliability and univariate normality showed that a 
correlational design was acceptable. Consequently, the self-report measures were 
correlated with the six sub-measures of divergent thinking assessed by the two versions 
presented. The overall findings from these two groups were very similar. While consistent 
small associations were found, neither of the creativity tests showed a particular pattern of 
association that could be explained in terms of mental imagery differences. As the 
findings were similar the scores were combined and partial correlations performed. 
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Overall the findings are very similar to those produced in the previous study with the 
VVIQ. 
As Study Three used shortened versions of the TTCT, the findings were open to 
the interpretation that the smaller associations found were the product of time limitation in 
task performance. To assess this possibility the present study compared the associations 
from both the shortened and standard versions of the task. Although no statistical analyses 
were carried out, it was evident from an observation of the overall Fisher's r values that 
the association between self-reported mental imagery and creativity did not improve as 
the amount of time to perform the task increased. Consequently, the scores for the two 
versions were analysed using a partial correlation technique. The final Fisher's r 
coefficient did not reach the 'marginally acceptable' criterion used by McKelvie (1995) to 
assess the usefulness of mental imagery measures in predicting behavioural performance. 
As was true of the previous study into the relationship between mental imagery 
and divergent thinking it was predicted that there would be a consistent association 
between the factors representing the vividness of mental imagery and the sub-measures of 
divergent thinking. As the content of the present self-report task was drawn from a 
creative source it was hypothesised that a stronger association would be found. However 
analyses of the combined scores found similar associations to those reported in previous 
studies. The full implications for future research into the individual differences approach 
are discussed in the next chapter. 
General Discussion 
The initial aim of the present chapter was to empirically evaluate the self-report 
measures of mental imagery used in individual difference studies of the role of mental 
imagery in creativity. Following these analyses of construct validity and internal 
reliability the measures were assessed in a correlational study of self-reported mental 
imagery and creativity. The overall conclusion drawn from these studies is that in groups 
of university students the self-reported vividness of mental imagery is minimally 
associated with performance on divergent thinking tasks. 
The meta-analytic review carried out in Chapter Four showed that the most 
commonly used self-report measures of mental imagery employed in individual difference 
studies of the role of mental imagery in creativity are the VVIQ and TVIC. Although 
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these studies consistently report a small association between mental imagery and 
creativity, an overview of the findings revealed several contradictions in the research. 
Consequently, it was decided that an initial inquiry into the individual differences 
approach required a thorough examination of the variables under review and that this 
necessitates an assessment of the construct nature and internal reliability of the self-report 
measures of mental imagery. 
The first study reported in this chapter suggested that the Marks' eyes-open VVI Q 
has good parametric properties. However, the PCA suggested that the eyes-open version 
could be interpreted either as a one or three factor measure of the vividness of visual 
imagery. Although previous research into the VVIQ and divergent thinking performance 
used a total scoring procedure, the alternative three factor solution was adopted in the 
present chapter because it accounted for more variance in the questionnaire and the factors 
produced demonstrably different responses. However, the association between imagery 
and creativity was still weak and the ambiguity of the findings meant that this was one of 
two possible ways of assessing the respondents' scores on the VVIQ. Therefore these 
findings do not question the validity of previous studies so much as offer a fruitful 
alternative way of studying vividness of mental imagery and divergent thinking. 
Whilst the findings from the first study produced some support for the scoring 
procedures used in the previous research with the VVIQ, the results from the second study 
questioned the TVIC scoring procedures adopted by previous researchers. The aim of this 
study was to assess the TVIC using the same procedures adopted in the previous study. 
However, univariate screening for skew and kurtosis showed that this measure should not 
be used as a continuous variable. These results questioned the validity of previous 
research into the role of the control of mental imagery and divergent thinking (Forisha, 
1981; Parrott and Strongman, 1985; and Shaw and DeMers, 1986). 
The third study investigated the relationship between the vividness and control of 
imagery and measures of figural and verbal divergent thinking. The Torrance measures of 
divergent thinking were selected because they were the most frequently employed tests in 
the previous individual difference research (Campos and Perez, 1989; Forisha, 1981; 
Parrott and Strongman, 1985; Shaw and Belmore, 1982-83; and, Shaw and DeMers, 
1986). The results from the study showed a small but consistent relationship between self-
reported vividness of mental imagery and divergent thinking performance. However, the 
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findings from the self-report control of imagery measure failed to show significant 
differences between the groups and any identifiable trend emerged in the opposite 
direction to the previous research [mdings (Forisha, 1981; Parrott and Strongman, 1985; 
and Shaw and DeMers, 1986). These findings may have arisen from a necessarily 
different scoring procedure. 
Although the vividness measure of mental imagery was consistently associated 
with the divergent thinking measures, the relationship was small. It was hypothesised that 
the strength of the association may be increased if vividness was tailored to creativity and 
so the VPIQ was developed. Its construct nature and internal reliability was assessed in 
the fourth study. The results from this study fell somewhere between those of the first and 
second studies. The VPIQ had reasonable parametric properties but it did not yield as 
good psychometric properties as the VVIQ. However, it was possible to interpret a three 
factor solution which accounted for almost 60% of the variance in the data set. 
Furthermore the items on these factors produced significantly different responses. 
The final study carried out in the present chapter assessed the relationship 
between the three factors derived from the VPIQ and the sub-measures of divergent 
thinking in two test-format procedures. As the shortened and standard forms of divergent 
thinking did not differ in their association with the VPIQ, partial correlation analyses were 
performed. The findings from this study again showed a consistent relationship between 
the vividness measure and the divergent thinking scores. However, the use of a context-
specific vividness measure did not result in a stronger association between vividness and 
creativity scores. 
In conclusion, the findings from the present study add further data to the 
individual differences approach on the association between mental imagery and creativity. 
The three studies into the construct validity and internal reliability of the self-report 
measures of mental imagery show that the eyes open version of the VVIQ can be treated 
as a three factor questionnaire. They also show that A.Richardson's (1969) version of the 
TVIC should not be used as a continuous variable and that it is possible to develop a 
context-specific measure of the vividness of visual imagery. However, although the two 
measures of vividness yield consistent associations with divergent thinking performance, 
these associations are small. Furthermore, the control of imagery measure does not predict 
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performance on divergent thinking tasks. These results are discussed in further detail in 
the following chapter where a revised meta-analysis is carried out. 
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Chapter VI 
Study Seven. A Revised Meta-Analysis in the light of the Findings from 
the Present Research 
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Introduction 
At the beginning of Chapter Four, it was argued that there are two predominant 
research protocols in the study of mental imagery and creativity. The first of these. 
identified as the individual differences approach, has seen a steady accumulation of 
research over the past twenty-five years. The alternative method, referred to as the image 
generation approach, emerged approximately ten years ago and is discussed in detail in 
the following chapter. Justification for these very different methods is based on the vast 
number of anecdotal reports testifying to the use of mental imagery in historical creativity. 
The aim of the individual differences approach appears to be the demonstration 
that mental imagery and creativity abilities are linearly associated. To establish this 
association a self-report measure of an aspect of mental imagery is correlated with a 
performance measure of creativity. The aim of the meta-analysis presented in Chapter 
Four was to collate the information from these studies and determine the nature of the 
association via weighted Fisher's r correlation coefficients. 
Having developed a set of selection criteria to protect against methodological 
problems linked to both the meta-analytic procedure and the measures under review, it 
became apparent that many of the studies did not fulfil the basic requirements. Little 
conformity was found in both the findings and the use of the measures. Consequently. a 
further set of studies was undertaken in which the selection criteria were adhered to. 
These studies found that when self-reported mental imagery and creativity are assessed 
independently of any other variable there is only a small association between the two 
variables. Coupled with these studies is a further study by Gonzalez, Campos, and Perez 
(1997) which was not available to the author when the first meta-analysis was carried out. 
As this study fulfils the criteria listed in Chapter Four it has also been included in the final 
analysis. 
The Revised Meta-Analysis 
Having carried out two studies into the relationship between three mental imagery 
measures and two divergent thinking measures, it became possible to carry out a revised 
meta-analysis. With the further study conducted by Gonzalez et al. (1997) the three 
additional studies increase the total sample size by 772 participants to 1494. The full 
analysis is listed in Table 6.1. 
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The final analysis of the relationship between self-reported mental imagery and 
creative performance is derived from 94 tests and 1,494 participants. The overall Fisher's 
r value is slightly lower than that found in the previous meta-analysis and falls just below 
Cohen's (1992) assessment of the minimum acceptable criterion validity (for a small 
effect 0.18). A positive effect of the addition of these further studies, however, is a greater 
consistency (X2(8)=8.90, p>0.05) and a stronger overall significance level (z=5.80, 
p<O.OOI). These findings therefore reinforce the existence of a relationship between 
mental imagery and creativity but reduce the importance of the relationship. 
Table 6.1. A Revised Meta-Analysis Following the Inclusion of Three Further 
Studies into Self-reported Mental Imagery and Creativity 
Author Tests and Lower Meanr Upper Probability 
Participants Bound Bound 
Bowers 1 (32) 0.17 0.54 0.72 0.003 
Campos and Perez 4 (122) 0.03 0.21 0.37 0.012 
Forisha* 6 (320) 0.08 0.19 0.29 <0.001 
Parrott and Strongman * * 14 (70) -0.19 0.05 0.28 0.413 
Shaw and Belmore 3 (67) -0.00 0.24 0.45 0.025 
Shaw and DeMers 24 (141) 0.06 0.22 0.37 0.004 
Gonzalez et al. 5 (n=560) 0.02 0.10 0.18 <0.001 
Ie Boutillier (Study Three) 24 (n=90) -0.10 0.11 0.31 0.148 
Ie Boutillier (Study Five) 18(n=92) -0.09 0.12 0.32 0.125 
Total 94(1494) 0.10 0.15 0.20 <0.001 
* Provides a composite score 
** Non-significant results were not reported so z = 0.00, r = 0.00, and p = 0.50 is assumed 
Characteristics of Mental Imagery 
As the three studies have contributed in various ways to a further understanding of 
mental imagery and creativity, individual meta-analytic procedures were carried out 
across these measures. In Chapter Four it was observed that both the vividness and control 
of mental imagery were significantly associated with the divergent thinking measures. 
However, inconsistencies, not immediate to the meta-analysis. were found when studies 
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that employed both measures were assessed. In the studies that followed further 
developments emerged and a re-evaluation was therefore deemed necessary. 
Table 6.2. Fisher's r Correlation Coefficients for studies that Employed a Measure of 
the Vividness of Mental Imagery 
Author Participants Lower Meanr Upper Probability 
and Tests Bound Bound 
Bowers 32 (1) 0.17 0.54 0.72 0.003 
Forisha 320(3) -0.07 0.04 0.15 0.237 
Parrott & Strongman 70 (7) -0.13 0.11 0.34 0.179 
Shaw & Belmore 67(3) -0.00 0.24 0.45 0.024 
Shaw & DeMers 141(12) 0.10 0.26 0.41 0.001 
leBoutillier (Study Three) 90(18) -0.08 0.13 0.33 0.108 
leBoutillier (Study Five) 92(18) -0.08 0.12 0.31 0.124 
Total 812(62) 0.07 0.14 0.22 <0.001 
The vividness measure most commonly used by those researching mental imagery 
and creativity is Marks' VVIQ (1972, 1973). This measure was also employed in Study 
Three of Chapter Five and an analysis of the internal structure of the eyes-open VVIQ 
showed that it could be assessed as a single or content-based multi-factor measure. As the 
latter approach explained a much greater proportion of the variance and yielded a 
parsimonious solution it was adopted in Study Three. This study can be coupled with a 
further investigation in which a new measure of vividness (the VPIQ) was developed and 
assessed in the context of divergent thinking. The results from these studies and those 
produced by the previous researchers are presented in Table 6.2. 
The two studies from the Chapter Five produced combined Fisher's r values that 
were very close to those observed in the first meta-analysis. Consequently, the findings 
from this study are very similar to those found previously. The seven studies were 
homogeneous (X 2(6)=10.71, p>0.05) and an overall Stouffer test was significant (z=3.99, 
p<O.OOI). The combined correlation coefficient was slightly lower than that found for the 
vividness measures in Chapter Four and falls just below McKelvie's acceptability level 
for criterion tests. 
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The inclusion of The Gonzalez et al. (1997) study resulted in a twofold increase in 
the number of participants taking part in imagery control studies. That Gonzalez et al. 
(1997), like all of the other studies, treated the control measure as a normally distributed 
continuous variable is worrying given the findings from Study Two in Chapter Five. As it 
is not possible to convert these scores the resulting meta-analysis (see Table 6.3) must be 
treated with caution. This is especially important as the findings from Study Three 
contrast with the other studies. 
Table 6.3. Fisher's r Correlation Coefficients for studies Employing a Measure of 
The Control of Mental Imagery 
Author Participants Lower Meanr Upper Probability 
and Tests Bound Bound 
Forisha 320(3) 0.07 0.18 0.29 <0.000 
Parrott & Strongman 70 (7) -0.18 0.06 0.29 0.307 
Shaw & DeMers 141(12) 0.04 0.20 0.35 0.008 
Gonzalez et al. 560(5) 0.02 0.10 0.18 0.010 
leBoutillier (Study Three) 90(6) -0.30 -0.10 0.11 0.839 
Total 1181(35) 0.06 0.12 0.18 <0.001 
The two further studies that employed the control of mental imagery resulted in a 
general reduction of the weighted Fisher's r from 0.17 to 0.12. The five studies were 
shown to yield similar findings when a chi-square analysis of heterogeneity of correlation 
coefficients was conducted (X2( 4)=6.82, p>0.05) and an overall significant test of criterion 
difference was observed (z=4.12, p<O.OOl). The final meta-analysis shows that the 
criterion validity of the TVIC has fallen below McKelvie's marginally acceptable 
threshold with less than 20/0 of the variance shared between the measures. 
Types of Divergent Thinking 
In the first meta-analysis it was found that figural divergent thinking had a 
marginally stronger association with the self-report measures of mental imagery than 
verbal divergent thinking. This was expected as the variable is very much dependent upon 
the stimulus attributes of the divergent thinking scores. The t\\"o measures of divergent 
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thinking selected for the criterion studies undertaken in the previous chapter were derived 
from the TTCT because they were representative of the two types of divergent thinking 
commonly used in this research area. The Gonzalez at al. (1997) study also included a 
figural and a verbal divergent thinking task. However, the overall analysis was perfonned 
on a combined score and an insufficient amount of infonnation was available to compute 
Fisher's r values. Consequently, only the results from the two criterion studies presented 
in Chapter Five are included. 
Table 6.4. Fisher's r Correlation Coefficients for studies Employing a Measure of 
Verbal Creativity 
Author Participants Lower Meanr Upper Probability 
and Tests Bound Bound 
Bowers 32 (1) 0.17 0.54 0.72 0.003 
Forisha 320(3) 0.08 0.19 0.29 <0.001 
Parrott & Strongman 70 (7) -0.24 0.00 0.24 0.500 
Shaw & Belmore 67(2) -0.02 0.22 0.44 0.036 
Shaw & DeMers 141(12) 0.01 0.17 0.33 0.022 
leBoutillier (Study Three) 90(12) -0.16 0.05 0.25 0.318 
leBoutillier (Study Five) 92(9) -0.06 0.15 0.34 0.075 
Total 630(26) 0.11 0.13 0.26 <0.001 
The Fisher's r value for the verbal measure dropped from 0.19 to 0.13 following 
the inclusion of the two further studies. Much of this effect can be explained by the effects 
of the TVIC score in Study Five which contrasted with those of the other studies. An 
analysis of heterogeneity showed that the findings were comparable (X2(6)=7.44, p>0.05) 
and an overall significant effect was observed (z=4.84, p<O.OOl). The revised estimate for 
the association between verbal divergent thinking and self-reported mental imagery was 
statistically inconsequential (McKelvie, 1995). 
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Table 6.5. Fisher's r Correlation Coefficients for studies Employing a Measure of 
Figural Creativity 
Author Participants Lower Meanr Upper Probability 
and Tests Bound Bound 
Campos & Perez 122(4) 0.03 0.21 -0.37 0.010 
Parrott & Strongman 70 (7) -0.07 0.11 0.34 0.179 
Shaw & Belmore 67(1) -0.05 0.29 0.50 0.009 
Shaw & DeMers 141(12) 0.10 0.26 0.41 0.001 
leBoutillier (Study Three) 90(12) -0.12 0.09 0.29 0.197 
leBoutillier (Study Five) 92(9) -0.10 0.11 0.31 0.146 
Total 582(46) 0.11 0.19 0.27 <0.001 
The association between self-reported mental imagery and figural divergent 
thinking was less severely affected by the inclusion of Studies Three and Five form 
Chapter Five. The studies produced homogeneous results (X2(5)=3.05, p>0.05) and when 
combined yielded an overall significant effect (z=4.66, p<O.OOl). The combined Fisher's r 
value, although reduced from that found in the original meta-analysis, showed marginally 
acceptable predictive validity. 
Discussion 
The combined findings from this revised meta-analytic review show that self-
reported mental imagery skirts between the border of inconsequential and marginally 
acceptable predictive validity (McKelvie, 1995). As expected, consistent small 
associations were found between the two variables which improved slightly when the 
divergent thinking tasks were presented in a figural form. The main controversy arising 
from these findings once again concerns the use of the TVIC as a normally distributed 
continuous variable. Though the overall trend from the present research is a down-sizing 
of the association between control and divergent thinking, the inclusion of a later study 
(Gonzalez et al., 1997) shows that researchers are still treating this variable as though it 
has sufficient psychometric properties. 
In this chapter data from the individual differences approach to the relationship 
between self-reported mental imagery and creativity have again been meta-analysed. 
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adding three studies employing this protocol. The overall findings, though consistent, 
show that this type of investigation yields only a small association between mental 
imagery and creativity. These results show only minimal support for the proposition that 
mental imagery is an important determinant of creativity and seem far removed from 
Shepard's (1978a) claim that creativity is a raison d'etre for the study of mental imagery. 
In the following discussion an attempt is made to explain why these findings are at odds 
with the claims of the leading iconophiles (Finke, 1989; Paivio, 1983; and, Shepard, 
1978a). 
Clearly those who posit a role for mental imagery in the creative process do so for 
good reason. The reason that stands out is the wealth of anecdotal reports of the use of 
mental imagery in historical creativity (see Chapter One). In considering the evident 
contrast between the results from the individual differences approach and the anecdotal 
reports of Coleridge, Einstein, Kekule, Poincare and others, at least four possible 
explanations emerge. These are: the 'myth of genius' explanation; problems with the 
predictive validity of the measures used; the special imagery account; and the importance 
of methodological issues. Each of these is discussed and possible resolutions are put 
forward where relevant. 
One explanation for the contrast between the current empirical and anecdotal 
findings pertains to the validity of the anecdotal reports of historically creative 
individuals. This argument, though not directly aimed at the reports of mental imagery, 
would explain the failure to find empirical support for imagery-based creativity in the 
context of retrospective embellishment. Several creativity theorists (Perkins, 1981; 
Schaffer, 1994; Weisberg, 1993) have investigated the claims of inspiration and insight in 
historically creative performance, including many moments of inspiration that involve the 
use of mental imagery in creativity. Weisberg (1993) has de constructed and evaluated the 
anecdotal reports of Mozart, Coleridge and many others. His conclusions suggest that 
there are often clear antecedents to these creative discoveries that have not been given the 
full weight of attention by these creative individuals. These include documentary evidence 
that the claims of 'insight' and 'inspiration' are false. Perhaps the claims of these 
individuals about their extra-ordinary imagery abilities are part of the 'myth of genius' 
being fostered. 
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The aim of Weisberg's (1993) research is to demonstrate that there are no special 
purpose skills involved in creativity. If he is correct, then it could also be inferred that 
there are no special forms of mental imagery. However, Weisberg (1993) regards the 
imaginal processes claimed by historically creative individuals as ordinary and does not 
attempt to challenge the claims of Einstein and Faraday who, above all others, claimed to 
think creatively in mental images (Daniels-McGhee and Davies, 1994; Miller, 1989: 
Tweney, 1989). Furthermore, this belief is supported by research which shows that people 
tend to report above the expected average mental imagery (Kihlstrom e t aI., 1991; 
McKelvie, 1995. 
The second reason why these studies may not concur with the anecdotal evidence 
relates to psychometric concerns over the creativity measures used. The development of 
measures of creativity following Guilford's Presidential address to the American 
Psychological Association in 1950 suggests a meteoric rise in both the number and use of 
divergent thinking tasks. This reached a plateau in the late 1960s and was followed by a 
general disenchantment in the 1980s (Micheal and Wright, 1989). In the late 1980s and 
the 1990s creativity became popular again but psychometric testing played a secondary 
role to theoretical, developmental, and computational accounts (Boden, 1990, 1994; 
lohnson-Laird, 1993; Karmiloff-Smith, 1993; Ochse, 1990; Post, 1994; Zohar, 1990). 
The disregard for cognitive measures of creativity may reflect a feeling that 
biographical and personality studies (Amabile, 1982; Eysenck, 1994, 1995; Gardner, 
1993, 1994; Gruber and Davis, 1988; Perkins, 1994) are now seen as a better means of 
understanding individual differences in creativity. However, the movement away from 
psychometric testing is also linked to a number of problems associated with creativity 
tests (Feldhusen and Goh, 1995; Hocevar, 1979; Hocevar and Bachelor, 1989). In a 
review of these issues Micheal and Wright (1989) list a wide range of concerns about the 
test administration, reliability, content, criterion and construct validity, and scoring of 
these tasks. They conclude that collaboration is required between theoreticians and 
psychometricians to develop measures that properly reflect creative abilities. 
While Micheal and Wright (1989) are correct in their assertion that there are many 
problems with the tests available to individual differences researchers they do so by 
undermining many positive accounts of these tasks that show that these albeit imperfect 
measures do have limited predictive validity. The most frequently used measures of 
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creativity in the studies reviewed here were those selected from Torrance's battery of 
divergent thinking tasks (e.g. Torrance, 1974). These tests have been available for many 
years and Torrance and others (Eysenck, 1994, 1995; Torrance, 1988) have sho\\TI an 
association between performance on these tests and future creative achievement. 
Similarly, Barron's Symbolic Equivalence Task (Barron, 1988) was shown to be a good 
indicator of present creative achievement. Thus, while there remain problems with 
creativity tasks there is at least some evidence that supports their continued use in 
individual differences research. 
There is, of course, also evidence of psychometric problems arising from the use 
of self-report measures of mental imagery (Ashton and White, 1980; McKelvie, 1995; 
Hiscock, 1978). Several studies have questioned whether these questionnaires actually 
measure mental imagery abilities (e.g. Ernest, 1977; Hiscock, 1978; and, Slee, 1988). 
Furthermore problems (i.e. response leniency, unaccountable sex differences and social 
desirability) pervade despite attempts to minimise their effects; the results from the 
present research testify to this. The functional utility of these measures is often small and 
where medium effect sizes have been shown they do not appear to be very robust 
(McKelvie, 1995). Nevertheless the present review does show that there is some shared 
variance between vividness measures and divergent thinking tasks. 
One question that needs to be answered is, given the above problems why do 
researchers continue to rely upon self-report measures of mental imagery? One answer is 
that mental imagery is simply problematic regardless of the measure used to investigate it. 
The operational indicators of its use in mentation seem to have as many problems as the 
questionnaires (Broerse and Crassini, 1984; Chambers and Reisberg, 1985; Intons-
Peterson, 1983; and Pylyshyn, 1973, 1981). Furthermore, for some aspects of mental 
imagery associated with creativity (e.g. vividness) there does not appear to be an objective 
measure available. Nevertheless, the paucity of studies utilising chronometric and 
accuracy measures of individual differences (e.g. mental rotation and comparison tasks) 
does leave a gap in the research. This issue is partly redressed in the following chapters 
where creative image generation tasks are assessed in respect of both objective and 
subj ective measures of mental imagery. 
Finally, even if the validity of the measures typically employed in the individual 
differences approach is accepted, it does not necessarily mean that mental imagery 
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provides a useful method for performing the divergent thinking tasks. In Chapter One it 
was demonstrated that mental imagery may be useful in the creative process but it is 
neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for producing creative responses. As the 
empirical evidence provided in the last three chapters shows only a small relationship 
between self-reported mental imagery and divergent thinking it is necessary to employ 
measures of creativity that are theoretically linked to mental imagery. This issue is 
addressed in the following chapters where the role of mental imagery in an imagery-
bound creativity task is assessed through the application of the individual differences 
approach. 
The third explanation for the failure of these studies to demonstrate an important 
role for mental imagery in creativity is the opposite to the first account. This explanation 
states that historically creative individuals are special and therefore have special ways of 
thinking that could not be unearthed in studies using samples drawn from the 'ordinary' 
population. That Dali, Einstein, Faraday, Kekule, Tesla and all the others who report the 
use of mental imagery are special is beyond doubt but do they have special forms of 
mental imagery? There is some support for a clearly distinguishable difference between 
these individuals and the general population. The reports of Mozart and Coleridge, for 
example, suggest that they had extremely vivid imagery; though the reports must be seen 
in the context of Weisberg's research (1993). The reports of Faraday and Einstein lay 
claim to a non-verbal thinking that seems inconceivable. Furthermore, the review of 
synaesthetic imagery carried out in Chapter Three showed that many historically creative 
individuals have special imagery skills. Finally, even where the processes are similar the 
motivation of these individuals to use mental imagery is surprising. Consider, for 
example, Edison and Dali' s methods for exploiting their hypnagogic imagery 
(Mavromatis, 1987). 
There are of course many examples of the use of mental images by historically 
creative individuals (e.g. daydreaming, dreaming, and reverie) that are typical of the 
general population or specific to circumstances that are available to a wide number of 
individuals in the population (e.g. opium-induced hallucinations). Coupled with this there 
now exists a well established experimental protocol that has demonstrated that 'ordinary' 
individuals are capable of using imagery to produce creative responses (Finke and 
Slayton, 1988). This method, defined earlier in the thesis as the image generation 
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approach, involves the generation, transformation and synthesis of stimulus parts into 
novel composite forms. Though the protocols used are not amenable to an individual 
differences approach it should be possible to construct a derivative form that enables 
comparison with performance on both imagery and creativity tasks. This is the aim of the 
next chapter. 
The final possible reason why these results did not live up to the expectations 
produced from the anecdotal reports is related to the methodological approach adopted by 
these researchers. If it is assumed that the measures used in these studies minimally 
perform their task and that many historically creative achievements use mental images 
available to the ordinary person, then it is necessary to return to these reports to 
understand why the association was so small. If this is done then it is immediately obvious 
that these studies have not given mental imagery (or creativity) a real chance. Quite 
simply the administration and presentation of the creativity measures is not amenable to 
the use of mental imagery in the manner reported by historically creative individuals. As 
was noted in Chapter Three the majority of the reports of the use of mental imagery in 
creativity occur in situations where there is minimal perceptual conflict or maximum 
perceptual facilitation. This area is dealt with in more detail in Chapter Ten. 
Conclusion 
It is concluded that the individual differences approach has established that self-
reported mental imagery abilities are consistently but minimally associated with 
performance on divergent thinking tasks. Though there have been many attempts to show 
why an association exists between the two variables these appear to be carried out in 
ignorance of the strength of the association. That is, that mental imagery reports only 
account for 2% of the variance in the divergent thinking measures used. It would therefore 
appear more useful to explore the reasons why the relationship is so small prior to 
assuming that it is larger in some individuals because they have X.y. or z cognitive 
attributes. 
In considering why the relationship is small four explanations emerge. The first of 
these claims that the mental images reported by historically creative individuals \vere part 
of a set of confabulations used to promote a 'specialness' concept of creativity. The 
second account explains the failure in terms of the inadequacy of the measures used to 
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investigate the association. The third is a special form of the indiyidual differences 
approach in that it defines historical creativity, and its concomitant images, as different 
from ordinary creativity. The final explanation states that the methodology employed in 
the individual differences approach does not allow for the use of mental imagery in 
creativity. This account calls for a greater understanding of the role of perceptual conflict 
and facilitation when researching the relationship between mental imagery and creativity. 
While it is probably the case that all of these explanations account for the 
findings, in at least some small form, some have greater consequences for future research 
than others. The first and third arguments are negative in the sense that they do not allow 
the average researcher to assess the association any further. The second and fourth 
explanations are positive in that they do allow for a greater understanding of the 
relationship between mental imagery and creativity. These are dealt with in the 
proceeding research where the individual differences approach is applied to an image 
generation approach. 
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Chapter VII 
The Image Generation Approach 
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Introduction 
The research presented in Chapters Four, Five, and Six showed that self-reported 
vividness of mental imagery is consistently associated with performance on divergent 
thinking tasks. However, the association between the two variables is weak and there is no 
evidence that anyone intervening variable could strengthen the association. Given the 
failure to find a statistically consequential association, using the psychometric approach, 
the aim of the following chapters is to investigate Finke's image generation approach 
(creative visualisation) from an individual differences perspective. As there has been no 
previous research into the role of individual differences using Finke' s creative 
visualisation task, much of the work that follows is exploratory. The aim of the present 
chapter is to discuss the nature of the image generation approach and to evaluate a test-
format version. In the following chapters the role of mental imagery in the task is 
evaluated using behavioural and self-report measures. 
Throughout the thesis it has been noted that there is considerable anecdotal 
support for the use of mental imagery in creativity. Although useful, these anecdotes are 
open to the 'myth of genius' account described in the previous chapter (Weisberg, 1993). 
Thus, the truth of the claim that mental imagery plays a role in creativity can only be 
properly addressed through empirical research. Until the late 1980s there had been little or 
no attempt to experimentally investigate creativity and imagery. However, since Finke's 
development of a creative visualisation task, the use of mental imagery in creative 
visualisation has allegedly been established (Finke, 1990; Finke and Slayton, 1988; and, 
Finke, Ward, and Smith, 1992). Nevertheless, there is still a need for more research into 
how mental images operate in these tasks. The aim of the present chapter is to develop a 
test-format version which can be used to distinguish abilities on the tasks. Once this is 
achieved it will be possible to assess the role of mental imagery in the task. 
As Finke and others have demonstrated that creative forms can emerge from tasks 
involving the mental synthesis of stimulus parts (Anderson and Helstrup, 1993; Finke, 
1989,1990, 1996; Finke and Slayton, 1988; Finke, Ward and Smith. 1992) it should be 
possible to demonstrate that some individuals are capable of producing more composite 
forms than others. In doing so, several questions arise. The principle question that arises 
is, do individuals who perform well on the creative visualisation task also perform better 
on imagery tasks that may utilise the same processes? A further question one may ask is. 
148 
how do mental imagery and creativity interact to produce responses on the creative 
visualisation task? To answer these questions a performance measure of the creative 
visualisation task needs to be developed. This is the aim of the present chapter. First, 
however, it is necessary to outline the development and nature of the creative visualisation 
protocol. 
Emergence in Mental Imagery Experiments 
Finke and Slayton's (1988) work on creative visualisation may represent the first 
attempt to demonstrate the emergence of unexpected and divergent composite forms in an 
imagery task but there are many examples of expected and convergent emergent forms. 
These have been developed to demonstrate a perceptual equivalence for mental images. 
As Finke (Finke and Pinker, 1982; Finke, Pinker, and Farah, 1989; and, Finke and 
Schmidt, 1977, 1978 ) has played a significant role in the development of these 
experimental protocols an initial overview of "emergence" in mental imagery studies will 
be undertaken. "Emergence" in mental imagery research refers to unexpected forms 
coming into being as a consequence of imaging. 
Mental imagery research in the past three decades has bristled with studies using 
an emergence paradigm. In fact all of the major experimental protocols claim to have a 
degree of emergence. This is hardly surprising as one consequence of not having 
emergence is that the participants comply to experimental demand characteristics. Viewed 
this way emergence is a crucial area of debate (Kosslyn, 1980,1981; and Pylyshyn, 1981) 
and a key driving force for continued experimental research (Broerse and Crassini, 1984; 
Chambers and Reisberg, 1985, 1992; Denis and Carfantan, 1985, 1986; Finke and Pinker, 
1982; Intons-Peterson, 1983; Jolicoeur and Kosslyn, 1985; Mitchell, and Richman, 1980). 
This research is based upon the notion that once an experimental protocol has been 
established the existence of emergence demonstrates participant naivete. 
While an additional demonstration of emergence is an essential component of 
mental imagery research many experiments use emergence as a fundamental feature of the 
protocol. The most obvious group of studies which seek emergence are those which 
employ imagery versions of well established visual illusions and after-effects. These 
studies have investigated a wide range of effects, including colour after-effects, the phi-
phenomenon and size constancy effects (Brosgole, Chan, Brandt-Tiven. Miller, and 
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Sanders, 1997; Broerse and Crassini, 1980; Finke and Schmidt, 1977, 1978; and, Wallace, 
1984). Though there have been successful demonstrations of the emergence of 
perceptually equivalent effects (Brosgole et al., 1997; Cerfe-Beare, 1993; Finke and 
Schmidt, 1977, 1978; Wallace, 1984) there are also alternative findings that challenge 
emergence (e.g. Broerse and Crassini, 1984; Reisberg and Morris, 1985; Rhodes and 
O'Leary, 1985). There has also been research that demonstrates a failure to find 
perceptually equivalent emergence in complex tasks (Chambers and Reisberg, 1985). 
Thus, studies of imagery-based perceptual anomalies have not fully demonstrated the 
existence of emergence in mental imagery. 
Emergence is also a key descriptor of the experimental protocol in tasks where 
individuals are required to perform operations upon an imaged form. This may take the 
form of rotation or manipulation in spatial imagery tasks (Cooper, 1990; Cooper and 
Shepard, 1973; and, Shepard and Metzler, 1971) or it may be more directly imposed upon 
the imaginal system in tasks involving the synthesis of fragmented forms (e.g. Finke, 
Pinker and Farah, 1989). The latter tasks require participants to amalgamate, transform or 
mutate a number stimulus parts into a form that is only recognisable as a composite 
whole. For example, Kosslyn, Reiser, Farah, and Fliegel (1983) carried out a study in 
which participants were required to synthesise fragmented parts of line drawings (e.g. a 
cat). They found that emergent solutions occurred in explicit imagery tasks but not in 
control conditions where imagery instructions were not presented. 
Figure 7.1. An Example of the Mutation and Transformation Stimuli Employed in 
Finke, Pinker, and Farah's (1989) Study of Emergent Patterns in Imagery 
The clearest demonstration of emergence in mental imagery tasks was provided in 
a series of studies conducted by Finke et al. (1989). These studies required the 
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participants to use their imagery to combine, superimpose and manipulate verbally 
described stimulus forms. For example, in a typical trial they may be asked to: imagine 
the letter 'Y', to add a circle to the bottom of the letter, to add a horizontal line just above 
the circle, and to rotate the composite form 1800 • If the participant is able to perform the 
task the emergent form should be a stick man (see Figure 7.1). Results from these studies 
showed that people were capable of recognising simple emergent structures following 
several transformation procedures. These tasks appear to be especially pertinent to the 
perceptual equivalence hypothesis because they are not susceptible to tacit inference, task 
demands and non-imagery heuristics. 
Creative Cognition 
Having shown that when people are asked to manipulate mental images they often 
find experimentally predictable emergent forms, Finke developed a procedure to assess 
the significance of experimentally unpredictable emergent forms. Finke and Slayton 
(1988) hypothesised that people taking part in a mental synthesis task could generate, 
transform and synthesise simple stimulus parts (e.g. a circle, the letter' J' and the number 
'8') into experimentally unpredictable but recognisable composite wholes. In a study of 
over 850 of these tasks they showed that recognisable composite forms were produced in 
400/0 of the trials and that 150/0 of these were independently defined as creative. Further 
research also found that only a small proportion of the creative responses were predictable 
in the sense that they could be guessed without mentally synthesising them. Furthermore, 
research into mental and physical synthesis has demonstrated that creativity is not 
improved with external support (Anderson and Helstrup, 1993). Thus, mental imagery 
seems to be important in this particular form of creativity. 
Finke and Slayton's (1988) research into creative mental synthesis has provided a 
useful protocol for further investigation into mental imagery and creativity. However, the 
exact procedure left several very basic questions unanswered. These include the 
usefulness of mental synthesis in real-world problem solving (where implementation often 
involves functional and categorical constraint) and the importance of generation and 
interpretation in the creative visualisation task. 
The functional utility of mental synthesis protocols was evaluated by transferring 
the task requirements to the creative invention of composite forms in three-dimensional 
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stimulus parts (Finke, 1990). The inventions produced by participants matched those 
found in the Finke and Slayton task (1988) in both frequency and the number of creatiYe 
responses. Finke (1990) also investigated the effects of constraint (e.g. restricting the 
composite forms to particular categories) on composite form generation. In several 
studies in which category (e.g. weapons, tools and utensils, and furniture), object (type of 
weapon, tool, or furniture), function (e.g. "a piece of furniture that a handicapped person 
could use"), and stimulus part (e.g. sphere, cylinder, and handle) were determined and 
freely selected Finke found that constraint generally had a positive effect on creative 
performance. In only one of these cases was constraint shown to be disadvantageous 
because it limited the number of possible responses available to the individual. The effect 
of constraint tends to show that so long as the range of responses is not too specialised it 
forces the person to think more creatively about the task (Finke et al., 1992). 
Finke (1990) was also interested in distinguishing the roles of generation and 
interpretation in the creative visualisation task. The need for such an investigation was 
apparent in the ambiguous interpretations of some of the composite forms found in the 
Finke and Slayton task. These begged the question as to whether interpretation occurs pre-
or post- the synthesis of the stimulus parts. To address this question Finke (1990) altered 
the protocol so that the participants interpreted 'pre-inventive' composite forms in the 
context of randomly selected categories. The results showed that regardless of whether 
the participants had created the pre-inventive forms there was a reduction in the number 
of solutions achieved. However, when the participants were given pre-inventive forms the 
proportion of creative inventions produced was equivalent to the previous tasks performed 
by Finke and Slayton (1988). Furthermore, where they formed their own pre-inventive 
forms the proportion of creative inventions was greater (approaching 50% of the total 
number of practical responses). 
Since its inception the creative visualisation task has consistently showed that 
synthesising and interpreting mental images can result in the emergence of creative 
responses. It therefore seems to be an ideal protocol for furthering the understanding of 
the role of mental imagery in creativity. The aim of the following study is to develop a 
test-format version of Finke and Slayton's original creative visualisation task. Provided 
that it can be demonstrated that this task has acceptable parametric properties, the role of 
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mental imagery in creativity can be explored in ways that have not previously been 
investigated. 
Study Eight. Piloting a Test-Format Version of Finke and Slayton's Creative 
Visualisation Task 
Introduction 
As a preliminary inquiry into the role of mental imagery in Finke's creative 
visualisation task (Finke, 1989, 1990, 1992; 1996 Finke and Slayton, 1988), the aim of the 
present study was to develop a test-format version of the task using the stimulus parts 
from Finke and Slayton's creative visualisation task. The only constraint was that the 
format simulates the standard performance tests used in psychological research whilst 
retaining the use of image transformation and synthesis. This is necessary as the creative 
visual synthesis task used in pervious research does not yield acceptable parametric 
properties 
Several forms of the creative visual synthesis task have been developed in the past 
decade (Anderson and Helstrup, 1993; Finke, 1990; Finke and Slayton, 1988). However, 
all of these have followed the protocol used in the original Finke and Slayton version. 
This protocol requires participants to generate a composite form from three randomly 
selected stimulus parts. If the participant has been successful they are required to make a 
brief sketch of the generated form. These sketches are then rated by judges for 
correspondence on a one to five scale ranging from poor to good. If they are defined as 
good correspondences they are assessed for creativity using independent judges ratings. 
The creative visualisation tasks used by previous researchers provide information 
about whether people can perform the task and the proportion of responses that are 
correspondent and creative. They have not been used to show that people differ in their 
abilities to produce correspondent and creative responses. This emphasis upon 
demonstration means that these tasks are assessed for frequency of occurrence rather 
quantity of performance. As the thesis focuses on how and why people differ in their 
creative abilities there is a need to transform the creative visualisation task into a form that 
produces acceptable parametric properties. The method used in the present chapter is 
derived from the standard divergent thinking measures (Barron, 1988; Guilford, 1969; 
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Torrance, 1972). That is, the tasks are presented in a pencil and paper format and the 
participants are given a specified amount of time to produce creative responses from a 
range of stimuli. 
To develop a standard pencil and paper test-format version of the creative 
visualisation task several adjustments to the standard protocol needed to be made. Firstly, 
it was necessary to provide the participants with sets of standard stimulus part assemblies. 
The advantage with this is that all of the participants receive the same sets of stimuli. This 
enabled the raters to further differentiate convergent and divergent stimulus part 
assemblies. Thus, randomness was sacrificed in favour of conformity. Secondly. it \vas 
also necessary to present the stimulus parts in a pictorial form. One disadvantage with this 
approach was that it placed less demand on the image generation procedure. However. as 
later studies (Finke, 1990) found that there were a larger proportion of creative responses 
when the participants were presented with composite forms then freeing the generation 
procedure may result in less demand upon the imaginal system. The aim of this study was 
to pilot a test-format version of the creative visualisation task. 
Method 
Participants. Twenty-five participants with a median age of 20 (ranging from 18 
to 37) volunteered to take part in the study. All were undergraduate psychology students 
at Middlesex University. One participant failed to comprehend the nature of the task and 
was therefore removed from further analyses. 
Design. The aim of the present study was to evaluate the parametric properties of 
the task. As an adjunct self-report measures were also taken to assess the participants' 
beliefs about how they performed the task. 
Materials. A test-format version of Finke and Slayton's (1988) creative 
visualisation task was developed in the form of a standard paper and pencil task (see 
Appendix 7.1). The instructions on the task informed the participants that they would be 
presented with a series of stimulus parts and that they would be required to mentally 
integrate these forms into a composite object or scene. A total of seven stimulus part sets 
was presented and the participants were required to think of up to three composite forms 
for each set. These were presented in the same order and consisted of four sets of three 
stimulus parts (square, circle, line; triangle, letter 'L', circle; square, oblong. circle; and. 
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triangle, cross, line). Two sets of four stimulus parts were also presented (triangle, semi-
circle, square, letter 'T'; and, ellipse, oblong, circle, line) and a [mal set consisting of six 
stimulus parts was given (triangle, circle, letter 'T', line, line, square). The participants 
were informed that they were free to choose the order of completion and were encouraged 
to move on to further sets if they were unsuccessful in forming composite forms. 
Instructions. On every page of the task the procedure and the rules underlying 
integration were specified. The instructions for each stimulus part integration were as 
follows: 
1. Think of an object or a scene. 
2. Write down the title. 
3. Draw a brief sketch of the object or scene. 
Underneath the instructions the rules for integration were specified. These were stated as: 
1. You can rotate the stimulus parts. 
2. You can change the size of the stimulus parts 
3. You cannot change the basic shape of the stimulus parts. 
The participants were informed that they must adhere to these rules and that 
drawing support (e.g. drawing single stimulus parts) was not allowed. Intermittent 
observation was carried out and post facto checks on drawing support confirmed that the 
participants complied with the rules and procedures. 
Self-report Measures. Five visual analogue scale measures (ranging for 0-1 OOmm) 
were presented to the participants after they had performed the creative visualisation task. 
These were intended to gauge beliefs about the difficulty of the task and the type of 
strategies they used. The first of these asked the participants how difficult they felt the 
task was. It was anchored from 'very difficult' to 'very easy'. The second scale measured 
the participants awareness to solution. This was anchored from' always aware' to 'never 
aware '. The three strategy scales (mathematical, verbal, and imagery) measured the 
participants' beliefs about how they created the composite forms. These were anchored 
from, 'always used' to 'never used '. 
Procedure. The participants performed the creative visualisation task on their o\vn 
in sound attenuated cubicles. After reading the instructions they were further informed of 
the nature of the task and having established that they understood the task they proceeded 
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to work as quietly and quickly as possible. Once the study had been completed the 
composite forms were scored by two raters on the basis of the three attributes listed 
below. 
Scoring Instructions. The judges were informed about the nature of the task and were 
asked to make three judgements about each composite form. The first task they performed 
was to identify the number of correct responses. To be judged as a correct response the 
composite form had to conform to the following criteria: 
1. It integrated all of the given shapes. 
2. It did not include any other shapes. 
3. The person provided a title 
4. The object or scene fulfilled a minimal correspondence with the title 
If the response was judged to be correct it was rated on a five-point scale (ranging from 
'Very Poor' to 'Very Good) of the correspondence of the form to the description. Finally 
the rater was required to state whether or not they thought the composite form was 
creative. 
Results 
The aim of the present study was to evaluate the parametric properties of the test-
format creative visualisation task and the type of cognitive strategies the participants 
report using to create composite forms. Following the completion of the task the scores 
from the creative visualisation task were rated by two judges for: the number of acceptable 
responses, the degree of correspondence between the composite forms and what they were 
said to be representing, and the creativity of the composite forms. As the ratings exceeded 
the 0.7 criterion adopted for inter-rater response measures the scores were collapsed for 
acceptability and correspondence. A score for creativity was only given if both judges 
agreed that the composite form was creative. 
While there were a large number of non-creative responses some very interesting 
and unexpected composite forms were produced. The ability to transform, rotate, and 
combine the stimulus parts (all presented in a standard size format) is clear from the 
examples given above. In viewing these responses it seems apparent that they could only 
be produced by using mental imagery. Consider any of the examples presented in Figure 
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7.2 and it is clear that the stimulus parts would have to be rotated or transposed in quite 
complex ways to produce the final product. 
Figure 7.2. Examples of Responses Scoring High on Correspondence and Rated As 
Creative By Two Judges. 
1. 2. 3. 
4. 5. 6. 
1. Underground sign (square, line, circle); 2. Floppy disk (square, circle, rectangle); 3. Ice cream stall 
(triangle, line, square, semi-circle); 4. Unicycle (square, rectangle, circle), 5. Coffee pot (letter 'T', square, 
triangle, semi-circle), 6. Ironing board (letter 'X', line, triangle). 
Basic data screening for skewness and kurtosis of the three measurements derived 
from the test-format revealed good parametric properties. Table 7.1 shows that all of the 
participants managed to produce at least one response (though one judge gave a zero 
rating for a participant on the number of acceptable responses) and that the average 
number of freely produced responses exceeded Finke and Slayton's one-per-two minute 
protocol (i.e. the maximum number of responses produced using this protocol is five). The 
ability to represent the responses averaged 2.1 per response which is below an average 
correspondence rating. Finally, the number of creative responses (29% of the total 
responses) shows that the participants followed the instruction to integrate the stimulus 
parts in as creative a way as possible. 
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Table 7.1. A Descriptive Analysis of the Measures Derived from the Test-Format 
Creative Visualization Task (n=24) 
Measurement Scale 
Number of acceptable responses 
Total Correspondence ratings 
Total Creative responses 
Mean 
6.71 
13.89 
2.00 
St. Dev. Min. Max. 
3.00 
6.69 
l.59 
1 
1 
o 
14 
28.5 
6 
Descriptive statistics of the self-report measures are presented in Table 7.3. An 
analysis of difficulty showed that the participants rated the creative visualisation task as 
above average in difficulty (t(21)=3.64, se=4.89, p<O.OOI). A one-sample t-test on the 
participants' perceived awareness of the solution showed that, although they tended to 
report awareness, this was not statistically significant.(t(21)=l.64, se=5.08, p>0.05). Self-
report measures of strategies employed to perform the task showed that the participants 
.reported using a verbal comparison below the mid-point on a 'never' to 'always' scale 
(t(22)=-1.90, se=5.90, p<0.05). The participants also reported rarely using a mathematical 
comparison strategy (t(-5.61, se=4.39, p<O.OOI). Finally, even though the participants 
were never explicitly asked to use mental imagery they rated its use significantly above 
the mid-point (t(21)=3.38, se=5.46, p<0.01). These measures therefore support the 
assumption that mental imagery is used in the creative visualisation task. 
Table 7.2. Self-report Ratings of Difficulty and Strategy Used to Perform the Test-
Format Creative Visualisation Task (n=24). 
Self-report measure Mean St.Dev. 
Task Difficulty 69.95 22.93 
Awareness of Solutions 58.32 23.83 
Use of a verbal comparison strategy 39.45 26.07 
Use of a mathematical strategy 25.36 20.60 
Use of a general mental picture strategy 68.45 25.62 
Discussion 
This brief study of the test-format version of the creative visualisation task 
demonstrates that it is possible to construct a measure which conforms to the parametric 
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properties found with other test-format tasks. Though the participants generally reported 
difficulty in completing the task, the fact that the judges found nearly seven responses per 
participant acceptable shows that the task is possible. Finally, though no references to 
mental imagery were made by the experimenter (or were presented in the task) the self-
report measures suggest that the participants frequently employed mental imagery in the 
task. 
In evaluating these findings in the context of Finke and Slayton's (1988) research 
it is necessary to understand the different scoring procedures used. The correspondence 
scale was altered and the criterion for acceptance was changed so that the judges used a 
two-tier system of correspondence. In the first instance they were instructed to make an 
assessment of sufficient correspondence. If the composite form passed this test it was then 
evaluated according to the degree of correspondence on a five-point scale. The result of 
this process was that the correspondence scores were generally lower than those found by 
Finke and Slayton (1988). However, this is partially offset by an increase in the number of 
responses produced and a greater proportion of creative responses. 
In summarising this study of it is concluded that a measure can be produced 
which shows good parametric properties. One of the consequences of developing the test 
in this format is that the overall correspondence between the composite form and what it 
is said to represent is reduced. However, this seems to be a natural consequence of this 
performance version. Furthermore, this is counteracted by an increase in both the quantity 
of responses produced and the proportion of creative responses. 
As the study has shown that a test-format version of the creative visualisation task 
can be developed which has acceptable parametric properties and elicits responses that 
can be judged on measures of acceptability, correspondence, and creativity it is possible to 
explore the roles of imagery and creativity in the task. As this research has not been 
conducted before it is necessary to assess which measures of mental imagery may predict 
performance on the creative visualisation task. Such an undertaking is even more 
speculative because the previous research into individual differences in mental imagery 
and creativity has focused solely upon self-reported mental imagery. 
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Chapter VIII 
The Role of Behavioural Measures of Mental Imagery in Predicting 
Performance on the Creative Visualization Task 
160 
General Introduction 
In previous chapters it was noted that individual differences research 
into mental imagery and creativity has predicted divergent thinking performance on the 
basis of self-reported mental imagery. Behavioural measures of mental imagery that 
assess rotation, scanning and comparison effects have not been used to study how mental 
imagery differences may influence performance on divergent thinking tasks. The use of 
self-report measures in previous studies of mental imagery and creativity seems to have 
been based upon convention rather than any stated theoretical rationale. As an alternative 
approach the aim of the present chapter is to assess the role of behavioural measures in 
performance on the test-format version of the creative visualization task. This will be 
achieved through two studies of mental imagery and creative visualization. In the first 
study a simple high and low mental rotation latency and accuracy split is employed to 
investigate whether imagery differences predict performance on the creative visualization 
task. The second study in this chapter investigates imagery-based and non-imagery based 
mental comparison performance. Initially, a review of the forms of behavioural predictors 
of mental imagery ability is undertaken. 
Bahavioural Measures of Mental Imagery 
The pilot study carried out in Chapter Seven showed that it is possible to construct 
a test-format version of the creative visualization task that has adequate parametric 
properties. As this version of the creative visualization task produces a sufficient range of 
scores it is possible to evaluate the association between mental imagery and creativity in 
the task. The aim of the present chapter is to select and implement behavioural measures 
of mental imagery as alternative predictors of performance on the creative visualization 
task. 
In Chapter Three a range of mental imagery tasks was discussed in the context of 
their validity and their relationship to mental imagery. Although these measures are 
normally used to demonstrate a representational or stimulus attribute hypothesis 
(1. T.E.Richardson, 1999) they have also been employed as individual differences 
measures (Farah, Hammond, Levine, and Calvino, 1989; Paivio, 1978a; Wethearly, Ball. 
and Stacks, 1997). This is because many of these tasks provide good indicators of 
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performance and therefore show an individual's ability in that particular form of mental 
imagery. In Table 8.1 some of the most common tasks used in mental imagery research 
are listed. As an aid to evaluating the usefulness of these measures in individual 
differences research the processing and response attributes have been stated. 
Table Four. Examples of Mental Imagery Tasks and the Hypothesised forms of 
Instruction, Imagery and Quantification 
Task Instruction 
Imagery After-effects 
Imagined Ambiguous Figures 
Creative Visualisation 
Convergent Emergence 
Imagery induced Illusions 
Imagery Mnemonics 
Mental Clock digit Comparison 
Mental Picture Comparison 
Mental Rotation 
Mental Scanning 
Paired Associate Learning 
Picture Memory 
E 
E 
E 
E 
E 
E 
E 
I 
E-I 
E-I 
E-I 
I 
Imaginal 
Processing 
G 
G,RFA 
G, T, C, I 
G, T, C, I 
G, I 
G, Rec 
G, T, S, Com 
T, S, Com 
T, Com 
G, Sc, Co 
G,Comb 
G 
Form of 
Prediction 
PC 
PC 
BC,BP 
BC,BP 
PC,BP 
BP 
BCh 
BCh 
BCh 
BCh, PCh 
BP 
BP 
Key Instruction (E - Explicit, 1- Implicit) 
Key Imaginal Processing (G-Generation, RF A- Reference frame adjustment, T-Transformation, C-
Composition, Com-comparison, I-interpretation, Rec-Recall, S-Superimposition, Sc-Scan, Co-
Conflrmation, Com-Combination.) 
Key form of prediction (BC = Behavioural conflrmation, BCh = Behavioural chronometric, BP 
=Behavioural Production, PC = Phenomenal Conflrmation, PCh = Phenomenal Chronemtric 
An examination of the processing responses employed in these measures suggests 
that any of the protocols could provide useful predictors of performance on the creative 
visualization task. Consequently any decision about which measure best predicts 
performance on the creative visualization task is controversial. However, it is necessary to 
decide upon which measure is the most appropriate predictor of performance on the 
creative visualization task. 
Studies investigating anomalous perceptual experiences occurring in mental 
imagery (e.g. imagery after-effects, imagined ambiguous figures, and imagery induced 
illusions) provide valuable information about the generation of mental images (Brosgole 
et ai., 1997; Finke and Schmidt, 1977, 1978; Wallace, 1984). However, as the existence of 
these effects is controversial (Broerse and Crassini, 1984; Chambers and Reisberg, 1985. 
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1992), it would not be sensible to use these measures as an indicator of indiyidual 
differences. 
Studies of the role of mental imagery in memory have been reviewed in Chapter 
Three. These cover a wide range of measures and provide valuable information about how 
stimulus attributes, individual differences, and imagery strategies effect memory 
performance (Atkinson and Raugh, 1975; Logie, 1986; Marks, 1973; Paivio, 1971; Quinn 
and McConnell, 1996). However, research into the function of memory in creativity is 
centrally concerned with heuristic transfer (Stein, 1989). As this aspect of creativity is not 
being investigated in the present research it is unlikely that the mediating effects of mental 
imagery ability will be of major importance. 
Four broad categories of task remain (convergent emergence tasks, mental 
comparison tasks, mental rotation tasks, and mental scanning tasks) and any decision 
made is necessarily arbitrary. The two measures that have been selected for empirical 
review are mental rotation and mental comparison. The decision to investigate these 
measures over the others is based upon several factors. As was noted in Chapter Three, 
the mental rotation protocol is the best known and most widely used behavioural measure 
of mental imagery. It has been thoroughly reviewed by researchers and seems to measure 
spatial imagery abilities (Kosslyn, 1994). As an introductory investigation into 
behavioural predictors of creative performance it would therefore seem to be the most 
suitable measure of spatial imagery. The mental comparison task has different advantages 
over the other measures. The most apparent of these is that equivalent tasks can be 
produced which do not involve imaginal processing. This is useful because it provides 
information about the role of imaginal and non-imaginal processes. Furthermore, it is the 
only protocol in the current range that has been shown to measure a hypothesized 
dissociable visual imagery (Farah et al., 1989). 
In the following studies two behavioural measures of mental imagery will be used 
to investigate the role of mental imagery in the test-format version of the creative 
visualization task. There are several reasons why they have been selected. There is a 
paucity of research investigating the role of behavioural measures of mental imagery in 
creativity and so these alternative measures of individual differences in mental imagery 
ability warrant investigation. The mental rotation task is hypothesized to measure spatial 
ability and the mental comparison task is hypothesized to measure visual imagery. As it is 
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not clear what the role of mental imagery is in the test-format creative visualization task , 
the provision of two distinct measures of mental imagery may further the knowledge 
about the task. The following study investigates the role of mental rotation differences in 
predicting performance on the creative visualization task. 
Study Nine. The Role of Mental Rotation Differences in Predicting Performance on the 
Test-Format Version of the Creative Visualization Task 
Introduction 
The mental rotation effect was first reported by Shepard and Metzler (1971) to 
demonstrate the role of mental images as 'functional substitutes' for percepts. In a series 
of experiments on the mental transformation of geometric shapes (Cooper and Shepard, 
1973; Shepard and Metzler, 1971) it was shown that imagery for apparent motion follows 
the same principles as kinematic transformation in visuo-motor tasks. In the form 
developed by Cooper and Shepard (1973) participants are required to state whether a letter 
or number (e.g. '7' 'L' 'F' or 'R') is 'real' or a mirror image. The notation is presented at a 
given number of angles (e.g. 0°, 30°, 60°, 90°, 120°, 150°, and 180°) ranging from the 
standard presentation to an upside-down position. Very robust effects show a linear 
relationship (0° and 30° angles often do not conform to this effect) between the time taken 
to respond to whether the letter is 'real' or not and the distance the letter is from its normal 
upright position. These results, and the participants' self-reports, suggest that the process 
is identical to perceptual and kinematic effects (i.e. it is the same as physically rotating the 
object or watching an object rotate). 
As a well replicated mental imagery measure there are several reasons why the 
mental rotation task may be a useful in the present investigation. The first of these 
concerns a hypothesized overlap in the operations used in the mental rotation and creative 
visualization tasks. The second is related to Shepard's claims about the role of mental 
transformation in creative thinking (Shepard, 1978a). 
The first reason for believing that mental rotation skills may be important in 
determining creative visualization responses is linked to the imaginal processing 
requirements inherent in both tasks. The most immediate example of a possible shared 
processing requirement is the need to transform region-bounded depictive stimuli. In the 
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creative visualization task it is imperative that the three (or more) stimulus parts are 
transformed to achieve a composite form. Furthermore, region-bounding (i.e. that all of 
the stimuli must be fully contained within the visual buffer) seems inevitable at some 
stage of the process. So what of the transformation procedures involved in mental 
rotation? The use of non-imaginal processes in mental rotation tasks has received much 
attention (Kosslyn, 1994). These studies show that alternative strategies (e.g. attention 
shifting of reference framing) are unlikely to be used unless the individual is very familiar 
with the task. Thus, it can hypothesized that the same region-bounded mental 
transformation procedures are used by naive participants in both mental rotation task and 
the creative visualization task. 
The second reason why mental rotation may provide a good indicator of creative 
visualization task performance is derived from reports of the use of mental rotation in 
creativity. Shepard (1978a) refers to several reports of the use of mental transformation in 
historically creative achievements; most notably Crick and Watson's discovery of the 
structure of DNA. He also reports correspondence by chemistry researchers confirming 
the functional utility of mental rotation in the laboratory. 
As a preliminary investigation into the imaginal processes involved in the test-
format version of the creative visualization task, the present study is concerned with 
spatial imagery abilities. It is hypothesized that the development of composite forms in 
the creative visualization task requires some spatial imagery processing. In considering 
the form of spatial imagery used it is evident that this may at some stage involve the use 
of region-bounded processing (i.e. the stimulus parts are fully contained in the visual 
buffer). The mental rotation task is the most frequently used measure of region-bounded 
spatial imagery and performance on this task (e.g. latency and accuracy measures) may 
act as a useful measure of an individual's ability to use this form of imagery in the 
creative visualization task. 
Method 
Participants. Twenty-four undergraduates studying psychology at Middlesex 
University took part in the study as part of a course requirement. 
Design. A simple independent groups design was employed with high and low 
imagery ability determined by median splits on reaction time and accuracy scores in the 
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mental rotation task. The dependent variables were the three measures of frequency, 
correspondence, and creativity derived from creative visualization task. 
Materials. The mental rotation task was a variant form of the Cooper and Shepard 
(1973) letter rotation task. The experimental condition consisted of 84 trials. Seven angle 
distances (0°, 30°, 60°, 90°, 120°, 150°, and 1800 degrees) were used with 12 trials 
presented in each condition. The letter stimuli were further broken down into three letters 
employing varying degrees of right reference frame information CL', 'F', 'R). Half the 
stimuli were 'real' letters and half were 'mirror' reversed. The mental rotation task used the 
SuperLab software package. The trials (extracted from PICT stimuli used in a 
demonstration programme) were randomly presented. 
The same test-format version of the creative visualization task (CVT) was 
employed as that presented in Chapter Seven. The CVT task was rated by two judges for 
frequency, correspondence, and creativity of responses. Inter-rater reliability coefficients 
exceeded 0.8 in the frequency and correspondence measures. Consequently, the scores 
were collapsed and a creativity measure was collated from the judges confirmation (full 
procedural and scoring instructions are provided in Chapter Seven). 
Procedure. On arrival the participants were told that they were to take part in a 
study of the role of mental imagery in information processing. Once they were fully aware 
of the nature of the mental rotation task and correctly responded to six practice trials they 
completed the 84 experimental trials. Following the mental rotation task the participants 
completed the test-format version of the creative visualization task. Together the tasks 
took approximately 20-30 minutes to complete. 
Results 
The Creative Visualization Task. The scores on the creative visualization task 
were similar to those reported in the previous study. Examples of the creative composite 
forms are presented in Figure 8.1. The frequency and correspondence of these responses 
suggests that participants are able to perform the test-format version of the creative 
visualization task. Furthermore, those forms defined as creative show that the participants 
were able to produce unexpected responses. One composite form in particular, defined by 
the participant as "an old fashioned camera". stood out from the other responses. not 
166 
because it was necessarily more creative but because it required the composition of six 
stimulus part forms. 
Figure 8.1. Examples of Responses to the Creative Visualization Task Which were 
Rated as Correspondent and Creative. 
1 . 
3. 
Ic--XD I 
2. 
4. 
~ 
I 
1. Old Fashioned Camera (letter 'T', square, circle, triangle, line, line) 2. Chronometer (square, circle, line) 
3. Baby in crib (oblong, ellipse, circle, line) 4. Birdhouse (triangle, semi-circle, square, line) 
Mental Rotation Effects. A preliminary assessment of the mental rotation task was 
carried out to confirm rotation, fold point, congruity, and right-reference frame effects. 
One participant was rejected from further analyses because she failed to perform the task 
at the 70% correct threshold. A one-way repeated measures ANOVA on the angle 
distances showed a significant rotation effect (F(6,114)=10.06, MSe=0.30, p<O.OOl). 
Analyses of fold point using eta-squared (variance explained: 0°=47%, 30°=44%, and, 
60°=40%) showed that the standard upright position produced the strongest rotation 
effect. The participants' reaction times were significantly faster when the letter was 
presented in a non-reversed form (t(18)=6.SS, se=0.06, p<O.Ol). A repeated measures 
ANOVA on reference frame information showed no significant differences between the 
three letter stimuli (F(2,36)=1.28, MSe=0.03, p>O.OS). As these effects combined to 
support a mental rotation process (see Figure 8.2) the participants were split at the median 
total response time ( 1.IS seconds) into high and low mental rotation latency groups. 
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Figure 8.2. Mean Response Time (Y Axis) in Seconds for the Seven Angles of 
Rotation (n=24) 
2 
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Mental Rotation Abilities and the Creative Visualization Task. The results from 
the creative visualization task are presented in Table 8.2. These show that the participants 
performed in a similar fashion to those in the pilot study . The average number of 
responses defined as appropriate by the judges exceeded six. Although those performing 
in the top half on the mental rotation task produced slightly more responses on the 
creative visualization task no significant differences were found (t(22)=0.38 , se=l.19, 
p>0.05). Furthermore, no significant differences were found for the correspondence 
measure (t(22)=0.14, se=3.47, p>0.05) and the creativity measure (t(22)=-0.50, se=0.84, 
p>0.05). 
Table 8.2. Mean Frequency, Correspondence, and Creativity Ratings on the Creative 
Visualization Task (Standard deviations are presented in brackets). 
Rotation Groups Frequency Correspondence Creativity 
High Latency 6.45 (2.62) 15.81 (6.29) 2.90 (l.70) 
Low Latency 6.00 (2.69) 15 .33 (9.25) 3.33 (2.06) 
Total 6.25 (2.59) 15.60 (7.53) 3.10 ( l.83) 
As research has suggested that accuracy may be a better predictor of mental 
rotation performance than latency (Wethearly, Ball , and Stacks, 1997) further analyses 
were conducted using a median accuracy score (76) split. Although these findings were in 
the predicted direction the differences were not significant. Consequently, non-significant 
differences were found for the frequency (t(22)=0.25, se=1 .19, p>0.05) correspondenc 
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(t(22)=0.17, se=3.46, p>0.05), and creativity (t(22)=0.97, se=0.82, p>0.05) measures. 
Overall these findings do not support a role for mental rotation ability in predicting 
performance on the creative visualization task. 
Discussion 
The preliminary results from the present study are similar to those reported in the 
previous studies reported above. The creative visualization measures yielded similar 
scores to those found in Chapter Seven. Likewise, the mental rotation task showed 
equivalent results to those observed in previous tasks (Cooper and Shepard, 1975). 
However, when the creative visualization task was assessed for high and low scorers on 
the mental rotation task, no differences were observed. Thus, these results suggest that the 
imaginal processes required in the creative visualization task are different from those 
required in the mental rotation task. 
Preliminary analyses of the mental rotation task conformed to the standard 
responses produced from this experimental protocol. An angle of rotation effect was 
clearly demonstrated and alternative non-imagery strategies did not appear in the 
analyses. Nevertheless, the hypothesized role of mental rotation in performance on the 
creative visualization task was not found. Explanations for this failure relate to 
experimental factors and the nature of the mental rotation task. 
Two problems with the present experiment may explain the failure to find 
significant differences on the three creative visualization tasks. The first concerns the 
failure to include left-reference frame stimuli in the mental rotation task. As all of the 
stimuli were right-reference frame it may be argued that the participants were able to use a 
non-imagery strategy unimpeded by reference frame alterations. Although this 
explanation is available, there are several reasons for believing that the participants 
employed the same strategies as those used in previous mental rotation tasks. Firstly, if 
they were using an attention shifting strategy then the effect of stimulus orientation should 
be degraded. This was clearly not the case in the present experiment. Secondly, if the data 
were influenced by right reference frame effects then it would be expected that the 
amount of reference frame information would also determine rotation performance. 
However, analyses of the stimuli showed that rich right reference frame stimuli CR") 
were not responded to faster than impoverished right reference frame stimuli ("L "). 
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Finally, previous research shows that attention shifting strategies are only likely to occur 
when the participants have either rehearsed the task or have been given explicit 
instructions to perform the task using a reference frame (Kosslyn, 1994) 
An alternative explanation for the findings is that the creative visualization task 
and the mental rotation task do not use the same forms of imaginal processing. Perhaps 
spatial imagery (as measured by the mental rotation task) is not used in the creative 
visualization task. As there has been no previous research into the use of mental imagery 
in the creative visualization task investigation is exploratory. Participants may not need to 
transform mental images in a region-bounded format. It could be that the generation, 
vividness and comparison of mental images is important. 
In conclusion, the research from the present study has failed to demonstrate an 
association between mental rotation and performance of the creative visualization task. 
Explanations for this finding may be based on the stimuli but it is more likely that the 
spatial imagery measured by mental rotation tasks is not relevant to performance of the 
creative visualization task. 
Study Ten. The Role of Mental Clock and Arithmetic Comparison in Performance on 
the Creative Visualization Task 
Introduction 
The aim of this study was to assess the generative and comparative processes 
involved in the creative visualization task. To do this two mental comparison tasks were 
developed. The first of these uses Paivio's (1978a) mental clocks protocol as a measure of 
imagery generation and comparison. The second uses an arithmetic equivalent form of 
generation and comparison hypothesized to involve no imagery processing. The role of 
imagery in mental comparison is discussed below. 
A considerable amount of research into performance on mental comparison tasks 
has been carried out since the 1970s. The best known effect produced from these studies 
is a chronometric distance effect. This effect is described by Moyer and Bayer as, "The 
time needed to compare two symbols varies inversely with the distance between their 
referents on the judged dimension."(1976, p.230). A typical example of chronometric 
distance is the finding that it takes longer to recognize that an elephant is larger than a 
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horse than it takes to recognize that an elephant is larger than a mouse. Dimensions which 
produce a symbolic distance effect have been found in a host of real world and 
experimentally learned categories (Banks, Fujii, and Kayra-Stuart, 1976; Brown and 
Siegler, 1991; Moyer and Bayer, 1976; Pavese and Ulmita, 1998; Paivio, 1975, 1978ab; 
Sailor and Shoben, 1993). 
Less obvious effects reported in mental comparison studies include a picture 
superiority effect in non-depictive dimensions (Banks et aI., 1976; Paivio, 1978b), 
congruity and a bowed serial position effect (Shoben, Cech, Schawenflugel, and Sailor, 
1989). The amalgamation of these findings shows that any theory of mental comparison 
tasks needs to explain both the consistency and complexity of the effects across verbal, 
pictorial, and mathematical dimensions. Two opposing explanations of the findings have 
been stated (Sailor and Shoben, 1993). The first (a semantic model) claims that the effects 
arise from the discrete coding of propositionally represented information (Banks et aI., 
1976). The second account explains the effects in terms of a dual coding model of 
information representation (Paivio, 1978b). This explanation states that mediated verbal 
and imaginal systems are invoked in mental comparison judgments (Paivio, 1975, 1978b). 
It also states that mental comparisons often involve both systems even when the stimuli or 
dimensions are non-depictive and that the imaginal system is the most effective 
comparator (Paivio, 1978b). 
Figure 8.3. Examples of the Imagery Stimuli Employed in Paivio's Mental Clocks 
Task (1978a, 1989) 
3:00 4:25 
3:00 4:25 
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The strongest support for the role of the imaginal system in mental comparison 
tasks is provided in Paivio's mental clocks task research (1978a). The nature and 
significance of this task is described by Paivio 
"Imagine two clocks showing the times 3.22 and 7.55. On which clock 
do the hour hand and the minute hand form the smaller angle? This is 
the basic task used in the present study. It essentially involves a memory 
size comparison based on one's knowledge about the relation between 
numerical times and the positions of the hands of a clock. The angular 
size difference between pairs of times can be determined only by 
translating the digital information into symbolic representations that 
preserve angular difference." (Paivio, 1978a, p.61) 
The advantage of this task over other relative judgments is that it enables the experimenter 
to create precise distance levels for comparison. The importance of this task in 
demonstrating imaginal processing is that it is unlikely that a person would have a 
semantic knowledge of the hierarchy of angular distances between clocks or that they 
would be able to perform the task computationally in the time specified (Paivio, 1978a). 
Furthermore, there is also support for the deliberate use of mental imagery from the self-
reports of those performing the task (Paivio, 1978a). 
Following a series of experiments Paivio (1978a) claimed that imaginal 
processing was the only way to explain the symbolic distance effect. He observed that the 
effect occurred in a purely perceptual analogue model and in an imagery condition where 
digital times and handless clock faces were shown. He also showed that when the hands 
for one clock face were removed the reaction times conformed to the hypothesized 
representational process. Furthermore, it was also observed that individuals with good 
spatial skills performed the task better than those with poor spatial skills. Combined, these 
results support the use of imagery processes. 
The emergence of standard comparison effects and the self-reports of those 
carrying out the task suggest that the imagery format version of the mental clocks task 
provides a good measure of imagery generation, transformation and comparison skill. 
Furthermore, it should be possible to develop an equivalent mental comparison task that 
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uses a propositional code. This task could act as a performance measure of non-imaoinal 
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mental comparison skill. For example, a propositionally encoded derivative of the mental 
clocks task could be developed by transposing the digit times into mathematical yalues. 
As there is an extensive research literature on mental comparisons in mathematics 
(Deheane, 1992; Moyer and Bayer, 1976; Pavese and Umilta, 1998) this is a good 
alternative measure which can be used to show non-imagery processing abilities. 
A review of the research area shows that Paivio's (l978a) stimuli differed from 
other mental comparison task stimuli that require imaginal processing. This difference 
concerns the addition of perceptual information. In typical imagery-based comparison 
tasks the participants are required to create the whole image (Farah et aI., 1988). Clearly 
some image generation is required but the presence of the clock faces means that it is 
easier to use a mathematical heuristic to solve the mental clocks task. For example, the 
participants could use the clock time markings as a simple aritmetic device. Though it is 
unlikely that naive participants would acquire this heuristic, as mathematics tasks produce 
a very robust symbolic distance effect (Pavese and Ulmita, 1998) it is necessary to modify 
Paivio's original imagery stimuli. Fortunately this is a relatively simple operation 
requiring the removal of the clock faces. This has the additional advantage of making this 
task equivalent to other imagery-based mental comparison tasks (Farah et aI., 1988). 
In this study it is hypothesized that High Imagers (those who perform above 
average on the mental clocks task) will perform better than Low Imagers (those who 
perform below average on the mental clocks task) on the creative visualization task. 
However, those who perform high on the arithmetic version of the mental clocks task will 
not perform better on the creative visualization task than those who score low on the 
arithmetic version. This hypothesis is based upon the assumption that the mental clocks 
task and the creative visualization task share the same generative and comparative 
imaging processes. 
Method 
Participants. Thirty-one female and fifteen male students from Middlesex 
University volunteered to take part in the experiment. The median age of the participants 
was 20 with a range of 18 to 41. 
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Design. A two-way independent groups design was employed to investigate 
performance on the three creative visualization measures. Participants were randomly 
assigned to the imagery and arithmetic condition. In the imagery condition they performed 
the imagery-bound version of Paivio's mental clocks task. In the arithmetic condition they 
performed a transposed version of the imagery condition. Following the completion of the 
conditions nested high and low groups were formed from reaction time scores controlled 
for task accuracy. Three dependent variables were derived from creative visualization task 
performance. 
Materials. 
Mental Comparison. The mental comparison tasks were based upon Paivio's 
mental clocks task (Paivio, 1978a). The imagery condition was developed first and the 
arithmetic condition was transposed from it. 
Twelve clock time trials were selected for each level of the three smallest 
distances used in Paivio's experiments (30°,60°, and 9(j angle differences). In order to 
maximize the use of mental imagery in the task the clock faces were removed and only 
digital times were presented to the individuals. Justification for this procedure is based 
upon an extensive research literature on distance effects in mathematics (Deheane, 1992). 
The digital time pairs were balanced for acute angle ratios in the three conditions (for 30 
degree distance: 30:60, 60:90, 90: 120, and 120: 150; for 60 degree distance: 30:90, 60: 120, 
and 90: 150; for 90 degree distance: 30: 120, and 60: 150). The trials were randomly 
presented on a computer screen with an inter-stimulus interval latency of one second. The 
trials were counterbalanced for left and right response. The aim of the digit-time only task 
is to press the response box pertaining to the smallest acute angle between the imagined 
clock hands. 
Figure 8.4. Example Stimuli Used in the Mental Comparison Conditions 
Task Left stimuli Right stimuli 
Imagery 
Arithmetic 
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9:50 
270:300 
5.35 
150:210 
An equivalent arithmetic task was developed through the transposition of the 
imagery clock time pairs. This was achieved by changing the second-hand time into a 
first-hand time and multiplying the product by thirty (see Figure 8.4). The objective of the 
arithmetic task is to press the response box that yields the smallest quantity when the 
smallest number of the pair is subtracted from the largest number of the pair and 
compared with the same product from the other pair. For example, in the above case the 
correct response is 'left' as 300-270 produces a smaller product (30) than 210-150 (60). 
Similarly, the clock time 9.50 produces a smaller acute angle (30°) than the clock time 
5.35 (60°). A full listing of the stimuli is provided in Appendix 8.1. 
The Creative Visualization Task. The same pencil and paper version of the 
creative visualization task was used in this experiment as that presented in Chapter Seven. 
Full details of instruction and scoring procedures are provided in Chapter Seven. 
Self-Report Measures. As a secondary source of information 15 visual analogue 
scales (ranging from 0-100 mm) were developed to measure the participants' self-reported 
mental abilities and task strategies. Upon arrival the participants completed five self-
report measures on: creative ability, mental image generation, arithmetic ability, problem 
solving skills, and writing ability. In all cases the scales ranged from 'poor' to 'excellent'. 
After completing the mental comparison task the participants rated five more analogue 
scales. The first of these measured task difficulty (anchored from 'easy' to 'hard). The 
second measured their self-reported awareness of the processes involved (anchored from 
'never aware' to 'always aware). Three measures of general strategy (anchored from 
'never used' to 'always used) were also completed. These were: verbal comparison 
strategy, general mathematical comparison strategy, and general mental picture 
comparison strategy. The final set of analogue scales were presented following the 
completion of the creative visualization task. These were the same as the scales used for 
the mental comparison task. 
Procedure. Forty-six participants carried out the experiment in a sound attenuated 
cubicle. They began the experiment by completing the five analogue scales pertaining to 
their self-reported mental abilities. Once they had been informed of the nature of the 
reaction time task they were given six practice trials (two from each of the distances). 
They only proceeded to the experimental conditions when they had successfully 
completed the six trials. Once the participants had completed the 36 experimental trials 
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they completed five more visual analogue scales. The participants then completed the test 
format version of Finke and Slayton's (1988) creative visualization task. Finally, they 
completed five visual analogue scales pertaining to the creative visualization task. 
Results 
The Creative Visualization Task. The aim of the study carried out in Chapter 
Seven was to evaluate the parametric properties of the test-format creative visualization 
task and the cognitive strategies the participants' report. Further verification of the 
parametric properties was undertaken in the present study. As the three measures 
produced good inter-rater reliability they were collapsed and assessed for the usual 
univariate data screening procedures. Both skew and kurtosis analyses showed that the 
three measures conformed to the parameters of the standard normal distribution. 
Furthermore, the scores in the present study were similar to those reported in the previous 
studies. Examples of creative responses are presented in Figure 8.5. 
Figure 8.5. Examples of Responses Scoring High on Correspondence and Rated 
As Creative In the Creative Visualisation Task. 
1 . 2. 
3. 4. 
1. Petrol Pump (oblong, line, circle, ellipse) 2. Ordinance survey map sign (triangle, line, cross) 3. Clock 
(triangle, circle, line) 4. Record Player (square, circle, line). 
Reports of difficulty and awareness to solution were similar to those found in the 
pilot study (see Table 8.3). A repeated measure ANOV A on the participants' self-reported 
strategies confirmed that mental imagery was the preferred strategy (F(2,86)=78.2.f. 
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MSe=471, p<O.OOl). Comparisons of self-reports by the pre-tasks (arithmetic and 
imagery) showed no carry over effects in difficulty, awareness or strategy self-reports (see 
Table 8.3). When compared to those of the previous study they show consistent responses 
to knowledge of task performance and strategy employed. 
Table 8.3. Self-report Ratings of Difficulty and Strategy in the Creative Visualisation 
Task by the Two Pre-task Conditions (n=45) 
Self-reports 
Difficulty 
Awareness 
Verbal strategy 
Mathematics strategy 
Imagery 
Mean 
80.18 
70.45 
29.95 
24.32 
Mental Picture Strategy 72.86 
Arithmetic 
St.Dev. Mean 
20.93 72.00 
26.74 68.00 
27.21 25.70 
22.08 18.64 
25.93 77.09 
St.Dev 
24.19 
26.19 
25.46 
19.11 
16.90 
Group Difference 
t( 44)=1.21 
t(44)=0.31 
t(44)=0.54 
t(44)=0.91 
t( 44)=-0.65 
Sex Differences. There is a considerable amount of empirical support for male 
superiority in many tasks associated with those used in the present study (J.T.E. 
Richardson, 1999). Independent groups t-tests were conducted on the three measures 
derived from the creative visualization task. Although the males performed better on all of 
the measures no significant differences were found (frequency (t( 45)=0.59, se=O. 9 L 
p>0.05); Correspondence (t(44)=0.40, se=1.88, p>0.05); and, Creativity (t(44)=l.00, 
se=0.52, p>0.05). An independent groups two-way ANOV A also showed no main 
(F(l,42)=0.20, MSe=5.44, p>0.05) or interaction effects (F(l,42)=0.05, MSe=5.44, 
p>0.05) when sex differences were evaluated in the context of mental comparison. 
Finally, an independent groups t-test showed no differences between males and females 
on the self-report mental picture measure (t(44)=1.44, se=4.72, p>0.05). In summary sex 
differences in imagery have not been found. 
Self-report Measures of General Abilities. Five independent groups t-tests were 
carried out to assess mental comparison group differences in self-reported general 
abilities. The results from these tests were all non-significant (creativity (t(.f.f )=0 . ..t2, 
se=4.68, p>0.05); imagery (t( 44 )=-0.37, se=4.24. p>0.05); arithmetic (t(.f.f )=0.45. 
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se=5.04, p>0.05); problem solving (t( 44)=-1.43, se=4.94, p>0.05); and, writing ability 
(t(44)=1.06, se=4.01, p>0.05)). A single self-report measure of the participants' ability to 
form mental pictures showed good parametric properties and no response leniency 
(t( 45)=-0.10, Se=3.34, p>0.05). 
Mental Comparison Effects. Paivio (1975, 1978ab, 1989) claimed that effects 
from mental comparison judgments are mediated by verbal and imagery processing 
systems. Two of these effects (time to completion and the symbolic distance effect) can be 
predicted from their association with the imagery code. To evaluate these claims a mixed 
two-by-three ANOV A was employed to assess time to completion and distance. An 
expected main effect was found for time to completion which supported the belief that the 
transposition of the clock times reduced latency (F(1,41)=25.72, MSe=16.65, p<O.OOI). A 
non-significant main effect of distance between the stimulus pairs was found 
(F(2,82)=2.29, MSe=0.94 p>0.05). Further confirmation of a failure to find the standard 
distance effect in either of these tasks was confirmed through a non-significant interaction 
(F(2,82)=2.73, MSe=0.94, p>0.05). Observation of the reaction times (see Table 8.4) 
shows no differences between the three distances for the imagery comparison task. 
Table 8.4. Reaction Time and The Number of Correct Responses by Mental 
Comparison Distances in the Imagery and Arithmetic Conditions 
30° 60° 90° 
Mean St.Dev. Mean St.Dev Mean St.Dev. 
Reaction Time 
Imagery (n=20) 9.18 2.27 9.19 2.79 9.25 1.87 
Arithmetic (n=23) 6.09 2.80 5.25 2.45 5.32 2.55 
Number of Correct Responses 
Imagery (n=22) 9.55 1.34 10.55 1.53 11.00 1.07 
Arithmetic (n=24) 9.75 1.89 11.17 1.05 11.04 0.62 
Self-Report Measures of Mental Comparison. The self reports concur with the 
reaction time scores in that the participants in the imagery condition reported a higher 
difficulty rating than those in the arithmetic condition (t( 44)=2.37, se=6.72, p<0.05). No 
difference was found in the awareness to solution (t(44)=-1.01, se=4.59, p>0.05). A mixed 
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two-way ANOV A was carried out on the two mental comparison conditions by the three 
self-report strategy measures. These showed that the participants in the imagery condition 
reported a greater use of strategies per se (F( 1,43 )=6.72, MSe=7 14.6S , p=O.Ol ). It also 
showed a greater use of a mathematical strategy than an imagery or verbal comparison 
strategy (F(2 ,86)=3.46, MSe=777 .35 , p<O.OS ). This effect is explained through an 
expected significant interaction effect (F(2,86)=6.40, MSe=777.3S , p<O.O 1). Simple main 
effect analyses, with strategies held constant, showed that those in the Imagery condition 
reported a greater use of a verbal comparison strategy (F(2,86)=3.26, MSe=238.22, 
p<O.OS). There was a non-significant difference in the self-reported use of a mathematics 
strategy (F(2 ,86)=2.35 , MSe=238.22, p>O.OS). Finally, a predicted significant difference 
was found for the use of a mental imagery comparison strategy (F(2,86)=SS.6S , 
MSe=238.22, p<O.OOl). Mean responses are presented n Figure 8.6. 
Figure 8.6. Self-reported Use of Verbal, Mathematical, and Mental Picture 
Strategies in the Imagery & Arithmetic Comparison Tasks (Range Omm ("never 
used") lOOmm ("always used"). 
80 
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Mental Comparison and Creative Visualization Performance. Despite the mixed 
findings on the mental comparison task the reaction time scores for the participants wer 
collapsed over distance to yield a single mental comparison performance measure . 
median split was used to form high and low groups for the imagery and arithmetic 
conditions. Mean scores on the three creative visualization measures were then analyzed 
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using an independent groups two-way design. Mean and Standard deviation scores by 
groups are presented in Table 8.5. 
Table 8.5. Creative Visualisation Task Scores by High and Low Performance Splits 
for the Two Tasks (Standard Deviations are presented in brackets) 
Frequency Correspondence Creativity Total 
Imagery Condition 
High (n=10) 6.50 (2.80) 12.70 (6.23) 1.80 (1.48) 21.00 (10.l5) 
Low (n=10) 5.80 (2.68) 10.75 (5.95) 1.90 (2.64) 18.45 (10.67) 
Arithmetic Condition 
High (n=12) 7.58 (2.82) 13.79 (5.81) 3.08 (1.88) 24.46 (9.52) 
Low (n=ll) 5.32 (3.34) 10.50 (6.64) 1.36 (1.43) 1 7.18 (11. 44 ) 
Initial analyses employed independent groups ANOV As for each of the creative 
visualization tasks. However, as non-significant differences emerged in all cases and the 
same trend was observed multivariate analyses are provided. A MANOV A was employed 
to test the hypothesis that those who performed above the median in the Imagery 
condition would also perform better in the creative visualization task. This hypothesis is 
based on the assumption that the imagery comparison task and the creative visualization 
task share the same imaginal processing resources. A non-significant finding for type of 
comparison task showed that the two groups were similar in their creative visualization 
skills (F(3,37)=0.18, p>0.05). Though the high performance groups performed better than 
the low performance groups a non-significant multivariate effect was found 
(F(3,37)=0.89, p>0.05). The interaction between type of comparison task and 
performance on the comparison task approached significance (F(3,37)=2.26, p<O.l). 
However, examination of the scores revealed that that those in the high arithmetic 
performance group performed proportionately better on the creative visualization task 
than their low arithmetic performance counterparts. No differences were observed 
between the two imagery groups. These results do not support the main hypothesis. 
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Discussion 
The results from this study confirmed the parametric properties of the test-format 
creative visualization task. They also showed that consistent self-report responses are 
given concerning the nature and processing skills required. The mental comparison tasks. 
however, failed to elicit the behavioural predictors found in previous research into the 
mental clocks task (Paivio, 1978a). Nevertheless, the self-report measures did offer some 
support for the use of predicted mental picture and mathematical comparison strategies in 
these tasks. The main hypothesis, although only significant at the 0.1 level, showed that 
the high arithmetic group's scores were better predictors of creative visualization 
performance than the high imagery group's scores. Explanation for this finding is 
necessarily post facto. It could involve the failure to replicate the distance effect, the 
convergent nature of the imagery comparison task or may simply reflect the superiority of 
an arithmetic measure in predicting problem solving abilities. 
Initial analyses of performance on the creative visualization task demonstrated 
equivalent findings to those found in the pilot study. The median number of acceptable 
scores produced was six and approximately 30% of these were rated as creative. The 
measures also showed good parametric properties. 
Assessment of the mental comparison tasks showed that they did not conform to 
the standard findings in this research area (Shoben, Cech, and Schawenflugel, 1983). 
These results require further discussion in light of the failure to find an imagery 
performance indicator of the creative visualization task. The standard linear distance effect 
has been reported in previous studies using both imagery tasks (Paivio, 1978a) and 
mathematics tasks (Pavese and Ulmita, 1998). As the response times for the imagery 
condition were considerably greater than those reported in Paivio's (1978a) clock task the 
removal of the clock faces might have resulted in a failure to discriminate imagery 
abilities between individuals. This interpretation is not borne out, however, by the 
distribution of the scores. These show that theresponse times had a sufficiently 
discriminable range (6.68 to 12.71). Furthermore, only one of the participants scored 
below a 75% correct threshold. 
One alternative explanation of why the high imagery group did not perform better 
on the creative visualization task than the low imagery group is that the convergent nature 
of the comparison task does not utilize the same transformation procedures required in the 
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creative visualization task. This explanation, however, is contradicted by the findings 
from the arithmetic task, which viewed separately account for almost 25% of the variance 
in the creative visualization task. Surely it would be expected that the subtraction and 
comparison processes required for this task are as convergent in nature as the imagery 
task. Furthermore, the participants did not report using mental imagery in the arithmetic 
task but did report using it in both the mental imagery comparison task and the creative 
visualization task. 
One very tentative explanation for the findings on the arithmetic task is derived 
from Deheane's triple code model of number representation (Cohen and Deheane, 1991; 
Deheane, 1992). He argues that numbers can be represented in three translatable codes 
(Arabic, verbal, and quantity). The third form (quantity) is defined as an analogue 
magnitude representation. As a preverbal system this number line has been likened to a 
'visual workbench' in which the most basic of notational comparisons are performed. This 
representational code is similar to Paivio's imagery code (Paivio, 1971). Consequently if 
such a representational code were invoked during arithmetic comparison then it is likely 
that it would also be employed during the clocks task and the creative visualization task; 
regardless of the phenomenal status of the processing. However, this explanation would 
have to account for a first-language preference for calculation in bilinguals and at least 
some verbal and notation code interfacing (see Deheane, 1992). 
In summarizing the findings from the present study it was found that individuals 
who performed well on a frequently reported mental imagery task did not perform 
significantly better on the creative visualization task. Explanations for these findings are 
based firstly on the failure to find a robust distance effect on the imagery comparison task 
and secondly on the convergent nature of the imagery comparison task. Neither 
explanation is fitting as both contradict the evidence from the self-report measures. One 
final account may be that the use of imagery in the creative visualization task requires 
source demands that are more closely linked to arithmetic processing than was previously 
conceived. It is more tempting to assume anomaly or artifact before being drawn into such 
an unproved post Jacto explanation. Only further research will answer the questions raised 
from this experiment. 
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General Discussion 
Following the development of a test-format version of the creative visualization 
task it was hypothesized that mental imagery abilities would predict performance on the 
task. As there had been little research into the role of behavioural predictors of mental 
imagery in creativity two exploratory investigations were carried out. The first study 
employed the best known measure of spatial mental imagery (the mental rotation task) 
and the second used a mental comparison task that could be employed in imagery and 
non-imagery forms. The results from these studies suggest that the spatial and visual 
behavioural measures do not directly predict performance on the creative visualization 
task. Assessments of why these measures failed to predict performance on the creative 
visualization task have been made in the respective discussion sections. 
In Chapter Six a meta-analytic review of the most commonly employed protocol 
for studying mental imagery and creativity was carried out. It was concluded that the 
relationship between self-reported mental imagery and divergent thinking performance 
was not large enough to warrant a theoretical explanation. Having derived small 
associations between the measures it was decided that new ways and methods of 
investigating how individual differences in mental imagery could predict performance on 
a creativity task needed to be implemented. As an alternative method of assessing the 
relationship between the two variables was available (the image generation approach) a 
test format version of one of the tasks used within the approach was developed. After a 
pilot study confirmed that the participants believed that they were using mental imagery to 
produce composite forms and showed that the test-format version has acceptable 
parametric properties it was used as a dependent variable in individual differences 
research carried out in this chapter. 
As this new measure of creativity seemed to involve the use of spatial and visual 
imagery it was hypothesized that performance on behavioural measures of mental imagery 
may predict how successful the participants were at producing creative and correspondent 
composite forms. However, the findings from the research carried out in this chapter have 
been very disappointing. Both latency and accuracy splits on the mental rotation task 
failed to show the hypothesized individual differences in performance on the creative 
visualization task. The findings from the mental comparison task are even more 
disappointing. Not only did the standard distance effect disappear (on which its 
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hypothesized role in mental imagery was based) following a necessary alteration to the 
task but the arithmetic alternative was found to be a better predictor of performance on the 
creative visualization task. 
Despite the failure to find the hypothesized differences on the creative 
visualization task one very positive aspect of the research has been found. This is the 
finding that the test-format version of the creative visualization task has been shown to 
yield good parametric responses in all the studies in which it has been employed. 
Furthermore, as two of the three studies measured the participants' beliefs about how they 
performed the task it can also be stated that people consistently report using mental 
imagery in the task. Finally, if the number of creative responses produced from the 
creative visualization task are viewed in the context of other measures of creativity then it 
can be concluded that this particular task produces a good proportion of novel responses 
(Feldhaus en and Goh, 1995). 
If participants tend to report the use of mental imagery in the creative 
visualization task and the proportion of creative responses is good when compared to 
standard divergent thinking tasks then it is puzzling that the measures employed in the 
present studies failed to support the hypothesized individual difference effect. It could be 
because the measures employed do not share the same representational processing 
requirements and that a return to the standard use of self-report measures of mental 
imagery may provide a better prediction. The finding that participants consistently report 
the use of mental imagery in the test-format version of the creative visualization task 
suggests that pursuing a direct prediction from mental imagery measures is worthwhile. 
However, a closer inspection of Finke's (1990) findings from the creative inventions task 
also suggests that creative visualization tasks may involve two distinguishable processes 
(imagery and creative interpretation). This is discussed in further detail in the next 
chapter. 
Conclusion 
The research carried out into the test-format version of the creative visualization 
task has consistently shown that it has good parametric properties and that the participants 
report the use of mental imagery in the task. However, the results presented in this chapter 
show that the forms of mental imagery that the mental rotation and clocks tasks are 
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hypothesized to measure (Paivio, 1989; Shepard, 1984) do not predict performance on this 
version of the creative visualization task. The evident contradiction between the self-
reported use of mental imagery in the task and the results from the two behavioural 
measures suggests that new ways of thinking about the creative visualization task need to 
be developed. Perhaps the standard individual differences approach may demonstrate a 
role for mental imagery in the task. Alternatively it may be that mental imagery plays a 
necessary (but not sufficient) role in performance on the creative visualization task. 
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Chapter IX 
Study Eleven. The Roles of Imagery and Creativity in Predicting 
Performance on a Creative Visualization Task 
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Introduction 
The results from Chapters Seven and Eight suggest that the test-format version of 
the creative visualization task produces good responses that the participants claim are 
produced from a mental imagery strategy. However, there does not seem to be a role for 
individual differences in mental rotation and comparison in predicting performance on the 
task. In this final study in the present series of investigations into the creative visualization 
task several self-report measures of the vividness of visual imagery are linked with 
Barron's Symbolic Equivalence Task (SET). The aims of the study are twofold. The first 
concerns the role of creativity, as measured by the SET, in performance on the creative 
visualization task. The second focuses upon a possible interaction between imagery and 
creativity in predicting performance on the creative visualization task. 
In considering the results from the previous studies using the test-format version 
of the creative visualization task it is apparent that the behavioural measures of mental 
imagery do not seem to be directly linked to performance on the creative visualization 
task. In considering why this may be it was suggested in the previous study that the 
creative visualization task may consist of two processes. The first involves the generation 
and composition of the stimulus parts and the second involves the identification and 
interpretation of a recognizable composite form. This dissociative process proposition was 
originally observed and investigated by Finke (1990). In a series of investigations Finke 
(1990) assessed the relative importance of composite generation and interpretation. The 
results from these studies showed that some composite forms yielded creative responses 
regardless of whether mental imagery had been used in the task. However, when the 
composite forms were developed by the individual (through the use of mental imagery) 
the number of creative interpretations increased. 
It is evident that the same procedure may be deployed in the test-format version of 
creative visualization task. If this is the case then differences in mental imagery may be 
masked by the interaction between the two processes involved. As creative responses are 
produced without the use of mental imagery, then creative interpretation should be the 
primary predictor of task performance. Mental imagery may be important only when a 
person is capable of creatively interpreting the composite forms that they have developed. 
Thus, if this interpretation is correct, then mental imagery ability is insufficient on its own 
in predicting performance on the task. What is more important is a measure of creative 
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abilities that involves creative interpretation. The aim of the present study is to investigate 
the role of both creativity and imagery abilities in predicting performance on the creative 
visualization task. 
In considering a measure of creativity it is clear that the verbal and figural tasks 
used in the research into the individual differences approach may not be suitable. The 
main reason for this is that they do not seem to require a creative transformation and 
interpretation. Rather the form of creativity focuses upon associative and fluency 
processes (e.g. Hocevar and Bachelor, 1989; Michael and White, 1989). In reviewing 
alternative measures with similar predictive validity one measure that may require the 
same generation of creative interpretation is Barron's Symbolic Equivalence Task 
(Barron, 1988). 
As a student of Bartlett, Barron (1988) was influenced by his emphasis upon the 
relationship between mental imagery and creativity (Bartlett, 1958). Barron (1988) took 
this knowledge of the inter-dependence of the two variables to the Institute of Personality 
and Assessment Research (IP AR) where his work with Mackinnon into creativity required 
further inter-linking between imagery and creative writing (Barron, 1988). In this context 
Barron developed measures that required the interpretation of verbally presented stimulus 
images. The measure that evolved (the SET) is an analogical reasoning task that uses 
highly imageable verbal stimuli. The creative process would therefore seem to be based 
upon the ability to re-interpret verbally presented stimuli through a mediated imaginal 
system. 
Through his work at the IP AR Barron (1969) was able to evaluate the predictive 
validity of the SET. In a series of studies he investigated performance on the SET in a 
range of recognizably creative groups (e.g. famous writers, eminent mathematicians, 
famous architects, successful entrepreneurs, and student artists). The findings from this 
research showed that these people scored better than those not recognized in society as 
creative. Furthermore, it produced a clear rank ordering of creativity that was linked to the 
general consensus opinion of the creativity of these groups. For example. the famous 
writers scored better than all of the professions. Famous architects were second placed 
and eminent mathematicians third. Bottom of these elite groups were the student artists 
for whom society's creative filter had not yet been imposed. Given the predictive validity 
of this test and its association with the transformation and interpretation of highly 
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imageable stimuli the SET seems to be an ideal measure of creativity in the test-format 
version of the creative visualization task. 
As performance on the chronometric behavioural measures of mental imagery 
failed to predict the frequency, correspondence, and creativity ratings on the creative 
visualization task it seems an apt time to investigate the role of the self-reported vividness 
of mental imagery in creativity. Although the results from the earlier chapters suggested 
that self-report measures can successfully predict creativity to only a limited degree, the 
creativity tasks employed in these studies were not directly associated with the use of an 
imagery heuristic. Furthermore, as it has been speCUlated that there may be two processes 
involved in the test-format version of the creative visualization task the present 
investigation is concerned with the interaction between the self-reported mental imagery 
and SET performance. 
If the main prediction from the present study is that those who have high self-
reported mental imagery and SET scores will perform better than others on the creative 
visualization task, then it is necessary to develop a dual criterion for group membership. 
Consequently, a different scoring procedure for the self-report measures of vividness of 
mental imagery needs to be applied. The procedure adopted in the present study is the 
same as that used to investigate the behavioural measures of mental imagery, namely, 
median splits. However, as the factor analytic investigations carried out in the earlier 
chapters provide valuable information about response averages, the high and low imagery 
groups can be defined from the larger sample of scores used in the factor analysis. 
The aim of the present study is to assess the relative roles of self-reported mental 
imagery and creativity in the creative visualization task. Justification for considering these 
variables together is based upon Finke's (1990) observation that although creative 
responses occur independently of the generation of composite forms, the combination of 
generation and interpretation produces a proportionately larger number of creative 
responses. As creative interpretation seems to be a key factor in predicting performance it 
is also hypothesized that those defined as high in creativity will perform better than those 
defined as low in creativity. As the participants have consistently reported the use of 
mental imagery in the test-format version of the creative visualization task, it is tentatively 
hypothesized that the high imagery group will perform better than the low imagery group. 
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Method 
Participants. Thirty-nine female and twenty-three male undergraduate psychology 
students at Middlesex University volunteered to take part in the study. The age of the 
participants ranged from 18 to 45 with a median age of 24. 
Design. A two-by-two independent groups design was employed to inyestigate the 
role of high and low imagery and creativity in determining frequency, correspondence, 
and creativity scores on the creative visualization task. High and Low Creatives were 
derived from a median split on their scores on the Barron Symbolic Equivalence Task 
(Barron, 1988). High and Low Imagers were defined on the basis of two self-report 
measures of the vividness of mental imagery. To be defined as a High Imager a 
participant was required to rate themselves above the average rating (as defined by the 
factor analytic studies) on both of the self-report measures. It was hoped that the use of 
this more stringent, duel criterion would provide a more reliable division of the 
participants. 
Materials. 
The Vividness of Visual Imagery Measures. Two self-report measures of mental 
imagery were employed in the present study: Marks' eyes-open version of the Vividness 
of Visual Imagery Questionnaire and The Vividness of Poetry Imagery Questionnaire. 
Both measures employ a block format linking four items to a specific content (see Chapter 
Five for further details). 
The Symbolic Equivalence Test. The measure of symbolic equivalence developed 
by Barron (1969) has been adopted in the present task (see Appendix 9.l for full details). 
The SET consists of ten stimulus images. At the beginning of the test the participants are 
told that the aim of the task is to think of metaphors, or symbollically equivalent images, 
for the stimulus images (up to three responses can be made for each stimulus image). 
They are then provided with an example stimulus image ('leaves blown in the wind') and 
three possible responses ('a civilian population fleeing chaotically in the face of armed 
aggression '; 'handkerchiefs being tossed about inside an electric dryer '; and. 'chips of 
wood borne dowstream by a swiftly eddying current '). 
In the present study the participants received a shortened split-half version of the 
SET. They were given 10 minutes to complete the task. Each response on the SET is 
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scored for aptness (1-3) and originality (4-5); example responses and full directions for 
scoring are provided by Barron (1988). Total scores are then derived from each 
participant through the summation of the response scores. In the present study the SET 
was scored by two judges and as the standard inter-rater reliability correlation coefficient 
(0.7) was exceeded average scores were computed for each participant. 
The Creative Visualization Task. The same test-format version of the creatiYe 
visualization task was employed in the present study. Total scores were derived for the 
number of responses, the correspondence of the responses, and the creativity of the 
responses. Frequency and correspondence ratings for the two raters exceeded a standard 
0.7 criterion. Scores for creativity were computed through judges consensus (see Chapter 
Seven for further details). 
Procedure. The participants were initially required to complete the two self-report 
measures of mental imagery. Once these had been completed they performed the ten 
minute version of Barron's Symbolic Equivalence Task. Finally, they were given the test-
format version of the creative visualization task. The imagery measures took between 
twenty and thirty minutes to complete. Generally, the tasks were completed within an 
hour. 
Results 
Responses to the three measures of creative visualization were slightly lower than 
those found in the previous studies. The difference, however, was marginal and may be 
attributable to the use of different raters. Examples of responses that were rated as high in 
correspondence and were defined as creative are given in Figure 9.1. 
Table 9.1. Creative Visualisation Task Achievement by High and Low Symbolic 
Equivalence Task Performance. 
Frequency Correspondence Creativity 
Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. 
SET High (n=32) 6.30 2.88 13.72 7.08 1.44 1.39 
SET Low (n=30) 4.00 2.12 8.40 5.15 0.67 0.88 
Total 5.19 2.78 11.15 6.73 l.06 1 ')-. ._-' 
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Figure 9.1. Responses Rated as High in Correspondence and Creativity on the 
Creative Visualisation Task. 
1 . 2. 
3. 4. 
1. Watering can (triangle, line, square, semi-circle) 2. Cooking (square, circle, oblong) 3. Moth (line, line, 
circle, triangle) 4. Canoeist (circle, square, line). 
The average collated score for the SET was 12.52 with a range of 0 to 28.50. A 
median split (12) was computed and high and low creativity groups were formed. High 
and low imagery groups were derived from a profile of their scores on both of the 
vividness of visual imagery self-report measures. Twenty-four of the participants were 
defined as High Imagers because they scored below the median on both of the imagery 
measures. Of these, 13 scored above the median on the SET (High Imagery-High 
Creativity) and 11 scored below the median on the SET (High Imagery-Low Creativity). 
The remaining 38 participants scored above the median on one or both of the imagery 
measures. Half (19) scored above the median on the SET (Low Imagery-High Creativity) 
and half (19) scored below the median on the SET (Low Imagery-High Creativity). 
The effects of self-reported mental imagery and SET performance on the creative 
visualization task were assessed through a series of two-way independent groups 
ANOV As. Analyses of the frequency measure showed a significant main effect for 
creativity (F(l,58)=13.84, MSe=6.39, p<O.OOI). Observation of the differences (see Table 
9.1) shows that those defined as high in creativity performed better than those defined as 
low in creativity. Although the High Imagers performed slightly better than the Lov.· 
Imagers a non-significant difference was found between the two groups (F(1.58)=1.07. 
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MSe=6 .3 9, p>0.05) . Although the high imagery-high creativity group performed better 
than the ' other thre e group s a non- significant interaction effect was obsen'ed 
(F(l ,58)=1.56, MSe=6. 39, p>0.05). In summarizing these fi ndings it is concluded that 
those defined as high in creativity on the SET produce more responses on the C T than 
those defined as low in creativity on the SET. 
Figure 9.2. Mean Correspondence Ratings on the Creative Visualisa tion Task (Y_ 
Axis) Split by High and Low Imagery and Creativity Groups 
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A further two-way independent groups ANOV A was performed on the 
correspondence rating scores for the imagery and creativity factors. A main effect of 
creativity was found (F(l ,58)= 14.18, MSe=36 .60, p<O.OOl) . Observation of the means 
showed that those who scored high on the SET performed better on the CVT than those 
who performed low on the SET, A non-significant difference was found fo r the imagery 
conditions (F(l ,58)=1 .38 , MSe=36 .60 , p>0.05 ). There was, however. a significant 
interaction between imagery and creativity (F(l ,58)=3.87, MSe=36.60, p<0 .05). Simple 
main effect analyses showed that those who reported high imagery and performed high on 
the SET perfonned significantly better on the CVT than those who reported Imv imagery 
and performed hi gh on the SET (F(l ,58)=5 .51 , p<0.05 ) . Converse ly, a non-significant 
difference was fo und between the high imagery-low creativity group and the low 
imagery-low creativity group (F(l 58 )=0 .3 1, p>0.05). Further simple main g ct 
analyses, where the imagery groups were held constant, showed a ignificant differ n c 
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between the high imagery-high creativity group and the high imagery-low creativity group 
(F(1,58)=13.37, p<O.OOl) and a non-significant difference between the low imagery-high 
creativity group and the low imagery-low creativity group (F(1,58)=2.09, p>0.05). 
Collectively these results show that although performance on the SET is fundamental to 
predicting performance on the CVT the combination of imagery and SET performance is 
the best predictor ofCVT correspondence performance (see Figure 9.2). 
A final ANOVA on the creativity measure of the CVT confirmed the finding that 
SET performance is a good predictor of CVT achievement (F(1,58)=8.40, MSe=1.33, 
p<O.Ol). It also showed that the imagery factor does not yield significant differences in 
CVT performance (F(1 ,58)=1.08, MSe=1.33, p<0.05). Finally, the same trend as that 
observed for the correspondence ratings was found for the interaction between imagery 
and creativity. However, the findings failed to show a significant interaction between the 
imagery and creativity factors (F(1,58)=2.80, MSe=1.33, p<O.l). 
Discussion 
The aim of this study was to investigate the roles of creativity (as defined by SET 
performance) and self-reported mental imagery in performance on the creative 
visualization task. Having found that the creative visualization task scores conformed to 
the previous findings high and low imagery and creativity groups were formed. Factorial 
independent groups analyses showed that the creativity scores consistently predicted 
performance on the creative visualization task. The imagery groups consistently showed 
non-significant differences. However, there was a general trend of imagery and creativity 
mediation in predicting performance on the creative visualization task. Although this 
trend did not reveal significant findings for the frequency measure it approached 
significance on the creativity scores and was firmly established on the correspondence 
ratings for the creative visualization task. 
Previous research had detected a two-phase process in the production of 
composite forms on the creative visualization task (Finke, 1990). The most fundamental 
process inferred from this research was the creative interpretation of pre-inventive 
composite forms. Thus, the ability to interpret and translate image forms appears to be an 
essential aspect of the creative visualization task. In the present study a measure of 
creativity (the Symbolic Equivalence Test) that involyed the re-interpretation of \-erbal 
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stimuli was employed to assess the role of creative interpretation. Following the 
derivation of high and low creativity groups analyses showed that performance on the 
creativity task consistently predicted scores on the three creative visualization task 
measures. These findings collectively support a role for creative interpretation in the 
creative visualization task. They also reinforce the observation that even in tasks that 
seem to require imagery processing ratings of the vivdness of mental imagery are not a 
sufficient predictor of performance. 
Having established a paper and pencil version of the creative visualization task. 
the main focus of this chapter, and the preceding chapter, has been upon the role of mental 
imagery in predicting performance on this version of the task. However, previous studies 
failed to show a role for the mental comparison and rotation of images in the creative 
visualization task. As a general failure to predict performance on the task was observed, 
this study assessed self-reported mental imagery in the context of a creative interpretation 
measure. Results showed that this imagery measure failed to independently predict 
performance on the creative visualization task. However, when the measure was assessed 
in the context of the creativity task, it was shown that imagery plays an important 
mediating role in performance on the creative visualization task. 
The results from the present study suggest that the role of mental imagery in the 
creative visualization task is dependent upon the individual's ability on a creativity task. 
The findings from the correspondence ratings show that the combination of high imagery 
and high creativity results in a greater score than low imagery and high creativity. Thus, 
although a high creativity score may in itself be a sufficient predictor of performance. a 
high imagery score is not. This is especially pertinent as the group that scored lowest were 
those who defined themselves as high in mental imagery but performed below average on 
the creativity measure. 
As these findings have tentatively unmasked a role for mental imagery in 
creativity they raise further questions about the findings from the previous research using 
mental comparison and letter rotation tasks. The findings from the self-report measures of 
imagery were similar to those found in the earlier studies of the role of mental imagery in 
the creative visualization task. Assessing the roles of spatial imagery in the context of the 
SET may also provide useful information about the use of mental imagery in creativity. 
As self-report measures do not predict performance on behavioural measures of spatial 
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imagery (Di Vesta et aI., 1971; Hiscock, 1978; and, McKelvie and Rohrberg, 1978) this 
may prove to be a particularly fruitful area of investigation. Such an investigation could 
involve a further distinction of imagery abilities into the visual and spatial formats 
variously supported by previous researchers (Farah, Hammond, Levine, and Calvanio, 
1988; Harshman and Paivio, 1987; Kosslyn, 1994; and, Logie, 1986, 1995; Logie and 
Marchetti, 1991). These may provide useful information about the respectiYe roles of 
generation, transformation and synthesis. 
Conclusion 
Previous studies into the role of mental imagery in the creative visualization task 
have failed to support the contention that imagery plays an important role in the task. As 
this failure may be attributed to the distinguishable roles of generation and interpretation 
in the task a measure of creativity was employed in the present study. Analyses of the 
results showed that the creativity measure consistently predicted performance on the 
creative visualization task. The results also supported a role for mental imagery, as 
mediated by performance on the creativity task. Future research should further assess the 
roles of transformation and integration of stimulus parts in the creative visualization task. 
As the present study has shown that imagery plays a mediating role in 
performance on the test-format version of creative visualization task, the final studies 
presented in the thesis turn to the third aspect of mental imagery and creativity outlined in 
Chapter Three. These studies, based upon the contention that mental imagery interacts 
with perception in creativity, investigate the role of mental imagery in creativity under 
conditions of perceptually congruous and incongruous information. 
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Chapter X 
Mental Imagery, Creativity & Perception 
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General Introduction 
The empirical research carried out in the thesis has amalgamated the t\\"o main 
experimental approaches to the study of mental imagery and creativity. Although the 
findings have provided further information about the role of mental imagery in creatiyity. 
they have not addressed the obvious disparity between empirical and anecdotal enquiry 
described in the first three chapters. The aim of this final empirical chapter is to partially 
address this disparity and to propose a new framework for investigating the role of mental 
imagery in creativity. Fundamental to this method is the hypothesised interaction betvveen 
perceptual and imaginal processes in determining the significance of imagery in creativity 
(Flowers and Garbin, 1989). Two experiments are carried out in which the role of 
perceptually congruent and incongruent information is addressed in the context of 
individual differences in mental imagery and creativity. 
In the previous chapters the principal methods for investigating the role of mental 
imagery in creativity (the individual differences and image generation approaches) were 
assessed and investigated using an individual differences protocol. The dominant method 
of investigating the relationship between the two variables was evaluated through further 
studies and meta-analytic reviews. It was concluded that self-reported mental imagery 
predicts performance on standard divergent thinking tasks but new methods of 
investigation are required to make this prediction empirically relevant. 
The failure to find an empirically relevant predictor of creativity led to further 
investigation in which behavioural measures of mental imagery were used to predict 
performance on a creativity measure derived using the image generation approach (Finke 
and Slayton, 1988). As differences in latency and accuracy on spatial and visual 
behavioural measures of mental imagery did not predict performance on this task a final 
study investigated the role of high and low imagery and creativity groups in creative 
visualisation performance. This study showed that the vividness of mental imagery is 
important in predicting performance on the task. However, this role is only effectiYe when 
an individual performs well on a measure of creative re-interpretation (Barron's SET). 
Thus, mental imagery seems to be a necessary but not a sufficient predictor of 
performance on the test-format version of the creative visualisation task.In assessing the 
results from this research it is concluded that while mental imagery has been shown to 
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playa role in creativity, there still remains a disparity between the empirical research 
findings and the anecdotal reports of historically creative individuals. A new method of 
enquiry may be necessary for further progress to be made. 
The main tenet of the present chapter is that the role of mental Imagery In 
creativity (and in information processing in general) needs to understood in the context of 
perceptual processing. Converging lines of evidence in mental imagery research suggest 
that perceptual processes can both interfere with and facilitate imaginal processing in 
cognitive tasks (Craver-Lemley and Reeves, 1992; Farah, 1985; Logie, 1986; Sobel and 
Rothenberg, 1980; Zubek, 1969). Furthermore, many of the anecdotal reports of the role 
of mental imagery in historical creativity suggest that the association bet\veen the two 
variables is strongly linked to environments in which perceptually incongruent 
information is inhibited or decreased (Daniels-McGhee and Davies, 1994: Ghiselin, 1952; 
Mavromatis, 1987; Ochse, 1991; Partington, 1964; Rothenberg, 1995). 
The aim of the following studies is to assess the mediatory role of perceptual 
processing in predicting performance on a creativity task. In the first study a perceptual 
competition hypothesis is tested. In this approach the role of imagery in creativity is 
hypothesised to become more pertinent in environments that lack perceptually 
incongruent information. In the second study an alternative aspect of the imagery-
perception link is investigated through a study of verbally sourced and perceptually 
sourced creativity tasks. It is hoped that these studies will demonstrate the importance of 
perceptual mediation in mental imagery and creativity. In keeping \vith the overall theme 
of the thesis, the significance of mental imagery in creativity is assessed through an 
individual differences protocol. 
Study Twelve. The Role of Mental Imagery Abilities in Creativity Under Perceptually 
Isolated and Interference Conditions 
Introduction 
The classification of mental images provided in Chapter Three suggested that the 
role of mental imagery in historical creativity is reported more frequently in conditions 
and circumstances defined by the author as "dream-associated'. This was further 
supported by the many anecdotal reports given throughout the thesis and the citation count 
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in Chapter Four which showed that the most common accounts of imagerY and creativity 
~ - -
occur in dreaming, hypnagogic, and daydreaming states (Daniels-.\1cGhee and Davies. 
1994; Feldman, 1988; Ghiselin, 1952; Kerr, 1993; Mavromatis, 1987; Paiyio, 1983: 
Shepard, 1978a). 
Aside from their' dream-associated' status a fundamental characteristic of many 
of the theories put forward to explain the states in which these mental images occur is the 
competition between perceptual and imaginal processing. For example, Hobson (1988) 
argues that the predominance of dream images results from a sensory-input blockade. 
Similarly, Singer's (1975) account of daydreaming posits a model of competing internal 
and external source demands. Hilgard (1992) claims that hypnotic phenomena arise from 
the suppression and dissociation of the reality monitor. Suler (1980) emphasises the 
emergence and dominance of preverbal primary process thinking during mediatation. 
Mavromatis (1987) notes the importance of autonomous hypnagogic visual phenomena 
and Zubek (1969) reports the proliferation of reported visual experiences in perceptually 
isolated conditions. Thus, accounts of the states in \vhich mental images are most 
frequently associated with historical creativity suggest that the inhibition of perceptual 
processes enhances imagery (Zuckerman, 1969). This view is further supported by 
Flowers and Garbin's (1989) review of the roles of perception and imagery in creativity. 
As they state: 
"Because documented self-reports of mental events associated with 
creative thought often include extensive use of mental imagery it seems 
plausible that creating an environment that minimises potentially 
interfering sensory input might be useful in facilitating manipulations of 
mental image processing and, hence, contribute to creative thought." 
(Flowers and Garbin, 1989, p.152). 
These theories and accounts of the 'dream-associated' states in which so many anecdotal 
accounts of historical creativity have been reported suggest that there may be a 
fundamental association between perceptual, imaginal, and creative processing. Ho\vevef. 
despite frequent references to these anecdotal reports, researchers have neglected to 
investigate the probable interaction between the three processes. 
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Perceptual Interference 
Early studies of interference effects were carried out at the beginning of the 
century by Scripture, Keulpe, and Perky (Craver-Lemley and Reeves, 1992). The most 
well known example of imagery interference was reported by Perky in 1910 (Richardson, 
1969). Perky found that participants failed to report the existence of supra-liminal stimuli 
whilst imaging. The results of this research have since been replicated in a range of 
experimental protocols (Craver-Lemley and Reeves, 1987, 1992; Segal and Fusella, 
1970). The findings suggest that an instruction to use visual imagery produces a lowering 
in the perceptual sensitivity threshold (Craver-Lemley and Reeves, 1992). 
Although imagery interference studies are theoretically important they do not 
show that perception interferes with imaging. Research into perceptual interference has 
evolved from the short-term memory research reviewed in Chapter Three. The 
experimental protocol (derived from a series of studies carried out by Brooks, 1967) tests 
participants performance on imagery and non-imagery memory tasks following a 
concurrent visuo-spatial task. The effects of perceptual disruption were thoroughly 
investigated in a series of studies carried out by Logie (1986). He showed decrements in 
mnemonic task performance even when the concurrent perceptual stimuli was unattended. 
The findings from this research suggest that imagery processing in memory tasks is as 
susceptible to visuo-spatial interference effects as verbally rehearsed material is 
susceptible to articulatory suppression (Baddeley, 1997). 
Environments that Enhance Imaginal & Creative Processes 
The research presented thus far offers tentative support for the notion that the use 
of mental imagery during test-format divergent thinking tasks is disrupted by incongruent 
perceptual competition. However, research into imagery mnemonics shows that these 
tasks can be performed perfectly well in test-room formats. It is only when the 
participants are required to perform a concurrent task that competition exerts an effect. 
Furthermore the research carried out in the previous Chapter showed that people were , 
capable of generating creative composite forms from stimulus parts. This research 
suggests that people can use imagery to perform tasks in test-room environments. 
It may be true that imagery can be employed in these tasks but the anecdotal 
reports of historical creativity suggest that imagery may be enhanced in environments that 
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either suppress or have minimal sensory information. The conclusion from the reyiew (in 
Chapter Three) of mental images and creativity showed that mental images were more 
likely to be implicated in the creative process when they occurred in ~ dream-associated' 
states. Furthermore, this was especially so when the individuals did not report a . special" 
form of imagery (e.g. synaesthesia). 
The review in Chapter Three also highlighted the general failure to empirically 
verify the role of 'dream-associated' mental images in creativity. This is probably due to 
the problem of implementation. In many circumstances it is not possible to construct an 
experimental environment that is capable of evaluating the role of these altered states of 
consciousness in creativity (e.g. dreaming and hypnagogia). Furthermore, even in the non-
somnambulistic 'dream-associated' states there is a problem with the implementation of 
psychometric tests of creativity. However, there is one condition in which it may be 
possible to employ a creativity measure. This is under conditions of short-term restricted 
environment stimulation (REST). 
A literature review of sensory deprivation research shows that there was an 
intense period of investigation between 1954 and 1969. This was followed by less interest 
in long-term sensory deprivation and the introduction of short-term perceptual invariance 
studies (Suedfeld, Steel, Wallbaum, Bluck, Livesey. and Caposzzi. 1994). The new 
direction of research has focused upon the beneficial effects of short-term sensory 
deprivation (Suedfeld, 1980; Suedfeld and Best, 1977: Suedfeld and Clarke. 1981: 
Suedfeld, Metcalfe, and Bluck, 1987). Recent research into sensory deprivation has used 
very short duration tasks in floatation chambers. As was noted. these studies have 
investigated the positive effects of the restricted environmental stimulation technique 
(REST). The emphasis upon the beneficial effects of REST has led several researchers to 
investigate its role in creativity. A study by Suedfeld et al. (1987) found that individuals 
reported having more creative ideas during floatation than a perceptually variant room 
isolation. Furthermore, a later study by Forgays and Forgays (1992) reported improved 
performance on Guilford's creativity scale following floatation. Earlier, a study by 
Tushup and Zuckerman (1977) found enhancements in creativity following a stimulus 
invariance procedure. 
As the study reported by Suedfeld et al. (1987) did not use a psychometric test. it 
provides a limited amount of support for a perceptual competition hypothesis. The other 
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experiments demonstrate an increase in divergent thinking abilities follo\ving short-term 
sensory deprivation. However, as these studies did not provide the participants with 
divergent thinking tests during the sensory deprivation period it cannot be concluded that 
an enhancement in creativity resulted from perceptual isolation. Furthermore. as the 
studies did not take measures of mental imagery, it cannot be assumed that the increase in 
divergent thinking was attributable to a decrease in perceptual processing in those with 
high mental imagery abilities. 
The aim of the present study is to investigate the role of concurrent restricted 
environmental stimulation in the creativity performance of high and low mental imagery 
groups. This will be carried out through the presentation of creativity tasks in restricted 
and focused environments. As the aim of the experiment is to assess the effects of 
concurrent perceptual isolation, presenting the creativity tasks in their standard written 
format may disrupt the experiment (Brooks, 1967). To minimise the effects of perceptual 
interference, the stimuli are presented in an oral mode during the perceptual isolation 
phase and in a written form following the perceptual isolation phase. 
Method 
Participants. Twenty-six undergraduate Middlesex University students 
volunteered to take part in the study. The sample consisted of20 females and 6 males with 
an age range of 18-47 and a median age of 24.5 years. 
Design. A mixed design was employed in which the two dependent variables 
(SET performance in oral and written modes) were assessed separately. High and low 
imagery groups were derived from a median split on the two self-report measures of the 
vividness of mental imagery. The environment factor consisted of two conditions, a 
perceptual isolation environment and perceptual focus environment. Counterbalancing 
was used to control for possible carry-over effects in environment and split-half SET. 
Materials. The Symbolic Equivalence test is fully defined in Barron (1988). Full 
details of the SET are presented in Chapter Nine (see Appendix 9.1). In the present study 
a split-half procedure was employed in which participants performed each half of the SET 
twice once in an oral mode and once in a written mode. The VVIQ and the VPIQ 
, 
versions used in the present study were identical to those presented in Chapter Five with 
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the exception that the participants were informed that they could perform the task \vith or 
without their eyes-open. 
Procedure. Following completion of the two self-report measures of mental 
imagery the participants performed the experimental component of the study. The 
participants performed the split-halves in two environment conditions. There was an 
interval of a week between the two phases of the experiment. In the perceptual isolation 
environment the participants were taken to a sound and light proof room. The participants 
were informed that they would be required to perform the SET following 20 minutes of 
perceptual isolation and were given the instructions to the SET. Follo\ving the first 
perceptual isolation phase they were presented with the SET in an oral mode (through a 
P.A. system) and their responses were recorded. After they had completed the SET they 
remained in the perceptual isolation environment for a further 20 minute period. After the 
second perceptual isolation phase a sufficient amount of light was provided to enable 
them to complete a written version of the SET. The perceptual focus condition was carried 
out identically to the perceptual isolation condition with the exception that between the 
presentations of the SET lighting was not restricted and they were required to attend to a 
video recording presentation. 
Results 
The SET was blind-rated by two judges using the procedure outlined by Barron 
(1988). As inter-rater reliability coefficients exceeded 0.8 a combined score was obtained. 
Separate analyses for order (F(l,24)=2.33, MSe=91.63, p>0.05) and split-half 
(F(1 ,24)=0.96, MSe=96.67, p>0.05) showed no significant effects. 
Oral Mode of Presentation. Analyses of performance on the SET were carried out 
independently for mode of presentation because the participants were performing the task 
a second time in the written mode of presentation (see Figure 10.1). A mixed ANOVA 
was carried out where the self-reported high and low mental imagery groups 
performances on the SET were assessed in the context of the perceptual conditions. 
Although the participants in the high imagery group performed better than those in the 
low imagery group the imagery factor was not significant at the conventional alpha level 
(F(1,24)=3.59, MSe=73.03. p<O.1). A significant main effect for the type of environment 
factor showed that that both groups performed better in the perceptual isolation condition 
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(F(1 ,24)=4.74, MSe=23.34, p<O.OS). Finally, although the high imagery group showed a 
relatively larger increase in performance in the perceptual isolation condition a non-
significant interaction was found (F(1 ,24)=1.97, MSe=23.43 , p>0.05). 
Figure 10.1. Mean SET Scores in the Oral Mode of Presentation For High and Low 
Imagers in Perceptually Focused and Isolated Environments (With Standard Error 
Bars) 
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Written Mode of Presentation. A mixed ANOV A was also employed to assess the 
effects of environment and imagery on performance in the written version of the SET (see 
Figure 10.2). A main effect of imagery showed that the high imagery group performed 
significantly better than the low imagery group (F(1 ,24)=S.20, MSe=32.22 , p<0.05). 
Although the effect of environment approached significance (F(1,24)=2.94, MSe=8 .67, 
p<O.l) observation of the scores shows that the difference observed between the two 
environments needs to be understood in the context of a significant interaction between 
environment and imagery (F(1,24)=7.46, MSe=8.67, p<O.O l ). 
As the mixed ANOV A revealed a significant interaction between the environment 
preceding the task and the participants ' self-reported mental imagery, simple main effects 
analyses were conducted in which the levels of each factor were held constant. These 
showed that the high imagery group performed significantly better on the perceptual 
isolation condition than on the perceptual focus condition (F(l,24)=10.71, 1 e=8.67. 
p<O.O 1). However, there was not a significant difference between the em'ironment 
conditions for the low imagery group (F(L24)=0.48 , MSe=8.67, p>0.05). imilarly th 
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high imagery group performed significantly better than the low imagery group in the 
perceptual isolation condition (F(1 ,24)=10 .78 , MSe=20.43 , p<O.Ol ) but not in the 
perceptual focus condition (F(l ,24)=0.59, MSe=20.43 , p>0 .05). 
Figure 10.2. Mean SET Scores in the Written Mode of Presentation For Hiah and 
~ 
Low Imagers in Perceptually Focused and Isolated Environments (With Standard 
Error Bars). 
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The results from this study concur with the previous research carried out into the 
role of mental imagery in creativity and also support the hypothesis that mental imagery 
abilities are predictive of performance on a creativity task when incongruent perceptual 
information is restricted. Analyses of both the oral and written modes of presentation 
showed that high imagers did not perform better than low imagers in the standard 
perceptually variant environment. However, the results from the written mode of 
presentation showed a significant difference in performance between High and Low 
Imagers in the perceptual isolation condition. Overall , the findings suggest that the use of 
mental imagery abilities in creativity is dependent upon the environment in which the task 
is performed. 
Previous research into creativity following short-term sensory deprivation period 
had shown that people benefited from the effects of isolation (Forgays and Forgays. 1992: 
Tushup and Zuckerman, 1977). Explanations for the improvement varied. Forgay and 
Forgays (1992) suggested that improvements in creativity following floatation may be the 
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result of a reduction in depression and an increase in vigour. Tushup and Zuckerman 
(1978) explained their findings in the context of daydreaming and fantasy differences. As 
previous research has shown that self-reported mental imagery correlates with 
daydreaming (Bowers, 1978; Glisky et al., 1995; Wallace et al., 1994) the present 
findings concur with Tushup and Zuckerman's (1977) conclusion. 
Future research into the role of perceptual isolation in predicting performance on 
creativity tasks should further assess the relationship between daydreaming, fantasy 
proneness and self-reported mental imagery vividness. Ideally an independent groups 
design could be developed which successfully differentiates people on these variables. 
The findings from this research could be used to discern the respective roles of the fantasy 
proneness and self-reported mental imagery. They may also verify the findings from this 
initial study into the inhibition of imagery differences in creative performance during 
perceptually variant environments. However, the final study in the thesis takes an 
alternative approach. The aim is to address several anomalies arising from the general 
mental imagery literature in the context of the roles of perception and imagery in 
predicting performance on a creativity task. 
Study Thirteen. The Role of Verbally Sourced Mental Imagery Abilities in Creativity in 
Perceptual and Verbal Sourced Versions of the SET 
Introduction 
In the previous study it was shown that self-reported mental imagery abilities 
predicted performance on the symbolic equivalence task when the participants were in a 
perceptual isolation environment but not when they were in a perceptual focus 
environment. Having shown that perception may playa mediating role for mental imagery 
in creativity, the final study in the thesis investigates further ways in which perception 
may interact with mental imagery in predicting performance on creativity tasks. The area 
of interest in this study is the way in which perceptually congruent information may 
facilitate performance on creativity tasks. 
One way in which mental imagery protocols could be categorised is on the basis 
of their interaction with verbal or perceptual representations. A particular feature of the 
best known and most frequently applied mental imagery protocols is that the mental 
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images are derived from perceptual representations. The majority of spatial imagery tasks 
involve the interaction between perceptual and imagery processes. For example, 
Shepard's (Shepard and Metzler, 1971) mental rotation task necessarily involves the 
perceptual identification of two three-dimensional forms prior to any spatial 
transformation. Similarly, Kosslyn's (Kosslyn et at., 1978) mental scanning task involves 
an initial perceptual representation of the to-be-scanned material. Thus, although these 
tasks are collectively referred to as measures of spatial imagery they are also perceptually 
sourced tasks. 
Conversely, there are many tasks which do not use perceptual respresentations as 
source material. Many of the self-report measures of mental imagery require the 
participants to create mental images from a verbal source (Marks, 1973; Richardson. 
1969; Sheehan, 1967). Many of the mental comparison tasks also involve the generation 
of mental images from verbal stimuli (Moyer and Bayer, 1976). Finally, Paivio's (1971) 
paired-associate learning tasks are also based upon the interaction between verbal and 
Imagery processes. 
Curiously this distinction between mental imagery protocols has not been 
sufficiently investigated by researchers predicting localisation of image generation 
(Sergent, 1990). However, if the results from the previous experiment are taken into 
account, then the mediating role of perceptually sourced material may be important in 
accounting for the role of mental images in creativity. This is especially relevant given 
one conclusion drawn from Chapter Two, namely, that if mental images play a role in 
creativity, then there needs to be a clear distinction between mental images and percepts. 
While the results from the individual differences research carried out in Chapter 
Six failed to show any difference between figural and verbal versions of the TTCT, these 
tasks were also shown to be of little value to an understanding of the role of mental 
imagery in creativity. As the SET (Barron, 1988) has been shown to be a useful predictor 
of the role of mental imagery in creativity, the aim of the present study is to develop a 
perceptually sourced version of the task. That is, to produce accompanying perceptual 
respresentations of the stimulus images that constitute the task. 
The immediate question that arises is, how would high and low self-reported 
mental imagery groups perform on the two tasks? The results from the pre\'ious study 
suggest that reducing perceptually incongruent information results in increased 
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performance in High Imagers but not Low Imagers. In the present study, howe\·er. it 
would be expected that Low Imagers would benefit more from perceptually sourced 
material. This is because they are provided with an additional source of information from 
which to create symbolic equivalencies. Conversely, the High Imagers report being able 
to generate images from a verbal source, so the perceptual information may prove to be a 
hindrance because it competes with rather than facilitates imaginal processes. 
Method 
Participants. Twenty-four female undergraduate psychology students at 
Middlesex University took part in the experiment as part of a course requirement. 
Design. A mixed factorial design was employed to assess the effects of perceptual 
facilitation and self-reported mental imagery ability in performance on the SET. The 
participants were given split-half versions of the SET. In the standard condition they were 
presented with written stimulus images and in the perceptual facilitation condition they 
were given written stimulus images accompanied with a pictorial representation (see 
Appendix 10.1). The participants were divided into low and high imagery groups on the 
basis of a standard median split on two measures of the self-reported vividness of mental 
imagery. The dependent variable was the score on the SET. The conditions were 
counterbalanced for order and split-half presentation. 
Materials and Procedure. The participants were given the eyes open version of 
the VVIQ and the VPIQ. These measures were fully defined in Chapter Five. Once they 
had completed the self-report measures they carried out the two versions of the SET. The 
first version of the SET consisted of four stimulus images presented in their standard 
written format. The second version consisted of the standard written stimulus images 
accompanied with computer-drawn perceptual representations (see Appendix 10.1). As 
two of the ten stimulus images used in the standard SET are auditory ("The sound of a 
foghorn" and "The increasing loud and steady sound of a drum") they were removed 
from the present study. Instead the participants were given four stimulus images in each 
presentation with a maximum of five responses to each stimulus image (see Appendix 
10.1). 
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Results 
The SET was blind-rated by two judges using the procedure outlined by Barron 
(1988). As an inter-rater reliability coefficient exceeded 0.8, a combined score \\"as 
obtained. An analysis of order effects was not significant (F(1.22)=0 .09, MSe=-.t) .81. 
p>0.0 5) . However, an independent groups analysis of variance showed that the split-
halves of the SET produced significantly different responses (F(1 ,20)=6.63 , MSe=35 .3-.t. 
p<0.05). As the halves were counterbalanced, they do not detract from the findin gs. 
However, they do demonstrate differences in responding to the stimulus images and 
therefore reduce the overall power of the final analyses. 
The mean responses for the high and low imagery groups on the two fom1s of the 
SET are presented in Figure 10.3. These suggest that although the two groups performed 
equivalently on the SET, there appears to be a preference for visually accompanied 
information in the low imagery group. In order to test the hypothesis that the high and low 
imagery groups would differ in their performance on the two versions of the SET a mixed 
ANOV A was carried out. This showed that the high and low imagery groups performed 
the same on the overall SET (F(1 ,22)=0.01, MSe=102.89, p>0.05). They also showed that 
the two versions of the SET yielded similar performance (F(l ,22)=1.73 , MSe= 10.15, 
p>0.05). However, there was a predicted significant interaction effect between self-
reported imagery ability and the type of SET presentation (F(l ,22)=5.13 , MSe= 1 0.15 , 
p<0.05). 
Figure 10.3. Mean Scores for the High and Low Imagery Groups by the Type of SET 
Task (With Standard Error Bars). 
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Simple main effects analyses revealed no significant differences benveen the high 
and low imagery groups when the perceptually sourced (F(l,22)=0.33. MSe=56.50. 
p>0.05) and verbally sourced (F(1,22)=0.62, MSe=0.62, p>0.05) conditions were assessed 
for the two imagery groups. Furthermore, a separate analysis on the high imagery scores 
for the perceptually and verbally sourced SET presentations was not significant 
(F(1,22)=0.45, MSe=10.15, p>0.05). However, when the low imagery groups scores \vere 
analysed it was found that they performed significantly better on the perceptually sourced 
version of the SET than on the verbally sourced version of the SET(F(1,22)=6.42, 
MSe=10.15, p<0.05). Overall these findings suggest that perceptually congruent 
information assisted performance on the SET for the low imagery group but not for the 
high imagery group. 
Discussion 
The findings from the present study showed that Low Imagers performed 
significantly better on a perceptually sourced version of Barron's SET than on a verbally 
sourced version. Although the High Imagers performed better on the verbally sourced 
version of the SET a simple main effect analysis failed to show a significant difference 
between the two conditions. Overall these findings suggest that the addition of perceptual 
information aids performance in individuals' who score low in self-reported verbally 
sourced vividness of visual imagery. 
The findings from the present research further support the role of perceptual 
information in predicting high and low imagery groups abilities on a creativity task. These 
findings are consistent with the findings from Study Twelve and illustrate the need for 
further research into perceptual mediation in the role of mental imagery in creativity. 
They also conform to the consistent research finding that self-reported mental imagery is 
statistically related to creativity in the standard creativity measures but that this 
association is statistically inconsequential. In the present study high and low imagery 
groups were derived from verbally sourced self-report measures. As these measures do 
not correlate with behavioural measures of spatial mental imagery that are perceptually 
sourced (Di Vesta et al., 1971; Ernest, 1977) then it would be interesting to assess high 
and low performance on spatial imagery tasks. 
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As was noted self-report measures of mental imagery are not normally associated 
with spatial measures of mental imagery. Furthermore, several researchers have suggested 
that there is a dissociation between spatial and visual measures of mental imagery (Farah 
et al. J 1988; Kosslyn, 1994). The results from the present study suggest a further 
distinction that may prove to be of particular benefit in future research. This is that there is 
a very obvious difference between perceptually sourced protocols and verbally sourced 
self-report measures. This distinction seems so obvious that it is surprising that mental 
imagery researchers have failed to investigate it in the context of the visual and spatial 
imagery dissociation previously noted. 
General Discussion 
The aim of the present chapter was to pilot new methods for studying the role of 
mental imagery in creativity. The underlying theme of the two studies was that creative 
performance needs to be understood in the context of interacting imaginal and perceptual 
processes. In the first study it was shown that perceptual isolation resulted in improved 
performance on Barron's Symbolic Equivalence Task in the high imagery group but not 
the low imagery group. The second study showed that verbally sourced self-reported Low 
Imagers performed better on a perceptually sourced version of Barron's SET than on a 
verbally sourced version of the SET. Although more research is required, these studies 
demonstrate that the role of mental imagery in creativity is mediated by perceptual 
factors. 
Given that the anecdotal reports of the role of mental imagery in creativity 
strongly suggest that perceptual information mediates performance, it is surprising that the 
research literature has ignored this factor. The first study simply took the most obvious 
conclusion from the anecdotal literature, that the use of mental imagery in historical 
creativity tends to occur in perceptually isolated circumstances, and assessed it in the 
context of individuals that report vivid and non-vivid imagery. The hypothesis was based 
upon an assumption derived from Chapter One, namely. that mental imagery is not a 
necessary condition for creativity but could be used by certain individuals in certain 
environments. The results from the study supported this hypothesis and sho\\-ed that 
previous research may have been correct in its selection of the individuals but had failed 
to develop appropriate conditions. 
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The findings from Study Twelve show that perceptual information in the 
environment is important and concurs with previous research which investigated fantasy 
proneness and perceptual isolation (Tushup and Zuckerman, 1977). Further research is 
required to clarify the effect and to investigate optimal perceptual isolation periods. This 
may show the link between fantasy proneness and imagery vividness in predicting 
creativity . 
Having established that self-reported mental imagery predicts performance 
differences in circumstances where perceptual information is manipulated the final study 
in the thesis aimed to show that Low Imagers preferred tasks that have additional 
perceptual information. The findings from this study showed that the source of the to-be-
imaged stimuli is an important predictor of performance in high and low imagery groups. 
These results have important implications for future research into mental imagery per se 
and the overlooked concept of perceptual and verbal source may help to explain why 
previous research has failed to find associations between measures of mental imagery. 
Further research is required. 
Conclusion 
In this final empirical chapter into the role of mental imagery in creativity a new 
perspective was developed in which the mediating role of perceptual processes was 
investigated. In the first experiment it was shown that the high imagery group performed 
significantly better than the low imagery group on a creativity task when perceptual 
interference effects were removed. Conversely, the second experiment showed that the 
low imagery group performed better than the high imagery group on a perceptually 
sourced version of the SET than on a standard verbally sourced version of the task. 
Overall the findings suggest that perceptual processes are key mediators of the role of 
mental imagery abilities in the performance of creativity tasks. Furthermore, the 
mediation effect interacts with individual imagery abilities. 
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Chapter XI 
Conclusions on the Role of Mental Imagery in Creativity 
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Introduction 
In the first chapter it was noted that mental imagery is neither a necessary 
nor a sufficient condition for creativity. However, this statement \yas intended to 
temper many exaggerated claims about the link between mental imagery and 
creativity rather than to diminish the importance of mental imagery in creativity. 
The significance of the use of mental imagery was reinforced through two case 
studies of historical creativity reported in Chapter One, a reinterpretation of what a 
mental image is in Chapter Two, and the review of the different kinds of mental 
imagery carried out in Chapter Three. 
These three chapters set the framework for empirical research into the role 
of mental imagery in creativity. Collectively they illustrate four issues in the 
imagery-creativity debate. The first of these (demonstrated in the final study) is 
that mental imagery should not be presumed in all cases of creativity and in some 
circumstances it may even become a false icon in the problem solving process. 
The second statement accepts that there are many examples of the use of mental 
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imagery in historical creativity but notes that there is not a single form of imaging 
that will lead to creative insights. This was most clearly demonstrated in Chapter 
Three and receives further support from the empirical research carried out 
throughout the thesis. The third statement claims that a link with creativity 
inevitably entails the rejection of a strong perceptual equivalence hypothesis. This 
statement is supported by the empirical research carried out in the penultimate 
chapter which showed that mental images have exclusive properties that facilitate 
creativity. The final statement is that creativity is associated with a diverse range 
of mental images which require investigation from a number of perspectives. 
While these statements have been considered in the present thesis, 
previous research into the role of mental imagery is based primarily upon the 
numerous reports of historical creativity outlined in Chapter Three. The dominant 
methodologies, designated as "the individual differences approach" and "the 
image generation approach", rarely go beyond the documentary support of 
historically creative individuals. This may explain why the findings from the 
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empirical research are driven more by statistical significance than by theoretical 
importance. 
Studying the role of mental imagery in creativity IS a fascinating 
experience but the elusive nature of the two variables makes the task very 
difficult. In the present thesis the role of mental imagery has been studied in a 
variety of new ways. However, there are many more ways in which imagery and 
creativity could be investigated. In the following discussion the main empirical 
findings are assessed and suggestions for further research are made. 
The Individual Differences Approach 
The aim of first three chapters was to develop a description of mental 
imagery that enabled the many forms to be categorised and evaluated in the 
context of their role in creativity. In carrying this out it was found that the main 
protocol used to empirically investigate mental imagery and creativity was the 
individual differences approach. The main features of this approach were. firstly, 
the application of self-report measures of mental imagery and, secondly. the use of 
divergent thinking measures of creativity. As a sufficient amount of research had 
been carried out using this protocol, it was decided that a meta-analytic 
investigation may provide further information about the role of mental imagery in 
creativity. 
In order to carry out the meta-analysis a set of criteria were established on 
the basis of the broader research into mental imagery and 14 studies were 
identified which employed the individual differences approach. As many of these 
studies failed to meet a necessarily conservative set of criteria, a meta-analysis 
was carried out on six studies with a total sample size of 752 participants. The 
findings from the main meta-analysis showed that self-reported mental imagery 
was consistently associated with divergent thinking abilities. However, the actual 
effect size only met the criterion for marginal acceptability (Cohen, 1992. 
McKelvie, 1995). 
As the six studies tended to use two specific characteristics of mental 
imagery and two forms of divergent thinking, meta-analytic procedures \\·ere 
carried out for each of these in order to identify stronger predictors of the role of 
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mental imagery in creativity. The findings showed that self-reported control of 
mental imagery was a better predictor of performance on the divergent thinkin2. 
tasks than the vividness of mental imagery. It was also found that figural divergent 
thinking tasks had a stronger association with the self-report measures of mental 
imagery than the verbal divergent thinking tasks. However. in both cases the 
differences in effect size were not statistically large enough to warrant a 
theoretical explanation. 
Although meta-analytic procedures provide useful gross estimates of the 
relationship between variables, they are still prone to masking inconsistencies in 
data sets which are detectable through observation. Non-statistical observation of 
the data sets showed that there were several inconsistencies in these studies. The 
first of these was the finding that some studies emphasised the role of vividness 
over the control of imagery (Parrott and Strongman, 1985) and others the role of 
control over the vividness of imagery (Forisha, 1981). Other inconsistencies were 
found in the role of sex differences in mental imagery (Forisha, 1981; Campos and 
Perez, 1987) and in the emphasis upon co-dependent variable (Bowers, 1978; 
Parrott and Strongman, 1985; Shaw and DeMers, 1986). Furthermore, there were 
large differences in the ways in which the mental imagery and divergent thinking 
measures were scored. 
In summarising the findings from this study, it was concluded that the 
most frequently employed method of investigating the role of mental imagery in 
creativity has produced a consistent overall association between mental imagery 
and divergent thinking abilities. However, the association is small (Cohen, 1992) 
and when the studies are individually examined several contradictory findings 
emerged. Consequently, it was concluded that further research needs to be 
conducted in which the standard measures are evaluated for construct validity and 
internal reliability prior to carrying out correlational research. 
Having decided that further research into the construct nature of the self-
report measures of mental imagery was required, two factor analytic studies were 
carried out on the most frequently used measures. The investigation into the eyes-
open version of Marks' VVIQ (1972, 1973) showed that the scale had reasonably 
good parametric properties but produced an expected response leniency effect 
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(McKelvie, 1995). A PCA analysis with oblique rotation suggested a one or three 
factor solution. As the three factors showed good internal reliability and the 
composite scores were shown to produce significantly different responses the 
three factor solution was adopted for further research into the individual 
differences approach. 
The A.Richardson (1969) version of the TVIC had been employed as a 
continuous variable by three of the six studies selected for the meta-analysis in 
Chapter Four. As the best known version of the TVIC this measure was distributed 
to 167 participants and the data were subjected to the same procedures as those 
used to assess the eyes-open version of the VVIQ. However, the TVIC showed an 
extreme response leniency and it became apparent that this measure should not be 
employed as a continuous variable. As the data from this study did not differ from 
previous factor analytic studies, which had ignored the problems of skew and 
kurtosis (Ashton and White, 1974; Kihlstrom et aI., 1991), it was necessary to 
consider alternative ways of using the TVIC. Eventually it was concluded that the 
only way in which the TVIC could produce statistically reliable information is 
when it is treated as a trichotomous variable (Khatena, 1975). 
Having shown that the eyes-open version of the VVIQ could be treated as 
a three factor instrument and that A.Richardson's version of the TVIC should be 
employed as a trichotomous variable, the two self-report measures were employed 
in a study of self-reported mental imagery and divergent thinking. Two shortened 
forms of Torrance's test of creative thinking were employed and measures of 
fluency, flexibility, and originality were derived for each test. Correlational 
analyses for the vividness factors concurred with the previous research in that they 
showed a small but consistent association with the sub-measures of divergent 
thinking. However, the control measure produced no effect and the only 
observable trend was the opposite to that found in the previous research. This 
finding suggested that when the control measure is treated as a trichotomous 
variable it does not predict performance on the divergent thinking tasks. Overall 
the effect size from this study was lower than that found in the meta-analysis. The 
reasons for this were attributed to the necessary changes made to the control 
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measure and it was concluded that further research was required to develop a 
better measure of the control of mental imagery. 
As the self-report measures of the vividness and control of mental 
imagery showed inconsequential criterion validity (McKelvie, 1995), a new 
measure of the vividness of mental imagery was developed which was specifically 
linked to creativity. This measure, referred to as the Vividness of Poetry Imagery 
Questionnaire (VPIQ), consisted of four blocks of figurative poetry. The aim of 
the task was to read the passages of poetry and then rate the vividness of specific 
extracts of the prose. A study of the VPIQ showed that it had reasonably good 
parametric properties but exhibited a small response leniency effect. It also 
showed that the VPIQ consisted of four factors but one these did not load 
significantly on any of the items. The other three factors showed sufficient internal 
reliability and their composite scores were significantly different. 
The final study in this series assessed the association between the three 
factors derived from the VPIQ and the sub-measures of divergent thinking derived 
from shortened and standard forms of the Torrance tests. As the standard form of 
divergent thinking did not produce a stronger effect size, the two forms were 
analysed in a multiple partial correlation design. The findings from this study once 
again showed a consistent association between self-reported vividness of mental 
imagery and divergent thinking performance. However, the use of a self-report 
measure that was linked to creativity failed to elicit a stronger association between 
the imagery and divergent thinking variables. 
The results from the two criterion studies carried out in Chapter Five were 
combined with the studies reported in Chapter Four (and a further study carried 
out after the first meta-analysis; Gonzalez et al., 1997) and a final meta-analytic 
procedure was conducted. This study was derived from 9 studies in which 1,494 
participants were tested. Overall the addition of the studies carried out in Chapter 
Five and the inclusion of the Gonzalez et al. (1997) study resulted in a reduction 
in the overall effect size from a Fisher's r of 0.20 to a Fisher's r of 0.15. Although 
this reduction is very small it is important because the effect size no longer meets 
a minimally acceptable criterion validity suggested by McKelvie (1995) in his 
meta-analytic review of the VVIQ. Thus, according to McKelvie's criterion the 
219 
association between self-reported mental imagery and divergent thinking ability 
does not appear to have statistical or theoretical importance. 
As the studies carried out after the initial meta-analysis employed 
measures of vividness and control, separate analyses were carried out for each of 
the characteristics of mental imagery. Although the two studies carried out in 
Chapter Five used different measures of mental imagery, they both measured the 
vividness characteristic and were therefore included in the first analysis. The final 
Fisher's r coefficient was 0.14 which was very similar to the findings for the two 
studies carried out in Chapter Five. 
The re-examination of the control measure of mental imagery represented 
a dilemma. Although an overall measure of effect was desirable, all of the studies 
that employed a measure of control treated it as a continuous variable. As the 
factor analytic study showed that this procedure produced statistically unreliable 
results, it was evident that generalisations from these studies could be spurious. 
Nevertheless, an analysis was carried and the findings showed that the overall 
effect size was reduced from a marginally acceptable Fisher's r coefficient of 0.17 
to an inconsequential Fisher's r coefficient of 0.12. 
The same procedure was also carried out on the two forms of divergent 
thinking. The results from the verbal divergent thinking tasks showed a reduction 
in the Fisher's r coefficient from a marginally acceptable 0.19 to an 
inconsequential coefficient of 0.13. The figural divergent thinking tasks also 
showed a reduction in the overall Fisher's r coefficient from 0.23 to 0.19. 
However, the association between self-reported mental imagery and figural 
divergent thinking performance remained within a marginally acceptable criterion 
validity range. 
In assessing the results from the studies carried out using the standard 
individual differences approach, it was concluded that new ways of assessing the 
role of imagery abilities in creativity needed to be developed. Generally, the 
research carried out into self-reported mental imagery and divergent thinking has 
failed to go beyond the basic empirical finding that there is a consistent 
association between the two variables. Furthermore, this association is small and 
with the exception of studies of mental imagery and figural divergent thinking is 
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statistically inconsequential. One problem with the protocols employed in this 
research is that they have failed to assess the full scope of mental imagery 
abilities. For example, there is a distinct lack of studies which have employed 
behavioural measures of mental imagery. Finally, the divergent thinking tasks 
employed in these studies may not require imagery processing at all, so it would 
be better to choose measures of creativity where there are stronger theoretical 
grounds for predicting the use of mental imagery. If the individual differences 
approach is going to provide useful information about the role of mental imagery 
in creativity, then these problems need to be addressed. 
The Image Generation Approach 
As the individual differences approach generally failed to show a 
statistically important role for mental imagery in creativity, new ways of assessing 
the role of mental imagery abilities in creativity needed to be developed. In 
Chapters Seven, Eight, and Nine the second protocol used to investigate the role 
of mental imagery in creativity was employed in the context of behavioural 
measures of mental imagery. This was carried out through the development of the 
pencil and paper version of the creative visualisation task. 
The image generation approach to the study of the role of mental imagery 
in creativity was developed by Finke and Slayton (1988). The aim of this approach 
is to show that under specific conditions mental images are used to produce 
creative responses. The main difference between this approach and the individual 
differences approach is that mental imagery abilities are not seen as important in 
determining their use in creativity. Consequently, the protocols employed in this 
research are not designed to elicit information about individual differences. Thus, 
the aim of the first study undertaken in this section was to develop a measure of 
creative visualisation that could be used to differentiate people's abilities on the 
task. 
A pilot study of a pencil and paper version of the creative visualisation 
task showed that it had sufficient parametric properties to be employed as a 
dependent variable measure of a particular form of creativity. Consequently three 
studies were carried out to assess the role of mental imagery abilities in predicting 
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performance on the task. The first two studies employed t\\/O well known 
behavioural measures of spatial and visual mental imagery (the mental rotation 
task and the mental clocks comparison task) and the third assessed self-reported 
vividness of mental imagery in the context of high and low Symbolic Equivalence 
Task (SET) performance. 
It had been noted in the research using the individual differences approach 
that the standard protocol used to assess the role of mental imagery abilities in 
performance on creativity tasks employed self-report measures of mental imagery. 
As there are a large number of protocols which derive behavioural measures of 
mental imagery performance, it was hypothesised that these tasks may provide 
further information about the role of individual differences in mental imagery in 
creativity. The first study into the role of mental imagery abilities in predicting 
performance on the pencil and paper version of the creative visualisation task used 
latency and accuracy scores from a version of Shepard's (Shepard and Metzler, 
1971; Cooper and Shepard, 1973) mental rotation task. Results from this study 
suggested that high and low abilities on this particular version of the mental 
rotation task did not predict performance on any of the measures of creative 
visualisation. 
As the mental rotation task did not predict performance on the pencil and 
paper version of the creative visualisation task, a further measure of mental 
imagery abilities was employed in a more complex and thorough design. The 
mental imagery task selected as a behavioural measure of visual mental imagery 
ability was a version ofPaivio's (1 978a) mental clocks comparison task. This task 
was selected because it is widely referenced in the mental imagery research 
literature (Kosslyn, 1994; Paivio, 1989; 1. T .E.Richardson, 1999), it is possible to 
develop an equivalent non-imagery version (Moyer and Bayer, 1976), and because 
it is hypothesised to be a measure of visual (as opposed to spatial) imagery ability 
(Farah et aI., 1988). 
A two-way independent groups experiment III which high and low 
imagery and arithmetic comparison abilities were assessed failed to show that high 
imagery comparison abilities predicted performance on the pencil and paper 
version of the creative visualisation task. Furthermore, analyses suggested that the 
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arithmetic condition was a better predictor of performance on the creatiYe 
visualisation task than the imagery condition. These results were found despite the 
fact that the participants reported the use of mental imagery on the imagery 
comparison task and the creative visualisation task but not on the arithmetic 
comparison task. 
The results from the studies carried out in Chapter Eight were 
disappointing. Combined they showed that behavioural measures of mental 
imagery ability did not predict performance on the pencil and paper version of the 
creative visualisation. One positive finding from the research reported in this 
chapter was that the pencil and paper version of the creative visualisation task 
yielded good parametric [mdings. Furthermore an impetus for continued research 
was the finding that the participants reported the use of mental imagery in the task. 
As abilities on the two behavioural measure of mental imagery failed to predict 
performance on the creative visualisation task, the final study in this series of 
investigation assessed self-reported mental imagery abilities. However, the 
research from the studies undertaken throughout the thesis suggested that research 
should go beyond a straightforward linear association between of mental imagery 
and creativity. 
A closer examination of the research carried out into the processes 
involved in the creative visualisation task suggested that mental imagery abilities 
may be dependent upon creative interpretation processes (Finke, 1990). In order to 
assess this hypothesis the final study into the role of mental imagery abilities in 
the pencil and paper version of the creative visualisation task, a measure of high 
and low creative interpretation abilities was derived from Barron's (1988) 
symbolic equivalence test. A two-way independent groups design showed that 
scores on the SET consistently predicted performance on the creative visualisation 
task. Although the vividness groups were not significantly different there was a 
significant interaction between self-reported mental imagery and high and low 
performance on the SET. Further analyses of the interaction effect revealed that 
self-reported High Imagers who also performed high in SET performance 
performed significantly better on the creative visualisation task than the other 
groups. 
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The studies carried out using the image generation approach represent a 
new method of investigating the role of imagery differences in performance of 
creativity tasks. The pencil and paper version of the creative visualisation task has 
been shown to produce creative responses and mental imagery has been strongly 
implicated in the task. Although it has been difficult to establish which particular 
forms of mental imagery playa role in this task, it was eventually found that the 
self-reported vividness of mental imagery played an important secondary role in 
predicting performance on the task. 
Perceptual Mediation in the Role of Mental Imagery and Creativity 
The research carried out in Chapters Four to Nine represents a 
continuation of previous empirical work into the role of mental imagery and 
creativity. As before the main focus of the research was on waking-state mental 
images that have a 'looking-at' status. Although these studies provide valuable 
information about the role of mental imagery in creativity, the anecdotal and 
theoretical reviews carried out in the first three chapters show that there are many 
ways in which mental images can be used to facilitate the creative process. The 
aim of the penultimate chapter was to draw upon the anecdotal reports of the use 
of mental imagery in historical creativity in order to develop new protocols for 
studying the two variables. 
A major premise derived from the first three chapters was that the use of 
mental imagery in creativity is dependent upon the amount of perceptually 
relevant and irrelevant information in the environment. This was highlighted in 
Chapter Three where it was shown that the majority of anecdotal reports of 
historical creativity took place in circumstances where internal processing 
demands dominated thinking. As these anecdotal reports suggest that mental 
imagery in creativity is mediated by perceptual information, the final studies 
investigated two aspects of mediation. The first study in Chapter Ten assessed the 
effects of perceptual isolation in performance on Barron's SET. The final study 
looked at perceptually sourced and verbally sourced information in predicting 
performance on Barron's SET. Both of these studies demonstrated that the 
association between individual differences in self-reported mental imagery and 
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performance on a creativity task was mediated by the presence or absence of 
perceptual information. 
An investigation into the effects of limiting perceptually incongruent 
information in environment was carried out in the twelfth study. This showed that 
those with high self-reported mental imagery performed significantly better than 
those with low self-reported mental imagery on the SET in a perceptually isolated 
environment but not in a perceptually focused environment. These results may 
help to explain why mental imagery abilities do not strongly predict performance 
in ordinary test-room formats. They also suggest that environments which limit 
the amount of perceptually incongruent information are conducive for the 
emergence and use of mental imagery in creativity. Further research should 
investigate optimal isolation periods and the role of mode of presentation. 
The final study considered the role of perceptual mediation through a 
study of perceptually sourced and verbally sourced versions of the SET. Many' 
studies of mental imagery have shown that behavioural and self-report measures 
of mental imagery are not associated (McKelvie, 1995). Explanations for this 
dissociation have focused upon the spatial characteristics of the behavioural 
measures and artifactual accounts of self-report measures of mental imagery (Di 
Vesta et al., 1971; Harshman an Paivio, 1987; Hiscock, 1978). However, a key 
difference between these measures of mental imagery seems to have been largely 
over-looked in the cognitive literature. This is that self-report measures of mental 
imagery use verbally sourced material and behavioural measures use perceptually 
sourced material. In the final study information source was investigated through a 
study of high and low verbally sourced mental imagery abilities. 
In Study Thirteen a quasi-experimental design showed that that those \vith 
high self-reported mental imagery on two vividness measures performed better on 
a verbally sourced version of the SET than on a perceptually sourced version of 
the SET. These findings tentatively open up a new method of investigating mental 
imagery and cognitive abilities and suggest that imagery abilities may be better 
understood in the context of the source of the information. Combined with the 
previous study the results from this research also suggest that the role of mental 
imagery in creativity is influenced by perceptual information and that further 
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research is required to demonstrate the full breadth of this mediation. This 
information is available in the anecdotal literature but had previously been 
neglected by imagery-creativity researchers. 
Further Research 
There remains a considerable amount of research into the role of mental 
imagery in creativity. Even though the two best known protocols were 
investigated and two further studies assessed the mediation of perceptual 
information, it seems that only the tip of an iceberg has been revealed. This is 
especially true of the image generation approach and the perceptual mediation 
model where more verification and elaboration on the effects is required. Each of 
the three areas is reviewed separately in the following section and new ways of 
investigating the role of mental imagery in creativity are considered. 
The research using the individual differences approach showed that the 
association between mental imagery and creativity was consistent but small. The 
overall findings suggest that this method of investigating the role of mental 
imagery in creativity is not productive and it is surprising that it should represent 
the majority of the empirical research. While it may be argued that the addition of 
mediating variables could reveal a stronger association between mental imagery 
and creativity, in reality these variables seem to obscure the relationship further. 
What is clearly required is the development of a new measure of the control of 
mental imagery that covers a broad range of situations in which the control of 
mental imagery is is to be attempted. Given the findings from the penultimate 
chapter, a fresh approach may be required in which participants are presented with 
perceptually sourced and verbally sourced versions of the task. 
A further requirement for future research is the use of alternative 
measures of creativity. The meta-analysis carried out in Chapter Six suggested that 
the measures of figural and verbal divergent thinking were not strongly associated 
with self-reported mental imagery. The reason for this may be related to the 
cognitive processes required to perform the task. For example, it has been knov"n 
for a considerable amount of time that the scores of originality and flexibility are 
largely explained through fluency (Hocevar, 1979). Given that research into 
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mental imagery has shown that processing is slow (Denis, 1982) and that the 
reports of historically creative individuals emphasise free floating thought 
(Ghiselin, 1952) then it may be better to employ measures that place less emphasis 
upon speed of processing. Such measures definitely include the pencil and paper 
version of Finke and Slayton's (1988) creative visualisation task and Barron·s 
(1988) Symbolic Equivalence Test. 
The studies carried out into the creative visualisation task and the 
perceptual mediation model were a response to the problems emphasised in the 
previous paragraph. The research carried out in Chapters Seven, Eight. and Nine 
showed that it is possible to employ a pencil and paper version of the creative 
visualisation task but also failed to show a direct link between imagery abilities 
and performance on the task. The statement made at the very beginning of the 
thesis, that mental imagery is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for 
creativity, is clearly supported by these findings. However, the importance of 
mental imagery was established in the study carried out in Chapter Nine and using 
this type of protocol in future research is likely to reveal interesting information 
about the use of imagery in creativity. For example, the failure to show a role for 
spatial imagery abilities in Chapter Eight may be redressed by an examination of 
performance in the context of Barron's SET. 
The most divergent movement away from the standard individual 
differences approach was the investigation of perceptual mediation in the role of 
mental imagery in creativity. Ironically, this area appears to offer the richest vein 
of information and the closest association to the anecdotal reports of historical 
creativity which formed the basis for the individual differences research. The 
initial finding that perceptually isolated environments facilitate High Imagers but 
not Low Imagers is predicted from the anecdotal literature. This study requires 
further verification and future research should focus upon the obvious 
contradiction between cognitive deficits in long-term sensory deprivation 
(Suedfeld, 1969) and enhancements in short-term studies. 
The final study into the role of mental imagery in creativity showed that 
low verbally sourced mental imagers performed better on a perceptually sourced 
version of Barron's SET and high verbally sourced imagers performed better on a 
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verbally sourced version of the SET. Again further research is necessary in order 
to verify this finding. With the possibility of revealing a new way in which mental 
imagery abilities can be understood the general application of this protocol may 
provide the clarity that has been missing in mental imagery research. That a study 
of mental imagery and creativity requires this clarity puts a paradoxical twist on 
Shepard's (1978) claim that creativity is a raison d'etre for studying mental 
lmagery. 
The aim of the thesis was to examine the link between mental imagery 
and creativity. Following a review of the theoretical, anecdotal and empirical 
evidence the individual differences approach was employed in three areas of 
inferred relevance. Although the research has covered the two main empirical 
approaches and analyses of perceptual mediation were undertaken, there remain 
large areas of interest that have not been investigated. Some of these areas were 
briefly noted in the review carried out in Chapter Three (synaesthesia, memory 
images) and others have emerged from the research undertaken (the role of 
stimulus attributes). In summary the scope for research may be difficult but there 
are many more avenues along which mental imagery and creativity can be 
explored. 
Conclusion 
The studies presented in this thesis have meandered through what is a 
challenging but rewarding area to research. In an attempt to close the gap between 
the anecdotal support for the role of mental imagery in historical creativity and the 
empirical research, several new protocols have been developed. The most 
important conclusions to be drawn from the research are threefold. Firstly, it has 
been demonstrated that the standard individual differences approach in which a 
self-reported measure of mental imagery is correlated with measures of divergent 
thinking shows a statistically inconsequential relationship between mental imagery 
and creativity. Secondly, it has been shown that an alternative protocol, the image 
generation approach, can be used as a measure of individual differences in 
creative visualisation and that self-reported mental imagery plays an important 
secondary role in predicting performance on the task. Finally. it has been found 
228 
that the role of mental imagery in creativity needs to be understood in the context 
of the perceptual information in the immediately surrounding environment. 
It is hoped that the material presented in the thesis will eventually lead to 
a better understanding of how mental imagery predicts performance on creativity 
tasks. The 'multifaceted' nature of the role of mental imagery in creativity has 
been noted by many researchers but few have tried to develop new methods of 
inquiry. More research using new methods is required if a full understanding of 
the two variables is ever to be achieved. Given the breadth of mental imagery and 
creativity this will demand a considerable amount of research. 
(WORD COUNT 74,689) 
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Appendix 5.6 The Test of Visual Imagery Control 
Name: 
Male or Female: Occupation: 
Read each question, then close your eyes while you try to visualize the scene described. 
Record your answer by underlining "Yes", "No" or "Unsure". whichever is the most 
appropriate. Remember that your accurate and honest answer to these questions is most 
important for the validity of this study. If you have any doubts at all regarding the ans\ver 
to a question, underline "Unsure". Please be sure that you answer each of the twel\e 
questions. 
1. Can you see a car standing in the road 
in front of the house? 
2. Can you see it in colour? 
3. Can you see it in a different colour? 
4. Can you now see the same car lying upside down? 
5. Can you now see the same car back on its four 
wheels again? 
6. Can you see the car running along the road? 
7. Can you see it climb up a very steep hill? 
8. Can you see it climb over the top? 
9. Can you see it get out of control and crash 
through a house? 
10. Can you now see the same car running along 
the road with a handsome couple inside? 
11. Can you see the car cross a bridge and fall? 
over the side into a stream below? 
12. Can you see the car all old and dismantled 
in a car cemetery? 
Yes No Unsure 
Yes No Unsure 
Yes No Unsure 
Yes No Unsure 
Yes No Unsure 
Yes No Unsure 
Yes No Unsure 
Yes No Unsure 
Yes No Unsure 
Yes No Unsure 
Yes No Unsure 
Yes No Unsure 
Appendix 5.7. The Vividness of Poetry Imagery Questionnaire 
The aim of the task is to assess your ability to create a mental picture of passages extracted 
from well known pieces of creative writing. The work has been specially selected for its use 
ofl~guage that e~okes mental imagery. This is the realm of the five senses. \vhere poetry 
reqUIres the creatIOn of perceptual representation. For example, much of the poetry written 
by the Lake Poets contains language that can be translated into a pictorial form: 
J wandered lonely as a cloud 
that floats 0 'er vales and hills. 
Will aim Wordsworth (1770-1850) 
For hope grew round me, like the twining vine, 
And fruits, and foliage, not my own, seemed mine. 
Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772-1834) 
You will be asked to read each passage twice. The first time you will read the whole 
passage imagining the scenes as they come before you. The second reading will invoh'c 
breaking the passage into elements that can be rated according to the imagery evoked. You 
are free to perform this task with your eyes open or closed - whatever is the most effective. 
You should rate the vividness of each image according to the rating scale given below. Refer 
to the rating scale after each response. Remember that your accurate response is vital. 
Finally, answer each question separately. 
Rating scale 
The image aroused by the item may be: 
Perfectly clear and as vivid as normal vision 1 2 " ..j. 5 j 
Clear and reasonably vivid 1 2 " ..j. 5 j 
Moderately clear and vivid 1 2 3 ..j. :'I 
Vague and dim 1 
, 3 .t "'I 
-
No image at alL you only "'know" that 1 2 
') 
..j. 5 j 
Task 1 
The following passage is taken from a poem by Nikki Giovanni (1972) called the "\\"inter 
Poem". Your task is to read the poem and visualize the scenes that are conjured by the 
author: 
Once a snowflake fell 
on my brow and i loved 
it so much and i kissed 
it and it was happy and called its cousins 
and brothers and a web 
of snow engulfed me then 
i reached to love them all 
and i squeezed them and they became 
a spring rain and i stood perfectly 
still and was a flower 
Nikki Giovanni (1943- ) 
Second Reading 
Now try to create a mental picture of the poem. Attempt to visualize each aspect of the 
poem circling the most appropriate response as you do so: 
Can you visualize: 
1. A snowflake falling on to your brow? 1 2 3 -l 5 
2" A web of snow engulfing you? 1 ! 3 4 5 
3. Squeezing snow into spring rain? 1 2 " -l 5 .) 
4. Turning into a flower? 1 ! " -l 5 .) 
Rating scale 
The image aroused by the item may be: 
Perfectly clear and as vivid as normal vision 1 2 " -l .:; .) 
Clear and reasonably vivid 1 1 " -l 5 .) 
Moderately clear and vivid 1 '1 3 -l :' 
-
1 '1 " ... ..., Vague and dim 
-
.) 
No image at alL you only "know" that 1 '1 
-, 
-l 5 
-
-) 
Task 2 
The next passage is part of a poem written by Robert Herrick (1591-167.f) called "To the 
Virgins, to Make Much of Time". Your task is to read the poem and yisualize the scenes 
that are conjured by the author: 
Gather ye rosebuds while ye may, 
Old time is still a-jlying,· 
And this same flower that smiled today 
Tomorrow will be dying. 
Robert Herrick (1591-1674) 
Second Reading 
Now try to create a mental picture of the poem. Attempt to yisualize each aspect of the 
poem circling the most appropriate response as you do so: 
Can you visualize: 
1. Gathering rosebuds? 1 ! ,., .f 5 
-' 
2. Old time flying? 1 2 3 4- 5 
3. A flower smiling? 1 ! " .f 5 
-' 
4. A flower dying? 1 2 3 .f 5 
Rating scale 
The image aroused by the item may be: 
Perfectly clear and as vivid as normal vision 1 ') 3 4- 5 ~ 
Clear and reasonably vivid 1 2 3 .f 5 
Moderately clear and vivid 1 2 3 .f 5 
1 2 " 4 5 Vague and dim -' 
No image at all, you only "know" that 1 2 
,., 
.f 5 
-' 
Task 3 
The third piece of writing is taken from T.S.Eliot's, "The Love Song of J.Alfred Prufrock". 
Your task is to read the poem and visualize the scenes that are conjured by the author. 
1 have heard the mermaids singing, each to each. 
1 do not think they will sing to me. 
1 have seen them ride seaward on the waves 
Combing the white hair of the waves blown back 
When the wind blows the water white and black. 
We have lingered in the chambers of the sea 
By seagirls wreathed with seaweed red and brown 
Till human voices wake us, and we drown. 
T.S.Elliot (1888-1965) 
Now try to create a mental picture of the poem. Attempt to visualize each aspect of the 
poem circling the most appropriate response as you do so: 
Can you visualize: 
1. Mermaids riding seaward on the waves? 
2. Combing the white hair of the waves? 
3. Seagirls wreathed with seaweed red and brown? 
4. Being woken to drown? 
Rating scale 
The image aroused by the item may be: 
Perfectly clear and as vivid as normal vision 
Clear and reasonably vivid 
Moderately clear and vivid 
Vague and dim 
No image at all, you only "know" that 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
~ 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
.., 
j 
~ 
.., 
j 
3 
4 
4 
-+ 
4 
-+ 
4 
-+ 
.t 
-+ 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
Task 4 
The [mal passage is taken from Richard Crashaw's, "An Epitaph upon a Young \larried 
Couple Dead and Buried Together". Your task is to read the poem and visualize the scenes 
that are conjured by the author: 
And though they lie as they were dead, 
their pillow stone, their sheets of lead, 
Love made the bed; they'll take no harm. 
Let them sleep: let them sleep on, 
Till this stormy night be gone, 
Till the eternal morrow dawn; 
Then the curtains will be drawn 
And they wake into a light, 
Whose day shall never die in night. 
Richard Crashaw (1613-1694) 
Second Reading 
N ow try to create a mental picture of the poem. Attempt to visualize each aspect of the 
poem circling the most appropriate response as you do so: 
Can you visualize the lovers: 
1. Dead? 1 2 3 4 5 
2. Lying under a sheet of lead? 1 2 .., 
-+ 5 j 
3. Sleeping through the stormy night? 1 ! 3 4 5 
4. Waking into a light? 1 2 3 
-+ 5 
Rating scale 
The image aroused by the item may be: 
Perfectly clear and as vivid as normal vision 1 2 .., -+ ) j 
1 2 '"I 4 ) Clear and reasonably vivid j 
Moderately clear and vivid 1 2 3 -+ ) 
'"I 
.t Vague and dim 1 2 j "'\ 
'"I 
-+ 5 No image at alL you only '"know" that 1 / j 
Appendix S.S. Chronbach's Alpha Item-total Statistics for YPIQ 
Contemporary Poetry (n=194). 
Item Mean if Variance if Item Total Alpha if Item 
Deleted Item Deleted Correlation Deleted 
One 18.2917 29.1062 0.4606 0.7625 
Two 17.6406 28.8388 0.3890 0.7714 
Three 17.5052 27.5392 0.4271 0.7666 
Four 16.7031 26.5135 0.4423 0.7659 
Nine 17.8542 27.0048 0.5889 0.7421 
Ten 17.4427 25.9967 0.5920 0.7387 
Eleven 17.2706 26.2509 0.5528 0.7452 
Twelve 16.9271 25.8166 0.4674 0.7622 
Appendix 5.9. Chronbach's Alpha Item-total Statistics for VPIQ 
Traditional Epitaphic Poetry (n=194). 
Item Mean if Variance if Item Alpha if 
Item Deleted Item Deleted Correlation Item Deleted 
Thirteen 6.2500 6.9948 0.6251 0.6438 
Fourteen 5.6719 6.6300 0.5307 0.7008 
Fifteen 6.1979 7.3219 0.5891 0.6658 
Sixteen 6.1302 7.7997 0.4416 0.7422 
Appendix 5.10. Chronbach's Alpha Item-total Statistics for VPIQ 
Traditional Metaphoric Poetry (n=194). 
Item Mean if Variance if Item Alpha if 
Item Deleted Item Deleted Correlation I tern Deleted 
Five 7.4896 7.4973 0.4750 0.6246 
Six 6.1615 7.2879 0.3816 0.6918 
Seven 7.0000 6.3979 0.5647 0.5614 
Eight 7.8333 7.9825 0.5031 0.6169 
Appendix 7.1. Instructions for the Pencil and Paper Version of the 
Creative Visualization Task 
In this task you will be required to integrate three or more shapes/figures into a seen or 
object in as creative a way as possible. Once you have thought of a scene or an object \\Tite 
the title and draw a brief sketch to illustrate the use of the shapes/figures. 
EXAMPLE 
SCALES 
D 
If you were given a square. a line. and a circle you could make some scales with a weight on 
the scales. Notice from the example that you are allowed to change the size of the 
shapes/figures. However, you are not allowed to change the basic shape. Thus, a circle 
cannot become an elipse, a square an oblong, etc.. Finally you must use all the 
shapes/figures presented. 
You have ten minutes to construct three possible scenes or objects from the parts presented 
on the following pages. Try to be as creative as possible. 
Appendix 7.2. Scoring Instructions for the Pencil and Paper Version of 
the Creative Visualization Task 
SCORING SHEET INSTRUCTIONS FOR CIT (Based on Finke and Slayton. 
1988) 
The aim of the Creative Integration Task is to integrate three or more shapes into an 
object or scene in as creative a way as possible. The participants are shown the 
shapes and are told to think of the object or scene, to twrite the title. and then to make 
a brief sketch to illustrate the use of the shapes. It is measured on the basis of three 
factors. 
Factor One - number of Correct Responses 
These are the number of responses that conformed to the rules of the task: 
1. They integrated all of the given shapes. 
2. They did not include any other shapes. 
3. They provided a title 
4. The object or scene fulfilled the minimal correspondence with the title 
Factor Two - Correspondence Rating 
As a judge it is your task to rate the correspondence between the drawing and the title. 
This judgement should not be made on the basis of the quality of the drawing but 
according to the patterns correspondence - had it been skillfully drawn. The 
following rating scale is to be used: 
The correspondence of the pattern to the description is (circle the most appropriate 
response): 
Very Good Good Average Poor Very Poor 
5 4 3 2 
Factor Three - Creativity 
The final factor of interest is whether you regarded the mental synthesis as creative or 
not. Please indicate by ticking the appropriate respones: 
Creative 
Not Creative 
1 
Appendix 8.1. Digit-time only and arithmetic equivalents for the three 
symbolic distance conditions 
Table I. Digit-time only and arithmetic equivalent scores for 30 degree difference 
(correct responses are placed on the left for convenience). 
Angle ratio Digit-time only Arithmetic equivalent 
30-60 4.25 9.55 120:150 270:330 
6.35 10.00 180:210 300:360 
3.20 8.30 90:120 240:180 
60-90 12.50 7.20 360:300 210:120 
5.15 6.15 150:90 180:90 
8.50 11.40 240:300 330:240 
90-120 10.05 1l.35 300:390 330:210 
9.30 12.20 270:180 360:480 
2.55 3.55 330:420 330:450 
120-150 4.40 l.30 120:240 30:180 
12.20 2.35 360:480 60:210 
4.00 5.00 480:360 510:360 
Table II. Digit-time only and arithmetic equivalent scores for 60 
degree difference (correct responses are placed on the left for 
convenience ). 
Angle ratio Digit-time only Arithmetic equivalent 
30-90 1.10 12.45 30:60 360:270 
5.20 3.30 150:120 90:180 
8.35 4.05 240:210 120:30 
10.55 2.25 300:330 60:150 
60-120 6.20 9.25 180:120 270:150 
7.45 10.30 210:270 300:180 
3.05 1.25 90:30 30: 150 
2.20 6.50 60:120 180:300 
90-150 12.l5 7.00 360:450 210:360 
1.50 11.30 390:300 330: 180 
2.25 5.50 60:150 150:300 
10.35 9.10 300:210 270:420 
Table III. Digit-time only and arithmetic equivalent scores for 90 
degree difference (correct responses are placed on the left for 
convenience ). 
Angle ratio Digit-time only Arithmetic equivalent 
30-120 3.10 6.10 90:60 180:60 
2.15 5.45 60:90 150:270 
12.05 8.20 360:390 2..j.O:120 
4.15 2.30 120:90 60:180 
7.40 10.10 210:240 300:..t.20 
9.40 7.55 270:240 210:330 
60-150 3.25 4.45 90:150 120:270 
9.35 8.05 270:210 240:390 
12.10 10.25 360:420 300:150 
10.40 2.45 300:240 420:270 
6.40 12.35 180:240 360:210 
2.00 6.05 60:00 180:30 
Appendix 9.1. 
THE SYMBOLIC EQUIVALENCE TEST 
Name: male/female: 
Age: Occupation: 
In this test you will be asked to think of metaphors, or symbolically equivalent images, for 
certain suggested stimulus images. The task can best be made clear by an example. 
Example: 
Suggested stimulus image: 
Leaves blown in the wind. 
Possible symbolic equivalents: 
A civilian population fleeing chaotically in the face of armed aggression. 
Handkerchiefs being tossed about inside an electric dryer. 
Chips of wood borne downstream by a swiftly eddying current. 
You have 10 minutes to make up three possible equivalents for each of the fiw Images 
presented on the following page: 
a] A train going into a tunnel: 
1) 
2) 
3) 
b] A candle burning low: 
1) 
2) 
3) 
c] A ship lost in fog: 
1) 
2) 
3) 
d] Sitting alone in a dark room: 
1) 
2) 
3) 
e] Empty bookcases: 
1) 
2..:2)~ __________________ _ 
3) 
You have 10 minutes to make up three possible equivalents for each of the five images 
presented on the following page: 
a] Haystacks seen from a plane: 
1) 
2) 
3) 
b] The sound of a foghorn: 
1) 
2) 
3) 
c] A floating feather: 
1) 
2) 
3) 
d] The increasing loud and steady sound of a drum: 
1 ) 
2) 
3) 
e] Tall trees in the middle of a field: 
1) 
2) 
3) 
TEST DETAILS 
The symbolic equivalence test was designed by F.Barron. The present form was derived 
from: 
Barron, F. (1988). Putting creativity to work. In Sternberg, R.J. (Ed.), The nature of 
creativity (pp. 76-98). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
MARKING PROCEDURE 
The test is scored on the basis of: 
1) Number of acceptable, but not original, responses - grades 1.2 or 3 on the level of 
aptness. 
2) Original responses - grades 4 or 5 according to degree of originality. 
3) Scores summed over the 10 images. 
Barron claims that the grading should be carried out by at least two markers and that a level 
of marking validity can be derived from comparison. It is also noted that the marking 
becomes more accurate with experience of using the test. 
Here are some example marks from Barron (1988, pp. 87-88): 
1. Stimulus image: 
A candle burning low 
Admissible responses: 
Life ebbing away 
A basin of water emptying down a drain 
The last drops of coffee going through a filter 
The last pages of a faded book 
The last hand in a gambler's card game 
2) Stimulus image: 
Empty bookcase: 
Admissible responses: 
A hollow log 
An empty sack 
An abandoned beehive 
An arsenal without weapons 
A haunted house 
(scored 1) 
(scored 2) 
(scored 3) 
(scored 4) 
(scored 5) 
(scored 1) 
(scored 2) 
(scored 3) 
(scored 4) 
(scored 5) 
Appendix 10.1. Pictorial Representations of the Symbolic Equiyalence 
Task 
Appendix 9.1. 
THE SYMBOLIC EQUIVALENCE TEST 
Name: male/female: 
Age: Occupation: 
In this test you will be asked to think of metaphors, or symbolically equivalent images. for 
celtain suggested stimulus images. The task can best be made clear by an example. 
Example: 
Suggested stirnul us image: 
Leaves blown in the wind. 
Possible symbolic equivalents: 
A civilian population fleeing chaotically in the face of armed aggression. 
Handkerchiefs being tossed about inside an electric dryer. 
Chips of wood borne downstream by a swiftly eddying current. 
Task 2 
The next passage is part of a poem written by Robert Herrick ( 1591-167-+) called ""10 the 
Virgins, to Make Much of Time". Your task is to read the poem and yisualize the ~cenc~ 
that are conjured by the author: 
Gather ye rosebuds while ye may. 
Old time is still a-flying; 
And this same flower that smiled today 
Tomorrow will be dying. 
Robert Herrick (1591-1674) 
Second Reading 
Now try to create a mental picture of the poem. Attempt to visualize each aspect of the 
poem circling the most appropriate response as you do so: 
Can you visualize: 
1. Gathering rosebuds? 1 'l "l 
-+ 5 
-
J 
2. Old time flying? 1 2 "l 
-+ 5 -) 
3. A flower smiling? 1 'l "l 
-+ 5 
-
-) 
4. A flower dying? 1 'l "l -+ 5 
-
-) 
Rating scale 
The image aroused by the item may be: 
Perfectly clear and as vivid as normal vision 1 'l "l -+ ) 
-
J 
Clear and reasonably vivid 1 2 3 -+ 5 
Moderately clear and vivid 1 J 3 -+ 5 
1 'l "l -t 5 Vague and dim 
-
J 
No image at all, you only ""know" that 1 J 3 -+ 5 
Task 3 
The third piece of writing is taken from T.S.Eliofs, "The Loye Song of J..-\lfred Prufrock". 
Y our task is to read the poem and visualize the scenes that are conjured by the author. 
1 have heard the mermaids singing, each to each. 
1 do not think the)' lrill sing to me. 
1 have seen them ride seaward on the 1\,[[1'eS 
Combing the lrhite hair of the waves blown back 
TVhen the 'wind blows the water white and black. 
We have lingered in the chambers of the sea 
By seagirls wreathed It'ith seaweed red and brown 
Till human l'oices wake us, and 11'e drovm. 
T.S.Elliot (1888-1965) 
Now try to create a mental picture of the poem. Attempt to visualize each aspect of the 
poem circling the most appropriate response as you do so: 
Can you visualize: 
1. Mermaids riding seaward on the waves? 1 , " 
-+ 5 
-
.J 
2. Combing the white hair of the waves? 1 2 " 
-+ 5 .J 
3. Seagirls wreathed with seaweed red and brown? 1 , '" 4 5 
-
.J 
4. Being woken to drown? 1 ! " 
-+ 5 .J 
~---
Rating scale 
The image aroused by the item may be: 
Perfectly clear and as vivid as normal vision 1 ! '" -+ ) J 
Clear and reasonably viyid 1 2 " -+ '" .J 
Moderately clear and vivid 1 , 3 -+ 5 
-
'" 
-t Vague and dim 1 ) J ) 
'" -+ 5 No image at all. you only --know" that 1 , J 
-
Task 4 
The final passage is taken from Richard Crashaw's, "An Epitaph upon a Young \larricd 
Couple Dead and Buried Together". Your task is to read the poem and visualize the scenes 
that are conjured by the author: 
And though they lie as they 11'ere dead, 
their pillow stone, their sheets of lead, 
Love made the bed; they'll take no harm. 
Let them sleep: let them sleep on, 
Till this stormy night be gone, 
Till the eternal morrow dawn; 
Then the curtains will be dravvn 
And they wake into a light, 
Whose day shall never die in night. 
Richard Crashaw (1613-1694) 
Second Reading 
Now try to create a mental picture of the poem. Attempt to visualize each aspect of th~ 
poem circling the most appropriate response as you do so: 
Can you visualize the lovers: 
1. Dead? 1 2 .., ..j. 5 .J 
2. Lying under a sheet of lead? 1 I 3 -+ 5 
3. Sleeping through the stormy night? 1 2 3 ..j. 5 
4. Waking into a light? 1 2 3 
-+ 5 
----
Rating scale 
The image aroused by the item may be: 
Perfectly clear and as vivid as normal vision 1 ') .., ..j. 5 .) 
1 2 .., ..j. =' Clear and reasonably vivid .) 
Moderately clear and vivid 1 I 3 ..j. 5 -
.., 
..J Vague and dim 1 I -) =' -
I .., 
-+ 5 No image at all. you only --know" that 1 
-
J 
Appendix 5.8. Chronbach's Alpha Item-total Statistics for YPIQ Contemporary 
Poetry (n=194). 
Item Mean if Variance if Item Total Alpha if Item 
Deleted Item Deleted Correlation Deleted 
One 18.2917 29.1062 0.4606 O. 76~5 
Two 17.6406 28.8388 0.3890 0.771-1-
Three 17.5052 27.5392 0.4271 0.7666 
Four 16.7031 26.5135 0.4423 0.7659 
Nine 17.8542 27.0048 0.5889 0.7-1-~ 1 
Ten 17.4427 25.9967 0.5920 0.7387 
Eleven 17.2706 26.2509 0.5528 0.7-1-)=: 
Twelve 16.9271 25.8166 0.467-1- 0.762=: 
Appendix 5.9. Chronbach's Alpha Item-total Statistics for VPIQ Traditional 
Epitaphic Poetry (n=194). 
Item 
Thirteen 
Fourteen 
Fifteen 
Sixteen 
Mean if 
I tern Deleted 
6.2500 
5.6719 
6.1979 
6.1302 
Variance if 
Item Deleted 
6.9948 
6.6300 
7.3219 
7.7997 
Item Alpha if 
Correlation Item Deleted 
0.6251 0.6-+38 
0.5307 0.7008 
0.5891 0.6658 
0.4416 0.7-+22 
Appendix 5.10. Chronbach's Alpha Item-total Statistics for VPIQ Traditional 
Metaphoric Poetry (n=194). 
Item Mean if Variance if Item Alpha if 
Item Deleted I tern Deleted Correlation Item Deleted 
Five 7.4896 7.4973 0.4750 0.6246 
Six 6.1615 7.2879 0.3816 0.6918 
Seven 7.0000 6.3979 0.5647 0.5614 
Eight 7.8333 7.9825 0.5031 0.6169 
Appendix 7.1. Instructions for the Pencil and Paper Version of the Creative 
Visualization Task 
In this task you will be required to integrate three or more shapes/figures into a seen or 
object in as creative a way as possible Once you have thought of a b" 
. scene or an 0 J ect \\Tlk' 
the title and draw a brief sketch to illustrate the use of the shapes/figures. 
EXAMPLE 
SCALES 
D 
If you were given a square, a line. and a circle you could make some scales with a \\eight lll1 
the scales. Notice from the example that you are allowed to change the size of the 
shapes/figures. However, you are not allowed to change the basic shape. Thus. a circle 
cannot become an elipse, a square an oblong. etc.. Finally you must use all the 
shapes/figures presented. 
You have ten minutes to construct three possible scenes or objects from the parts prc~ented 
on the following pages. Try to be as creative as possible. 
Appendix 7.2. Scoring Instructions for thfencil and Paper Version of the Creative 
Visualization Task 
SCORING SHEET INSTRUCTIONS FOR CIT (Based on Finke and Slayton. 
1988) 
The aim of the Creative Integration Task is to integrate three or more shapes into an 
object or scene in as creative a way as possible. The participants are shown the 
shapes and are told to think of the object or scene. to twrite the title, and then to make 
a brief sketch to illustrate the use of the shapes. It is measured on the basis of three 
factors. 
Factor One - number of Correct Responses 
These are the number of responses that conformed to the rules of the task: 
1. They integrated all of the given shapes. 
2. They did not include any other shapes. 
3. They provided a title 
4. The object or scene fulfilled the minimal correspondence with the title 
Factor Two - Correspondence Rating 
As a judge it is your task to rate the correspon~ence betwee? the drawing ~nd the title. 
This judgement should not be made on the basI~ of the q~ahty of the drawmg but 
according to the patterns correspondence - had It been skIllfully drawn. The 
following rating scale is to be used: 
The correspondence of the pattern to the description is (circle the most appropriate 
response): 
Very Good Good Average Poor Very Poor 
5 4 3 
Factor Three - Creativity 
The final factor of interest is whether you regarded the mental synthesis as creative or 
not. Please indicate by ticking the appropriate respones: 
Creative 
Not Creative 
1 
Appendix 8.1. Digit-time only and arithmetic equivalents for the three symbolic 
distance conditions 
Table I. Digit-time only and arithmetic equivalent scores for 30 degree difference 
(correct responses are placed on the left for convenience). 
Angle ratio Digit-time only Arithmetic equivalent 
30-60 4.25 9.55 120:150 270:330 
6.35 10.00 180:210 300:360 
3.20 8.30 90:120 240: 180 
60-90 12.50 7.20 360:300 210:120 
5.15 6.15 150:90 180:90 
8.50 11.40 240:300 330:240 
90-120 10.05 1l.35 300:390 330:210 
9.30 12.20 270:180 360:480 
2.55 " -5 J.) 330:420 330:450 
120-150 4.40 l.30 120:240 30: 180 
12.20 ? " -_.J) 360:480 60:210 
4.00 5.00 480:360 510:360 
Table III. Digit-time only and arithmetic equivalent scores for 90 degree difference 
(correct responses are placed on the left for convenience). 
Angle ratio Digit-time only Arithmetic equivalent 
30-120 3.10 6.10 90:60 180:60 
2.15 5.45 60:90 150:270 
12.05 8.20 360:390 240:120 
4.15 2.30 120:90 60: 180 
7.40 10.10 210:240 300:420 
9.40 7.55 270:240 210:330 
60-150 3.25 4.45 90: 150 120:270 
9.35 8.05 270:210 240:390 
12.10 10.25 360:420 300: 150 
10.40 2.45 300:240 420:270 
6.40 12.35 180:240 360:210 
2.00 6.05 60:00 180:30 
You have 10 minutes to make up three possible equivalents for each of the five Images 
presented on the following page: 
a] A train going into a tunnel: 
1) 
2) 
3) 
b] A candle burning low: 
1) 
2) 
3) 
c] A ship lost in fog: 
1) 
2) 
3) 
d] Sitting alone in a dark room: 
1) 
2) 
3) 
e] Empty bookcases: 
1 ) 
2) 
3) 
You have 10 minutes to make up three possible equivalents for each of the five images 
presented on the following page: 
a] Haystacks seen from a plane: 
1 ) 
2) 
3) 
b] The sound of a foghorn: 
1) 
2) 
3) 
c] A floating feather: 
1) 
2) 
3) 
d] The increasing loud and steady sound of a drum: 
1 ) 
2) 
3) 
e] Tall trees in the middle of a field: 
1 ) 
2) 
3) 
TEST DETAILS 
The symbolic equivalence test was designed by F.Barron. The present form was derived 
from: 
Barron, F. (1988). Putting creativity to work. In Sternben!, R.1. (Ed.). The nalUre of 
creatil'ity (pp. 76-98). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
MARKING PROCEDURE 
The test is scored on the basis of: 
1) Number of acceptable, but not original, responses - grades 1,2 or 3 on the level of 
aptness. 
2) Original responses - grades 4 or 5 according to degree of originality. 
3) Scores summed over the 10 images. 
Barron claims that the grading should be carried out by at least two markers and that a level 
of marking validity can be derived from comparison. It is also noted that the marking 
becomes more accurate with experience of using the test. 
Here are some example marks from Barron (1988, pp. 87-88): 
1 . Stimulus image: 
A candle burning low 
Admissible responses: 
Life ebbing away 
A basin of water emptying down a drain 
The last drops of coffee going through a filter 
The last pages of a faded book 
The last hand in a gambler's card game 
2) Stimulus image: 
Empty bookcase: 
Admissible responses: 
A hollow log 
An empty sack 
An abandoned beehive 
An arsenal without weapons 
A haunted house 
(scored 1) 
(scored 2) 
(scored 3) 
(scored 4) 
(scored 5) 
(scored 1) 
(scored 2) 
(scored 3) 
(scored 4) 
(scored 5) 
Appendices 
Appendix 4.1 Evaluations of Effect Size, Power, and Sample Size 
Requirements in 6 Studies of the Association Between Self-reported 
Imagery and Creativity. 
Study Imagery Creativity I\' Effect Power Predicted 
Measure Measure Size of Stud> S3.mpk SIZe" 
B (1978) VVIQ St. Conseguences 32 0.49 0.9281 "l"l 
C & P (1989) VES TTCT Fig. Ruency 122 0.2-+ 08578 103 
" " " " " " TTCT Fig. Rex. 122 0.23 08291 113 
" " " " 
TTCT Fig. Orig. 122 0.1-+ OA(13.+ 311 
" " " " " " 
TTCT Fig. Elab. P2 0.21 0.762-+ 136 
F (1981) BQMI TTCT Verb. Ru. 320 0.12 0.8578 .+25 
" " " " 
TTCT Verb. Rex. 320 Not Reported ------ Non-Significant 
" " " " 
TTCT Verb. Orig. 320 Not Reported ------ Non-Significant 
TVIC TTCT Verb. Ru. 320 0.15 0.8562 270 
" " TTCT Verb .. Rex. 320 0.20 0.9772 150 
" " 
TTCT Verb. Orig. 320 0.18 0.9'+76 187 
P & S (1985) VVIQ TTCT Verb. Ru. 70 Not Reported ------- Non-Significant 
" " 
TTCT Verb. Rex. 70 Not Reported ------- Non-Significant 
" " 
TTCT Verb. Orig .. 70 Not Reported ------- Non-Significant 
" " " " 
TTCT Verb. Total. 70 Not Reported ------- Non-Significant 
" " 
TTCT Fig. Ru .. 70 0.31 0.8546 60 
" " 
TTCT Fig. Rex. 70 Not Reported ------- Non-Significant 
" " " " " " 
TTCT Fig. Elab. 70 0.3'+** 0.9116 63 
" " TVIC TTCT Verb. Ru. 70 
Not Reported ------- Non-Significant 
" " " " " " 
TTCT Verb. Rex. 70 Not Reported ------- Nnn-Significant 
" " " " " " 
TTCT Verb. Orig. 70 t\ot Reported ------- Non-Signiflclnt 
" " " " " " 
TTCT Verb. Total 70 Not Reported ------- Non-Significant 
" " " " 
TTCT Fig. Ru. 70 Not Reported ------- t"on-Significant 
" " 
TTCT Fig. Orig. 70 Not Reported -------
I\'un- SI pllrll"~lllt 
" " 
TTCT Fig. Elab .. 70 0.3-+ 0911 h -+9 
S & B (1982-83) VVIQ 
" " 11 " 
" " 
S & D (1986) VVlQ 
" " 
" " 
" " " " 
" " 
" " 
" " TVIC 
" " " " 
" " " " 
" " " " 
" " " " 
" " " " 
RAT 
ITCT Verb. Total 
ITCT Fig. Total 
ITCT Verb. Ru 
ITCT Verb. Rex. 
TTCT Verb. Orig 
TTCT Fig. Ru. 
TTCT Fig. Flex. 
TTCT Fig. 0rig 
ITCT Verb. Flu 
TTCT Verb. Rex. 
TTCT Verb. Orig 
ITCT Fig. Flu. 
TTCT Fig. FlC\ 
TTCT Fig. On; 
67 
67 
67 
8-1-
8-1-
8-1-
84 
8-1-
~-1-
8..:1-
84 
84 
8..:1-
84 
8-1-
0.19 
0.2-1-
0.29 
0.1-1-
0.005 
0.076 
0.38 
0.18 
0.131 
0.179 
0.046 
0.062 
0.292 
0.021 
0.00 I 
0.4692 
0.6397 
0.7909 
0.3701 
0.9816 
0-1-921 
0.3286 
0.0.5035 
0.8708 
16-:-
103 
69 
311 
39 
I~C 
356 
189 
68 
Appendix 5.l.Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire 
Eyes Open 
Visual imagery refers to the ability to visualize, that is, the ability to fonn mental pictures. or to "~cc in 
the mind's eye". Marked individual differences have been found in the strength and clarity ,)f reported visual 
imagery and these differences are of considerable psychological interest. 
The aim of this test is to detennine the vi \'idness of your \isual imagery. The items of the test will 
possibly bring certain images to your mind. You are asked to rate the vividness of each image hy reference 
to the 5-point scale given below. For example, if your image is "vague and dim" then gi\'e it a rating of -l. 
Before you turn to the items on the next page, familiarize yourself with the different categories on the ratin~ 
scale. Throughout the test, refer to the rating scale when judging the \'ividness of each image. Try to do 
each item separately, independent of how you have done other items. Complete all items for images 
obtained with the eyes open. 
Rating Scale 
The image aroused by the item might be: 
Perfectly clear and as vivid as nonnal vision 1 2 3 S 
Clear and reasonably vivid 1 2. 3 ) 
Moderately clear and \'ivid 1 
-, ~ S 
Vague and dim 2 3 :! s 
No image at all, you only "know" that 1 2 3 ~ 
you are thinking of an object 
In answering items 1 to 4 think of some relative or friend whom you frequently see I but who is not with 
you at present) and consider carefully the picture that comes before your mind's e) e. 
Item 
1. The exact contour of face, head, shoulders 
and body. 
2. Characteristic poses of head, attitudes 
of body, etc. 
3. The precise carriage, length of step, etc. 
in walking. 
4. The different colours worn in some 
familiar clothes. 
1 ') 3 
1 ') 
2 3 
1 2 3 
Visualize the rising sun. Consider carefully the picture that comes before your mind's eye. 
Item 
5. The sun is rising above the horizon into 
a hazy sky. 
6. The sky clears and surrounds the sun 
with blueness 
7. Clouds. A storm blows up, with flashes 
of lightening. 
8. A rainbow appears. 
Rating Scale 
The image aroused by the item might be: 
Perfectly clear and as vivid as normal vision 
Clear and reasonably vivid 
Moderately clear and ,i,id 
Vague and dim 
No image at alL you only "know" that 
you are thinking of an object 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 3 
2 3 
2 3 
2 3 
') 3 -l 
1 3 -l 
') J. -l 
') 3 :! 
2 .3 -+ 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
.'\ 
~ 
Think of the front of a shop you often go to. Consider the picture that comes before )nur mind's eye 
Item 
9. The overall appearance of the shop from the 
opposite side of the road. 
10. A window display including colours, shapes 
and details of individual items for sale. 
11. You are near the entrance. The colour, shape 
and details of the door. 
12. You enter the shop and go to the counter. The 
counter assistant serves you. Money changes 
hands. 
1 3 
1 3 
3 
3 5 
Finally, think of a country scene which involves trees, mountains and a lake. Consider the picture that 
comes before your mind's eye. 
Item 
13. The contours of the landscape 1 2 3 5 
1 .. t-. The colour and shape of the tree 2 3 5 
15. The colour and shape of the lake 1 2 3 5 
16. A strong wind blows on the trees '} 3 5 -
and on the lake causing waves. 
Rating Scale 
The image aroused by the item might be: 
Perfectly clear and as vivid as normal vision 1 1 3 4 .) 
Clear and reasonabl) vivid '} 3 4 .) 
Moderately clear and "ivid 
'} 
-
1 4 5 
1 3 :!. .) Vague and dim -
1 , ..j. ~ No image at aIL YOll only "know" that - J 
Appendix 5.2. Scree Plot of Factors Emerging following a PCA on the Eye-open 
Version of the VVIQ (0=198) 
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Appendix 5.3. Chronbach's Alpha Item-total Statistics for YYIQ ;\ature Scenes 
(n=198) 
Item Mean if Item Variance if Item Alpha if item 
Deleted Item deleted correlation deleted 
Five 16.8939 32.-+405 0.579-+ 0.8610 
Six 16.9444 33.2304 0.-+885 0.8712 
Seven 16.7980 32.2940 0.5698 0.8658 
Eight 16.8232 33.7673 0.-+735 0.876-+ 
Thirteen 16.7828 33.7648 0.5259 0.8667 
Fourteen 16.8458 3-+.4439 0.4965 0.8706 
Fifteen 16.8737 32.1261 0.5715 0.8615 
Sixteen 16.7273 33.4988 0.-+161 0.8718 
Alpha = 0.8827 
Standardised Item Alpha = 0.8841 
Appendix SA. Chronbach's Alpha Item-total Statistics for \ vlQ Person Scenes 
(0=198) 
Item Mean if Item Variance if Item A.lpha if item 
Deleted Item deleted correlation deleted 
One 6.6970 6.2833 0.-+ 7-:"9 0.7298 
Two 6.6126 6.1869 0.4649 0.7303 
Three 5.9343 5.8586 0.4288 0.736-1-
Four 6.7222 6.4453 o ')-~I ._).L 0.8088 
Alpha = 0.8017 
Standardised Item Alpha = 0.8052 
Appendix 5.5. Chronbach's Alpha Item-total Statistics for \ 'YIQ Shop Scenes 
(n=198) 
Item Mean if Variance if Item Alpha if item 
Item Deleted Item deleted correlation deleted 
Nine 7.0960 5.5694 0.4096 0.6666 
Ten 6.5202 5.5199 0.3427 0.7020 
Eleven 6.6869 5.6833 0.3005 0.7160 
Twelve 7.3182 6.4008 0.2761 0.7368 
Alpha = 0.7625 
Standardised Item Alpha = 0.7631 
Appendix 5.6 The Test of Visual Imagery Control 
Name: 
Male or Female: Occupation: 
Read each question, then close your eyes while you try to \-isualize the scene described. 
Record your answer by underlining "Yes", "No" or "Unsure", \vhicheyer is the most 
appropriate. Remember that your accurate and honest ans\\er to these questions is most 
important for the validity of this study. If you have any doubts at all regarding the 311S\\Cr 
to a question, underline "Unsure". Please be sure that you answer each of the t\yche 
questions. 
1. Can you see a car standing in the road 
in front of the house? 
2. Can you see it in colour? 
3. Can you see it in a different colour? 
4. Can you now see the same car lying upside down? 
5. Can you now see the same car back on its four 
wheels again? 
6. Can you see the car running along the road? 
7. Can you see it climb up a very steep hill? 
8. Can you see it climb over the top? 
9. Can you see it get out of control and crash 
through a house? 
10. Can you now see the same car running along 
the road with a handsome couple inside? 
11. Can you see the car cross a bridge and fall? 
over the side into a stream below? 
12. Can you see the car all old and dismantled 
in a car cemetary? 
Yes No Unsure 
Yes No Unsure 
Yes No Unsure 
Yes No Unsure 
Yes No Unsure 
Yes No Unsure 
Yes No Unsure 
Yes No Unsure 
Yes No Unsure 
Yes No Unsure 
Yes No L Tnsure 
'{es No L'nsure 
Appendix 5.7. The Vividness of Poetry Imagery Questionnaire 
The aim of the task is to assess your ability to create a mental picture of passages extracted 
from well known pieces of creative writing. The work has been specially selected for its use 
of language that evokes mental imagery. This is the realm of the fi\"e senses. where podry 
requires the creation of perceptual representation. For example. much of the poetry writh.'n 
by the Lake Poets contains language that can be translated into a pictorial form: 
1 wandered lonely as a cloud 
that floats 0 'er vales and hills. 
Willaim Wordsworth (1770-1850) 
For hope grew round me, like the twining l'ine, 
And fruits, and foliage, not my own, seemed mine. 
Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772-1834) 
You will be asked to read each passage twice. The first time you will read the whole 
passage imagining the scenes as they come before you. The second reading \vill involve 
breaking the passage into elements that can be rated according to the imagery evoked. You 
are free to perform this task with your eyes open or closed - whatever is the most effective. 
You should rate the vividness of each image according to the rating scale given below. Refer 
to the rating scale after each response. Remember that vour accurate response is vital. 
Finally, answer each question separately. 
Rating scale 
The image aroused by the item may be: 
Perfectly clear and as \'ivid as normal vision 1 2 ..., -t ) .J 
Clear and reasonably vivid 1 2 
..., 
-t 'I .J 
Moderately clear and vivid 1 2 3 -t ) 
1 , ..., -t ) Vague and dim - -) 
..., 
-t 5 No image at alL you only ""know" that 1 2 -) 
I. 
2. 
5 
Sitting Alone in a Dark 
Room 
A Ship lost in Fog 
1. 
4 
s 
A Ship lost in og 
1. 
3 
4. 
s 
A candle burning low 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
A candle burning low 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4 
5 
l. 
2. 
3 
Sitting Alo e in a Dark 
Room 
:' , 
.', \ ." . 
. . .. . 
. " 
" '. :c :_ '.;.-:, :~/f :/:~, <: ~: ,>~, .. :';~:' : ~ .. :' 
~ ~ " 
--- -
'\ ~, , . - . 
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.- • - - (~':J 
.. ..... ... 
Tall Trees in the Middle 
of a Field 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4 
" '", 
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Tall Trees in the Middle 
of a Field 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5 
Task 1 
The following passage is taken from a poem by Nikki Giovanni (1972) called the .. \\Tinter 
Poem". Your task is to read the poem and yisualize the scenes that are conjured by the 
author: 
Once a snowflake fell 
on my brow and i loved 
it so much and i kissed 
it and it was happy and called its cousins 
and brothers and a \1'ch 
of snow engulfed me then 
i reached to love them all 
and i squeezed them and they became 
a spring rain and i stood pelfectly 
still and was a flower 
Nikki Giovanni (1943- ) 
Second Reading 
Now try to create a mental picture of the poem. Attempt to visualize each aspect of the 
poem circling the most appropriate response as you do so: 
Can you visualize: 
1. A snowflake falling on to your brow? 1 ! .., -l 5 j 
2. A web of snow engulfing you? 1 2 3 -l 5 
3. Squeezing snow into spring rain? 1 ! 3 4 5 
4. Turning into a flower? 1 ! .., 4 :) j 
Rating scale 
The image aroused by the item may be: 
Perfectly clear and as vivid as normal vision 1 ! .., -l 5 
-
_1 
Clear and reasonably vivid 1 2 
.., 
-l =' .) 
Moderately clear and vivid 1 ! 3 -l ~ 
1 I .., .t =' Vague and dim - .) 
.., 
-l 5 No image at all, you only "know" that 1 I j 
-
